The old century
had come to an end and the United States, its armed services triumphant
from victory in a splendid little war over a technologically inferior
adversary, was ready to take its rightful place among the major military
and economic powers of the world. A former assistant secretary of the
Navy, who became a national hero in that war, was soon to become president
and use his bully pulpit for, among other things, the building of a Great
White Fleet that was the first step in making the United States a naval
power "second to none."
That former
assistant secretary, later president, Theodore Roosevelt, was a shrewd
judge of human nature and a lifelong student of American history. He knew
that most of his fellow Americans had little if any interest in foreign
affairs, or in national-security issues in general. Roosevelt himself was
a staunch advocate of the seapower principles postulated by Alfred Thayer
Mahan, whom he greatly admired. So to remedy the situation he helped found
the Navy League of the United States in 1902, contributing significant
financial as well as moral support.
There were many,
of course, in the Congress and in the media—indeed, in Roosevelt’s own
cabinet—who were not sure that the Great White Fleet was needed. It cost
too much and, despite its fine appearance, would have little if any
practical value for a nation unchallenged in its own hemisphere and
unlikely ever to send its sons to fight in Europe’s wars, much less Asia’s.
Besides, there might be an occasional colonial war here and there, but the
possibility of a direct war between the major powers of Europe was
becoming more and more remote with each passing year.
Within less than
five years the vision of a lasting peace throughout the world was
demolished when the Japanese Navy shocked the world by defeating the
Russian Navy in the Battle of Tsushima (27-28 May 1905), sinking eight
Russian battleships and seven Russian cruisers. The Japanese fleet, which
started the war a year earlier with a surprise attack on Russian ships
anchored in Port Arthur, lost three torpedo boats at Tsushima.
Less than a
decade later The Great War—"the war to end all wars," it was
called—started in Europe. The United States remained a nonparticipant
until April 1917, but then entered the war in force. U.S. seapower
contributed significantly to the eventual Allied success. The joyous
Armistice of 11 November 1918, however, was followed by the debacle at
Versailles that sowed the seeds of World War II.
Again, America
and its allies were not prepared. The United States once again stayed on
the sidelines until jolted out of its lethargy by the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor. That put 15 million American men and women in uniform, led
to total mobilization of the U.S. economy—and of the mighty U.S.
industrial base—and resulted millions of deaths later in the
unconditional surrender of both Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. The
century was less than half over, but it was already the most violent in
all human history.
This time around,
some lessons were learned—but not very well, and they were not
remembered very long. When North Korea invaded South Korea the United
States again was unprepared—as it was a generation later in Vietnam. The
Cold War cast a nuclear shadow over the entire world for more than four
decades, though, and forced the much-needed rebuilding, modernization, and
upgrading of America’s armed forces.
As the world
enters a new century, and new millennium, those forces are the most
powerful, most mobile, and most versatile in the world. Moreover, the
young Americans in service today are the best-led, best-trained, and
best-equipped in this nation’s history. But that does not mean that they
are capable of carrying out all of the numerous difficult and exceedingly
complex missions they have been assigned. The victories of the past are no
guarantee of success in future conflicts. And it is not foreordained that
the so-called "American century" that has now ended will be
extended by another uninterrupted period of U.S. economic and military
dominance.
Operation Allied
Force, the U.S./NATO air war over Kosovo, is a helpful case in point. The
precision strikes against Serbian forces, and against the civilian
infrastructure of the former Yugoslavia, eventually led to the withdrawal
of Serbian troops from Kosovo and the occupation of that battered province
by U.S./NATO and Russian peacekeepers. The one-sided "war"
lasted much longer than originally estimated, though. It did not
"stop the killings" (of ethnic Albanians), the original purpose
of the war. And it left Slobodan Milosevic still in power in Belgrade.
It is perhaps
inevitable that political leaders will focus almost exclusively on the
"victories"—however fleeting and however gossamer—that can
be claimed. The prudent military commander, though, will focus on the
problem areas, the near-defeats and potential disasters, the
"What-ifs" and the close calls. There were an abundance of all
of these in Kosovo last year—just as there were in the war with Iraq in
1990-91.
Logistics is the
first and perhaps most important of those problem areas—and the biggest
"What if" as well. In both conflicts. In the war with Iraq the
question was "What if Saddam Hussein had not stopped with Kuwait but
continued into Saudi Arabia and all the way to Riyadh?" The answer—on
this, virtually all military analysts agree—is that the war would have
lasted much longer and would have cost much more in both lives and money.
As it was, it took the greatest sealift in history before the vastly
superior U.S./coalition forces could defeat the previously overrated Iraqi
army. That massive sealift—more than 10 million tons of supplies carried
halfway around the world—would have been impossible, though, were it not
for the fact that, on the receiving end, Saudi Arabia had built a large,
modern, and well-protected port infrastructure.
Logistics was not
a problem in Kosovo, either—but only because the U.S./NATO air forces
accomplished their mission (belatedly), and ground forces did not have to
be brought in. It was a close call, though—more so than is generally
realized—and the end result was due more to good fortune than to careful
planning. The ports in the area that might have been available to
U.S./NATO shipping are few in number, inefficient, extremely limited in
their throughput capacity, and vulnerable both to sabotage and to attack
by ground forces. Which is exactly why U.S. sealift planners say that a
ground war in Kosovo would have been "a logistics nightmare."
Nightmares aside,
there are other problems, of much greater magnitude, affecting all of the
nation’s armed forces. All are underfunded. All are overcommitted—usually,
in recent years, to humanitarian and peacekeeping missions that, however
worthwhile in themselves, detract from operational readiness and from the
training required for actual combat missions.
There is more:
The U.S. defense structure is the leanest it has been in the post-WWII
era. Funding for the acquisition and procurement of ships, aircraft,
weapons, and avionics/electronics systems has been cut precipitously in
recent years and the result has been a steady decline in the size—and,
therefore, responsiveness—of the vital U.S. defense industrial base.
Except for the
Marine Corps, all of the services also are suffering from prolonged
recruiting and retention problems that, if not resolved, will lead to a
"hollow force" of the early 21st century similar to that of the
late 1970s. There is increasing evidence, anecdotal but mounting, that
combat readiness has declined.
Following are
some particulars about how the various problem areas enumerated above have
affected the nation’s sea services—balanced by a report on the current
strengths and capabilities, as well as needs, of each service.
Since the end of
the Cold War the Navy’s active fleet has been cut almost in half, and is
now just over 300 ships, the lowest level since the early 1930s. What
makes the situation worse is that the administration’s future-years
defense plan (FYDP) calls for construction of only 6-7 ships per year for
the foreseeable future, whereas a building rate of 9–10 ships is needed
to meet the minimum requirement of 305 ships postulated by the Quadrennial
Defense Review. Independent defense analysts say that a more realistic
estimate of Navy fleet requirements would be anywhere from 350 to 400
ships, depending on the scenarios postulated. To maintain a fleet of that
size would require a building rate of 10–12 ships per year.
Exacerbating the
ship-numbers problem is the fact that, because hundreds of Cold War U.S.
air and ground bases overseas have now been closed, and hundreds of
thousands of troops have returned to CONUS (the Continental United
States), a much heavier share of the collective defense burden is now
borne by the Navy’s forward-deployed carrier battle groups (CVBGs) and
Navy/Marine Corps amphibious ready groups (ARGs). In many areas of the
world the CVBGs and ARGs are now the only combat-ready forces immediately
available to the national command authorities.
The difficulties
imposed on Navy carriers are particularly heavy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
have told Congress that a minimum of 15 active-fleet carriers are needed
to maintain a continuous presence in the most likely areas of
international crisis—i.e., the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean, and the
Western Pacific (particularly the waters off the Korean Peninsula and,
more recently, in the Taiwan Strait between the People’s Republic of
China on the mainland and the Republic of China on Taiwan). With only 12
carriers now available—11 in the active fleet and one reserve carrier
used primarily for training purposes—the Navy has had to adopt a
"gapping" strategy that leaves one or more of these "hot
spots" without a carrier for several weeks, or sometimes months, at a
time. In today’s fast-paced era of naval warfare, the Navy League said
last year, the gapping strategy is "not a prudent risk, as it is
sometimes described, but an invitation to conflict."
The Navy’s
fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) is the best in the
world, but also undersized to meet all current as well as projected
commitments. According to force requirements provided to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff by the regional commanders in chief, more than 70 SSNs are needed
to meet all of the Navy’s worldwide commitments—but there will be only
50 available unless the QDR levels are revised upward. This could pose
major risks in areas where land-based enemy aircraft and missiles make it
difficult for carriers and other surface ships to operate close to the
littorals.
The Navy’s SSBN
(nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine) force continues to be the
dominant and most survivable leg of the U.S. strategic-deterrent
"triad" of SSBNs, manned bombers, and intercontinental ballistic
missiles. There are now 18 Trident SSBNs in the active fleet, but only 14
are likely to be needed in the future. The proposed conversion into an
SSGN (nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine) configuration of the four
SSBNs now slated for deactivation would add significantly to the Navy’s
overall power-projection capabilities and compensate to some extent for
current deficiencies in surface combatants.
Perhaps the
brightest stars in the current fleet inventory are the Aegis
guided-missile cruisers and destroyers that played such a key role in the
Gulf War and in several lower-scale combat actions since then. The
combat-proven effectiveness of the Aegis fleet has made it a strong
candidate to serve as the principal building block for the
national-missile-defense system favored by Congress and likely to be built
in the first decade of the new century.
Navy aircraft and
weapon systems also are the best and most technologically sophisticated in
the world. Because of the continued underfunding in procurement and
acquisition, however, all of these fleet assets have been considerably
overworked, a spare parts shortage has developed, and the maintenance
workload has increased significantly.
The U.S. Marine
Corps has changed commandants, but continues the march—and its proud
tradition of always being "the most ready when the nation is least
ready."
That mandate from
Congress is more daunting on the eve of the 21st century than it has been
at any previous time since the dark days preceding World War II and the
Korean War. In both of those conflicts the Marines suffered a
disproportionate number of casualties, particularly in the early months of
fighting—primarily because forward-deployed Marine units had to hold the
line until the nation (and the other armed forces) could catch up to the
Marines in readiness.
Today, all of the
nation’s armed services are in a reasonable state of readiness. But the
operating tempo is the highest it has ever been in peacetime, and most
deployments in the past several years have been for humanitarian and
peacekeeping assignments rather than for combat missions. Training has
suffered, therefore, and there has been a slow but steady degradation of
combat readiness—well-documented in hearings before the House Armed
Services Committee.
Under former
commandant Gen. Charles C. Krulak the USMC’s senior leaders developed a
cogent and forward-looking plan to field a 21st-century Marine Corps that
will be fully combat-ready to meet the assymetric challenges likely in the
foreseeable future. It will be up to Gen. James L. Jones Jr., who
succeeded Krulak on 1 July 1999, to implement that plan. But significant
additional funding will be needed for, among other things:
• Maintaining
the Corps at its current authorized strength of approximately 172,000
Marines on active duty and in the Reserves;
• Modernizing
the Corps’ Total Force with the aircraft, weapons, rolling stock,
electronics and avionics systems, and other supplies and equipment needed
to maintain combat superiority on the littoral and inland battlefields of
the future;
• Building,
upgrading, and maintaining a self-sustaining expeditionary tactical
aviation force, including the revolutionary V-22 Osprey tiltrotor
aircraft, which can operate from aircraft carriers, amphibious assault
ships, and/or expeditionary airfields ashore.
• Expediting
the early development and procurement of: (a) the joint strike fighter,
which USMC leaders have told Congress is urgently needed both to maintain
a modern tactical aviation force and to replace the obsolescent aircraft
now in the Corps’ inventory; and (b) advanced amphibious assault
vehicles capable of safely and swiftly carrying Marines and their
equipment to and over the beaches to positions that in some combat
scenarios will be far inland; and
• Implementing
Corps-sponsored initiatives to develop and field the advanced-capability
shallow-water mine countermeasures systems needed to allow future Marine
assault forces to maneuver safely through the littorals.
Alone of all the
services, the Marine Corps has consistently met its recruiting and
retention goals in recent years. Several studies suggest that this is
because the Marine Corps keeps a clear focus on its highest priorities—"Making
Marines and Winning Battles"—and that young men and women respond
more readily to that inspiring challenge than they do to the less lofty
appeal of material benefits.
Today’s Coast
Guard remains Semper Paratus—but just barely, and at a very high price.
The U.S. Coast Guard is perhaps the most overworked and underfunded agency
in government today, but it carries out—efficiently and at minimum cost
to the taxpayer—a multitude of missions that increase almost annually.
Several studies suggest that the Coast Guard returns a minimum of four
dollars in services for every tax dollar provided to the multimission
service in appropriations.
The Coast Guard
is also the world’s premier lifesaving organization, and in recent years
has saved an annual average of more than 5,000 lives—and has assisted
many more thousands of people in distress on the seas, on the Great Lakes,
and in the nation’s inland and coastal waterways.
But lifesaving is
only one of the many "services to taxpayers" in the USCG
portfolio. In recent years the Coast Guard has also, on average: conducted
44,000 law-enforcement boardings, identifying 24,000 violations; seized
76,000 pounds of marijuana and 62,000 pounds of cocaine; investigated
6,200 marine accidents; inspected 23,000 commercial vessels; responded to
12,400 spills of oil or hazardous materials; serviced 55,000 aids to
navigation; and interdicted 10,000 illegal migrants.
To carry out all
of those missions in the future, however—and several others likely to be
added—the Coast Guard needs a major recapitalization of virtually its
entire physical plant: ships, aircraft, electronic and sensor systems, and
shore facilities. To its credit, the Coast Guard itself has taken the
initiative by developing a so-called IDS (Integrated Deepwater System)
plan that, if fully funded, would permit an orderly and cost-effective
replacement of cutters, aircraft, and other assets over a period of years.
Failure of the executive and legislative branches of government to support
and fully fund that plan would cripple the Coast Guard’s continued
effectiveness—and would cost the American people in numerous ways.
Even today, very
few Americans realize how dependent the United States is on the U.S.-flag
Merchant Marine for national defense and its continued economic
well-being. In times of war or international crises that might lead to war
95 percent or more of the weapons, supplies, and equipment needed by U.S.
forces overseas must be carried by ship—usually over thousands of miles
of ocean. It would be military folly to rely on foreign-flag shipping to
carry that cargo.
Most innovations
in the maritime industries in the post-WWII era—e.g., containerization,
LASH (lighter aboard ship) vessels, and RO/ROs (roll-on/roll-off ships)—have
been of American origin, and the United States is by far the greatest
trading nation in the entire world. Literally millions of U.S. jobs, and
billions of tax dollars, are generated by the import and export of raw
materials and finished products into and out of U.S. ports.
The port
infrastructure itself is badly in need of renovation and remodernization,
however. Because of short-sighted laissez-faire economic policies,
U.S.-flag ships today carry only a minor fraction of America’s two-way
foreign trade. The result is the loss of thousands of seafaring jobs,
significantly reduced U.S. sealift capacity, and a Merchant Marine that is
now in extremis.
The creation of
the Maritime Security Program was a helpful first step toward recovery,
but it will take many years, perhaps decades, before the U.S.-flag fleet
can regain its traditional title as "the vital Fourth Arm" of
national defense.
Additional
funding, and a larger force structure, will resolve or at least ameliorate
some of the most difficult problems now facing the nation’s armed
services, not only in procurement and RDT&E (research, development,
test, and evaluation) but also in readiness. More and better equipment,
combined with a lower operating tempo and higher pay, would in turn have a
salutary effect on both recruiting and retention.
There are more
intractable problems, though, that all the money in the world will not
resolve—and that should be of major concern not only to the nation’s
armed services and defense decision makers, but to all Americans. The most
difficult and most obvious of these problems is the proliferation in
recent years of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and the means to
deliver them. There already are a dozen or more nations—several of them
extremely hostile to the United States—that already possess (or are
close to acquiring) more destructive power than was unleashed by all the
armies and navies in the world during World II.
It can be taken
for granted that WMDs soon will be available to terrorist groups as well.
But what is even more alarming is the near certainty that neither the
United States nor the so-called "global community" at large will
take the probably draconian steps that would be needed to counter this
unprecedented threat. Not, that is, until weapons of mass destruction are
actually used by terrorists. The only real question here is not
"if," but "when."
There are other
dangers, other problems, other defense issues of transcendent importance
that must be attended to at the start of this new century and new
millennium. The succession in Russia, for example. In China as well. The
mentally unbalanced military adventurism of the leaders of North Korea.
The list could go on and on.
Quite possibly
the greatest threats to world peace, though, are American complacency and
American lethargy. The history of the 20th century shows that, once
aroused to action, the American people can and will unite to defeat any
enemy, no matter how long it takes or how much it costs. That history also
shows, though, that it takes more than education and persuasion to unite
the American people. It takes sudden and painful shock.
The problem here
is that, in the past, the nation always had time to recuperate from its
initial losses, and even from a Pearl Harbor. That may no longer be the
case. There is now a bipartisan consensus that the United States should
build and deploy a national-missile-defense (NMD) system as soon as
"practicable." If that consensus had existed several years ago
the need today might not be so urgent. As it is, relatively few Americans
realize that the United States is still absolutely vulnerable to enemy
missile attacks. Another way of saying it is that not one U.S.
missile-defense system has yet been deployed that could shoot down even
one incoming enemy missile. That is a sobering thought.
The old axiom
says that leadership "begins at the top." But in a democracy
that is not entirely true. If the American people demand a certain course
of action loud enough and long enough, the elected "leaders" in
the executive and legislative branches of government almost always will
follow. In the field of national defense the American people have demanded
very little in recent years, and, with a few notable exceptions, that is
exactly what they have been provided.
In his prescient
"Prize Essay" (The Foundation of Naval Policy) in the April 1934
Naval Institute Proceedings Lt. Wilfred J. Holmes argued persuasively that
the size of the fleet (and, by implication, the size and composition of
all naval/military forces) should always be consistent with national
policy. "Failure to adjust the size of navies to the needs of
external [i.e., national] policy—or, conversely, to adjust external
national policy to the strength of the military fleet—has, in the past,
frequently led to disaster," Holmes said. At the 1922 Limitation of
Armaments Conference, he noted, the United States "relinquished naval
primacy in the interests of worldwide limitations of armaments."
Unfortunately, though, "the retrenchment in [U.S.] naval strength was
not followed by retrenchment in the field of national policy."
The circumstances
are not exactly the same today—but they are close enough. The current
operating tempo, for all of the nation’s armed services, is the highest
it has ever been in peacetime. Commitments have been increasing annually,
without commensurate increases in funding. Ships, aircraft, and weapon
systems are wearing out—and so are our military people. The
"gapping" of aircraft carriers in areas of potential crisis is
an invitation to disaster—and, therefore, represents culpable negligence
on the part of America’s defense decision makers.
Eventually, a
very high price will have to be paid for these many long years of national
lethargy, for the massive underfunding of the nation’s armed forces, and
for the continued mismatch between commitments and resources. When that
time comes—sooner is much more likely than later—it may well be the
darkest day in this nation’s history.
Is there still
time to reverse course? Perhaps. But not much time. And the leadership may
well have to come not from those who hold high office in Washington, but
from the American people themselves.
If they do
provide that leadership, there will indeed be another American century. It
will not be another century of violence, but of peace.
Peace on earth,
for all mankind.
John R. Fisher
National President
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