"Citizens in Support of the Sea Services"

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President's Message
A Report to the Committee

 

It is traditional that, at or near the end of his term, an outgoing national president of the Navy League provides an assessment or "summing up" of the state of the sea services and the state of the Navy League itself. It is in the spirit of that tradition that I submit the following report to what I--and, I know, all national presidents--recognize as the "committee of the whole." In other words, all members of the Navy League, not just the Steering Committee or the Executive Committee, or the NLUS Board of Directors.

It is appropriate, I think, to begin with a few final comments on the war against the government of Serbia--better put, against Slobodan Milosevic. Despite the on-again, off-again nature of the cease-fire negotiations, all Americans can take heart in what, as of the middle of June, does seem to be the beginning of the end of what easily might have become a long political and military quagmire. There are numerous problems still to be overcome, and more than a few political landmines to be avoided. It remains to be seen, moreover, whether the end of the NATO air campaign and the withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo signal the start of a true era of lasting peace in the Balkans or merely the close of another short chapter in the history of what for centuries has been one of the most violent regions in the world.

The definitive "lessons learned" reports have yet to be written, but it already is generally agreed that the premature U.S./NATO renunciation of the ground-forces option was a major blunder, as was the lack of a clear "exit strategy." Presumably, neither of those mistakes will be repeated in the future.

A less evident but perhaps even more important lesson is this: It is now overwhelmingly clear that the wars of the 21st century will almost certainly be of relatively short duration but extremely high intensity. In practical terms what this means is that there will be very little time, if any, for the massing of U.S. and allied forces in the combat zone. Additionally, there will be absolutely no time at all to develop, test, and build the weapons of war that those forces will need if they are to have any hope of winning.

If this analysis is correct--the Gulf War and the NATO air campaign against the government of Serbia are the best evidence that it is--the implications for U.S. national security policy are profound and dictate at least the following: (1) America's forward-deployed forces--whether land-based air and ground units or naval forces at sea in international waters--must be fully combat-ready at all times; (2) The stockpiles of weapons, equipment, ammunition, and various other supplies and consumables now prepositioned overseas should be maintained in quick-breakout status, and must be periodically both tested and modernized; (3) U.S. airlift and sealift assets should be significantly expanded and upgraded to ensure the continued sustainment of combat forces beyond the initial stages of conflict; and (4) Probably the most important of all: U.S. defense acquisition policies must be revised to ensure the procurement of enough ships, aircraft, weapon systems, and spare parts to meet reasonably foreseeable requirements. This shockingly common-sense approach would represent a major change, of course, from the present acquisition policy--which, even though it has never been publicly admitted, seems always to assume a best-case/lowest-cost outcome of any overseas conflict involving U.S. forces.

Here the evidence is clear: The administration's long-term defense strategy postulates forces sufficient to fight, and win, two medium theater wars simultaneously or "nearly simultaneously." But few if any U.S. military professionals would argue that the nation's armed forces would be able, today, to win two wars, particularly in different theaters, at or about the same time.

The young men and women in service today represent the finest this nation produces. They are well-trained, well-motivated, and well-led. They do--superbly--everything their country expects of them, and a lot more. But they are overworked, overcommitted, and underpaid. All of which has made recruiting difficult, and retention even more so.

In recent years many if not all defense budget decisions have been made for primarily political purposes--e.g., to lower budget deficits and/or to make more money available for "entitlements" and other domestic programs--rather than to meet validated national-security requirements. All of the nation's armed services have been consistently underfunded for quite a few years, have been made to do more with less, and have had to compensate for funding shortfalls by overworking their equipment and their people.

The Navy is an excellent case in point. Its operating tempo is the highest it has ever been in times of peace. There are now just over 320 ships in the active fleet. Close to 50 percent of them are underway on any given day, and more than 30 percent are usually deployed overseas. The administration's FYDP (future-years defense plan) postulates further cuts, to a fleet of only about 300 ships by 2003. However, the current and outyear budget projections will sustain a fleet of just over 200 ships. The aviation and weapons inventories suffer from similar requirements/funding mismatches. What makes this a problem of even greater magnitude is that the FYDP numbers themselves are best-case projections. The Navy's real requirements, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have told Congress, are for 15 carrier battle groups (vice the current 12), more amphibious ships as well, and closer to an overall total of 400 ships in the active fleet--including a minimum of 72 SSNs (nuclear-powered attack submarines) rather than the 50 now projected.

The Marine Corps is in much the same situation. The post-Cold War closure of hundreds of former U.S. overseas bases means that in many areas of the world forward-deployed Marine expeditionary units are the only combat-ready ground forces immediately available to regional commanders in times of crisis. The need for additional Marine security detachments at U.S. embassies overseas and for additional FAST (fleet antiterrorism security team) units has put additional strains on the Corps' limited manpower. Always the most forward-looking of the nation's armed forces, the Marine Corps is seeking to increase its combat capabilities through procurement of a "mobility triad" of Osprey tiltrotor aircraft, LCACs (landing craft, air cushion), and AAAVs (advanced amphibious assault vehicles). Once again, though, exemplary planning has been consistently undercut by a lack of sufficient funds, and the result is that most of the major procurement decisions have been pushed into the outyears.

The U.S. Coast Guard, which because of Navy cutbacks has been playing an increasingly vital national-defense role, is perhaps the most underfunded of all of the nation's armed services. Not only is this politically and militarily imprudent, it is also economically foolhardy. The Coast Guard is one of the few agencies in government that demonstrably returns several dollars in services to the American taxpayer for every dollar appropriated. It is also the world's premier lifesaving organization, and that distinction alone should give it a higher budgetary priority than it has received in recent years.

Finally, the U.S.-flag Merchant Marine is still in extremis. Our U.S.-flag ships carry less than 4 percent of this nation's two-way trade tonnage--which is expected to double, and perhaps triple, within the next 25 years. The U.S. port structure required to manage the throughput of this massive increase in cargo also is in need of repair, renovation, and upgrading. A "Manhattan Project" approach to address and assess the nation's overall maritime requirements, commercial as well as military--and to develop and implement a remedial plan of action--might be what is needed. Nothing else that has been proposed so far seems likely to evolve into a long-term program that will meet America's maritime needs in the 21st century.

I will close this President's Message with a brief status report on the Navy League itself. We are in excellent shape, both fiscally and from an organizational and programmatic point of view. The League's annual Sea-Air-Space Exposition is the premier naval/maritime exhibition in the world. Our corporate affairs, legislative education, awards, and youth programs all have expanded in recent years. The two principal NLUS educational publications--Sea Power Magazine and the annual Almanac of Seapower--are leaders in their respective fields. The Navy Leaguer, which focuses on news about, and/or of interest to, our 330-plus NLUS councils worldwide--is a growing success. We have a highly professional and very hard-working headquarters staff.

It is our Navy League councils that are the heart and soul of the Navy League, and that work most closely with the sea services on a day-to-day basis--I want to most emphatically include our overseas councils in that description. The scope and variety of council programs, and the dedication and generosity of our individual members (corporate members as well), are our greatest strengths.

With all that said, I also should point out that we cannot become complacent. We need new members. Thousands more! We also need additional funding if we are to continue, and to expand, the programs we sponsor on behalf of the nation's sea services. And we must always keep in mind that our principal goal and primary mission is to help our nation's sea services in every way possible. It is without question that they need our help today more than ever before in our nation's history. We should never lose sight of that fact.

Space does not permit the listing of the many, many individual members who have helped Pam and me so much over the past two years--among the most wonderful and most rewarding years of our lives. But we love you all, and we appreciate--more than mere words can express--everything that you have done for us. We will remember you always.

Jack Fisher takes over the helm of the Navy League at the end of our 1999 national convention in Chicago. Pam and I ask that you give him and Kit the same friendship and support that you have always given us. God bless you all, and may you have fair winds and following seas.

 

Jack M. Kennedy, National President



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Interview with Rear Adm. Malcom I. Fages, director of the Submarine Warfare Division in OPNAV

 

 

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