| Storms of protest, attacks on U.S. embassies, and
street demonstrations in numerous world capitals following the errant bombing of the
Chinese embassy in Belgrade. The bipartisan confusion on Capitol Hill about the course of
the war and the several chaotic, complex, and contradictory votes on legislation variously
intended to support the troops but at the same time reign in the administration and
prevent the president from sending in ground troops. The bullish reports from NATO
headquarters about the escalating effectiveness of the air campaign--followed by muted
admissions that the killings in Kosovo also have escalated and that there may now be more
Serb troops in that battered province than before the NATO mission of mercy started.
Not to mention more than 700,000 Kosovar
refugees, the embarrassing missile "attack" on Bulgaria, the culpable shortage
of certain smart munitions, and the exceptionally well-publicized (thanks to Slobodan
Milosevic) hits on hospitals, civilian residential areas, and other nonmilitary targets.
And, of potentially the greatest long-term importance, the initial rebuff of Russia
followed in short order by the warm embrace of that country, itself in turmoil, to serve
as what now seems to be the mediator of last resort.
Any line item on the preceding bill of
particulars might easily be explained. War is chaos, almost by definition. Mistakes
do happen. Hindsight is always clearer than foresight. Nonetheless, and no matter how the
current conflict ends, it is already evident that the 1999 U.S./NATO war against Serbia
will be remembered for, if nothing else, the uncomfortably long list of lessons learned.
Which is a roundabout way of saying: (a)
lessons learned in the past, but either forgotten or simply ignored this time around;
and/or (b) mistakes made in the current campaign that should never be repeated by future
commanders in chief.
The macrolessons are, or should be,
obvious: (1) Gradual escalation does not work--as was proved in Vietnam. (2) A kinder,
gentler war is a contradiction in terms and should not even be attempted. (3) In a
democracy, any war that does not have the strong (but not necessarily unanimous) support
of the American people and of Congress will be extremely difficult and perhaps impossible
to win. (This is the Caspar Weinberger/Colin Powell principle.) (4) For all practical
purposes, any future conflicts in which U.S. forces are involved must be fought, by people
already on active duty (or in the active reserve), with weapons already in the inventory.
Which brings one back to the previously
mentioned "shortage of certain smart munitions"--an understatement of colossal
dimensions. Almost all of the nation's armed services also are suffering from shortages of
pilots, of technicians, and of maintenance personnel. There are not enough airlift
aircraft. There may, possibly, be enough front-line combat aircraft for the Kosovo
campaign, but there certainly are not enough of them to carry out the administration's own
two-war strategy (which is carefully, but ambiguously, described as maintaining the
ability to fight two "nearly simultaneous" wars, whatever that means).
There also are far too many shortages of
spare parts--horrendous shortages, in some cases. Which means increased maintenance, a
higher personnel tempo, reduced combat readiness, lower morale, and the cannibalization of
CONUS-based aircraft to keep forward-deployed aircraft combat-ready. In many if not most
cases such shortages can be predicted well in advance--simply by reviewing historical
usage rates, for example--and should not happen.
The same is true, at the other end of the
size scale, of the largest "item" in the Navy's inventory--aircraft carriers.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have told Congress that the Navy has a demonstrable, validated,
need for 15 aircraft carriers. The Joint Chiefs are wrong. The United States has a
demonstrable, validated, need for 15 aircraft carriers. There are now only 12 in the
Navy's inventory. The lack of a spare part could mean a weapons system down, a sortie
aborted, or a mission scrubbed. The lack of an aircraft carrier, though--more precisely,
the lack of three aircraft carriers--could mean the loss of a war. Loosely translated,
that also could mean the loss of South Korea, perhaps. Or Taiwan. Or Kuwait again--and
Saudi Arabia as well.
None of these cataclysmic scenarios is
likely, of course. But none can be entirely ruled out, either--particularly when one
considers how many times the nations of the Free World have been taken by surprise
throughout this most violent of centuries. Slobodan Milosevic obviously has learned some
lessons from history, even if NATO's leaders have not, and it would not be surprising if
his counterparts in Pyongyang, Beijing, and Baghdad had learned most of those same
lessons.
|
