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Which does not obviate the need for refining, and redefining, our national-defense strategy to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The dissolution of the USSR has undoubtedly diminished the likelihood of a global nuclear holocaust--but it also has left several former Soviet republics in possession of their own nuclear arsenals. Moreover, the proliferation throughout the world of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs--chemical and biological as well as nuclear) significantly increases the potential for local and regional wars--which could easily escalate into conflicts of much larger scale.

Add to this the fact that literally hundreds of America's former overseas air and ground bases have been closed over the past two decades and it becomes obvious that a much greater share of the overall defense burden now must be shouldered by the nation's sea services--more specifically, by forward-deployed Navy carrier battle groups (CVBGs) and Navy/Marine Corps amphibious ready groups (ARGs). The CVBGs and ARGs operate in international waters and can come and go as they please. In other words, they do not violate the sovereignty of any other nation, and thus cause no diplomatic problems for the commander in chief in times of inter-national crisis.

Of perhaps greater importance: Sea-based forces are mobile, and they are extremely fast. Those admirable combat qualities make them very hard to find and extremely difficult to target and destroy. All of which argues that, to remain viable, the U.S. defense strategy for the 21st century must be increasingly maritime in nature.

The logic is inescapable. Regrettably, defense budgets are based only partly on logic--but even more on politics and on short-term rather than long-term requirements.

The Navy's shipbuilding program is perhaps the best example. According to the Clinton administration's own Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) the Navy needs a minimum of 305 ships to carry out all of its assigned missions. Here, three points are relevant: (1) Many members of Congress, and such experts as former Secretary of the Navy James H. Webb Jr., say the QDR estimate is too low and that the real need is for a fleet of anywhere from 350 to 400 ships; (2) The Future-Years Defense Plan (FYDP) submitted to Congress by the same Clinton administration will, according to the Congressional Research Service, pay for a fleet of only about 250 ships--and probably fewer; and (3) The Navy's new-construction program is now the lowest it has been since 1932--the height of the Great Depression.

What this means, no matter how euphemistically it is worded, is that current U.S. defense policy is deliberately, knowingly, consciously based on mortgaging the future to pay for shorter-term needs. And very few of those needs are in the area of national defense.

A few additional facts worth considering:

• The "average" modern warship takes about 3­6 years to build, so a frenetic short-term catch-up program would not be possible.
• Most (but not all) U.S. warships have active service lives of 30­45 years; however, many of the ships in today's fleet will be retiring for age early in the next century.
• All U.S. wartime-contingency plans are based on the ability of naval/maritime forces both to achieve a forcible entry (if such is required) and to sustain in-theater air and ground operations after conflict has started.

There is much more to this story, of course--and the Navy League intends to tell it. So please consider the preceding to be a primer--but also a call to action. I plan to return to the subject of shipbuilding in the next issue of Sea Power, and in several future President's Messages.

John R. Fisher
National President

A Revolution at Sea for Surface Combatants
Interview with Rear Adm William W. Cobb, Jr