| Ten years ago
the Navy was well on its way to a fleet of 600 deployable battle force ships. Included in
that number, according to the USN's own force-structure goals, would be 100 AAW (anti-air
warfare) cruisers and destroyers, 37 ASW (antisubmarine warfare) destroyers, and 101
frigates--a total of 238 surface combatants.
Today's active-duty surface force is only
about half that number, and is projected--under the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR)--to stabilize in 2003 at 112 surface combatants in the active fleet (27 cruisers, 62
destroyers, and 23 frigates), plus four ships in the Naval Reserve Force. The theory is
that the highly sophisticated multimission surface ships in tomorrow's Navy will be able
to exploit advanced technology to maintain U.S. maritime supremacy not only on the high
seas but also in the near-shore littoral regions of the world considered by many defense
analysts to be the most likely areas of future conflict.
There are only four problems with that
scenario--all of them major, and none of them susceptible to an easy-fix/low-cost
solution.
The first problem--which can be fixed
(but at a price)--is that the Navy's current and projected outyear SCN (shipbuilding)
budgets will fund the construction of only six or seven ships per year. "The math is
simple," as Rear Adm. Michael G. Mullen, director of surface warfare in the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations, points out in this month's Sea Power interview. "We
need to build eight or nine ships a year." This problem is not new and should take no
one by surprise. Several years ago CRS (Congressional Research Service) analyst Ronald
O'Rourke pointed out in a well-documented study that, if SCN funding is not increased
significantly in the very near future, the Navy's total active fleet might have to be
reduced to fewer than 200 ships.
Consider, in that context, that on a
"typical" day in January 1998 there were 347 ships in the active fleet and, of
those, 172 (49 percent) were underway. Which brings up the second problem: the
unprecedentedly high, and continuing, operating tempo of today's fleet. As Admiral Mullen
also reports, active-fleet ships deployed overseas are underway as much as 85 percent of
the time--and the underway time is often well over 50 percent even when the ships are back
in CONUS (the continental United States). That operating tempo, in peacetime,
simply cannot be sustained without more ships and more people. But the QDR projections and
the administration's FYDP (future-years defense plan) call for fewer ships and fewer
people. So this problem falls into the "insurmountable" category. And will stay
there until disaster strikes--as it almost assuredly will.
The third and fourth major problems can
be quickly summarized: additional missions; and increased
enemy capabilities. With the return to CONUS of most U.S. air and ground
units formerly stationed overseas, forward-deployed naval forces now bear a greater share
of the collective defense burden in times of international crisis. More often than not in
recent years, the surface fleet has been the Navy's own leading player during these
crises. That will be increasingly so when the land-attack destroyer and other new surface
combatants enter the inventory with the capabilities needed not only to wage war on the
sea, under the sea, and in the littorals, but also to carry the attack to enemy land
targets as much as 1,500 miles inland.
There are two sides to the
"capabilities" card, though. The worldwide proliferation of technology, and of
advanced weapon systems, to potential Third World and regional adversaries makes the
littoral arena one of sudden danger to all ships and aircraft that venture into harm's
way. Those who justify the massive reductions in force imposed on U.S. forces by citing
the superior combat capabilities of today's ships, aircraft, and weapon systems too often
forget, or simply (and willfully) ignore, the fact that enemy forces also have increased
their capabilities almost exponentially.
In his foreword to the Navy's new ASW
"focus statement"--also covered in detail in this issue of Sea Power--Chief
of Naval Operations Adm. Jay L. Johnson comments that Winston Churchill "was fond of
saying 'action this day' when he wanted something done.
"I cannot say it any better,"
Adm. Johnson continues in his foreword. "I expect 'action this day' from all hands to
ensure the U.S. Navy remains the most for-midable ASW force in the world."
That should be the watchword for members
of the Navy League as well--and for all supporters of a strong U.S. defense program. We
must double, and if necessary redouble, our efforts to convince America's decision makers
in the executive and legislative branches of government that our,
and their, first priority must be, always,
to maintain a strong national defense posture.
Next year, or at some vague time in the
"outyears," will be far too late. What is needed is action NOW. Action this day!
|
