Editor in chief James D. Hessman and
Senior Editor Gordon I. Peterson interviewed Adm. Joseph W. Prueher, commander in chief,
U.S. Pacific Command, for this issue of Sea Power.
Adm. Joseph W. Prueher is the 17th U.S.
naval officer to serve as the senior U.S. military commander in the Pacific and Indian
Ocean areas. From his headquarters at Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii, he leads the largest of the
U.S. unified commands and directs U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force operations
across more than 100 million square miles. A native of Nashville, Tenn., Adm. Prueher was
graduated with distinction from the U.S. Naval Academy. Prior to assuming command of U.S.
armed forces under the Pacific Command, he served as the vice chief of naval operations.
In addition to command of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, Adm. Prueher commanded Carrier Group One
in the U.S. Pacific Fleet from April 1991 until November 1993. He also served as the
commandant of midshipmen at the U.S. Naval Academy. A former test pilot and flight
instructor at the Naval Test Pilot School, Adm. Prueher has flown more than 5,500 hours in
52 types of aircraft, has more than 1,000 aircraft carrier landings, and holds a master's
degree in international affairs.
Sea Power: Admiral, what are
the most distinctive political and military changes you have witnessed in the Pacific
theater since you took the helm of the Pacific Command [PACOM] three years ago?
PRUEHER: There have been some significant
developments in our AOR [area of responsibility]. To me, the most noteworthy was the 1996
election in Taiwan that precipitated China's missile exercise. The ensuing China/Taiwan
Strait crisis led us to send two aircraft carrier battlegroups in response. What
frustrated me at the time was that we had no military relationship with China, and so that
situation got very tense, very fast. Our options for resolution were limited, and military
communications channels were difficult. We have built better dialogue since then. We have
a positive relationship with China's senior leadership. It still needs work, but we do
have a good relationship. If something like the China/Taiwan Strait situation should start
rumbling again, we now have better means of resolving the situation.
There also have been successful
transitions of power in Japan, Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines. Japan's transitions
of power--there have been many--have been orderly. Korea had its first peaceful election
when Kim Dae Jung [president of the Republic of Korea] took over. That is a great plus for
democracy in the region. The transition between Ramos [former Republic of the Philippines
President Felix V. Ramos] and President Joseph Estrada was peaceful as well. In
Thailand--which is a democracy but also a country of great internal military power--there
was pressure for General Mongkon Ampornpisit [supreme commander of the Royal Thai Armed
Forces] to take over militarily when the government fell about 18 months ago. But he did
not do that--he supported the constitution; he supported democracy. Now we have Prime
Minister Chuan Leekphai, and things are on track in Thailand. In Indonesia, where after 32
years President Suharto stepped down, B.J. Habibie took over constitutionally. The
important things there are the restraint shown by Indonesian armed forces--the ABRI [Armed
Forces, Republic of Indonesia]--and that the process of change is working
constitutionally.
Another recent challenge has been the
explosion of nuclear devices by India and Pakistan in the spring of 1998. I think the
international system is absorbing this now. But India and Pakistan both exploded nuclear
devices for domestic reasons; they are not rogue or pariah states--but it does potentially
change the nuclear balance. The outcome is still uncertain.
OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense],
the State Department, and NSC [the National Security Council] are still very much involved
in trying to ensure a good outcome. We are involved in the Indian part of the situation,
and we stay in touch with Tony Zinni at CENTCOM [Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, commander in
chief, U.S. Central Command] on the Pakistan part. Our commands are working very well
together.
Finally, we have the Asia economic crisis
which is now affecting the entire region along with an attendant impact on stability. From
a military view, my discussions with defense leaders in the region over the last year have
turned from plans for military modernization to ways to mitigate the effects of the
economic downturn to, in some cases, concern for internal stability.
On the subject of forward-deployed
forces, how do you assess their operational readiness? Are your component commanders
having any problems?
PRUEHER: The readiness issue has been
prominent lately with the CINCs [commanders in chief], with the service chiefs, with
Congress, and with the secretary of defense. In PACOM, we have about 100,000
forward-deployed troops, but those troops represent the capabilities of the U.S. Seventh
Fleet, III MEF [Marine Expeditionary Force], 5th and 7th Air Forces, the 8th Army in
Korea, Army forces in Japan, and our SOF [Special Operations Forces] there. Those forces
are up and ready. They are equipped, prepared, and trained. They can answer the bell.
The readiness image that comes to my mind
is corrosion on a car--once it eats through the paint and you can see it, you already have
a serious problem underneath. We are trying to predict readiness shortfalls before the
problems break through the paint. CNO [Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jay L. Johnson] has
talked about "the bathtub effect" where, after a deployment, readiness drops
down into the bathtub and climbs back out before the next deployment--with our West Coast
forces that bathtub is deeper and steeper. For example, the naval aviation attack
squadrons that workup at Fallon [Strike Warfare Center, Naval Air Station, Fallon, Nev.]
do not have sufficient operational aircraft along with the right weapons, LANTIRN
[low-altitude navigation-and-targeting IR system] pods or FLIR [forward-looking infrared
radar], to train with during the turnaround. So, as they arrive at this advanced phase of
their training, their entry-level proficiency is lower, and they often require remedial
training.
Another example is the Stennis
Battle Group [nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis]. In February
1998, they deployed on short notice from the East Coast in response to the crisis with
Iraq. The air wing had not received much of the equipment it needed for the squadrons to
properly work up. The parts and equipment came in only after the deployment began, and
much of it was cross-decked from other ships. So it was only after they had been underway
for a while that the crews were fully qualified. Our Navy's claim to fame is that we are
ready to operate when deployed--on this deployment we were not--at least initially. This
is the kind of erosion of readiness we are trying to correct. We need an infusion of money
and parts.
Some other indicators include PACAF's
[U.S. Air Forces, Pacific] cannibalism rate for aircraft--up from 7 to 11 percent in
working spares since fiscal year 1995. And the Pacific Marines' full mission-capable
aircraft rate is down to about 60 percent. These are indications that we have a genuine
problem. The issue for us is money to buy spare parts to fix the problem. There is a lag
time of years in this area--money that was put in the budget in the 1980s for spares is
beginning to run out now. Our readiness prediction systems do not tell us this--it has
been camouflaged by the down-sizing we have gone through.
Finally, we also need to work on
retention. For example, Archie Clemins [Adm. Archie R. Clemins, commander in chief, U.S.
Pacific Fleet] reports that he is 17 percent down in his junior enlisted ranks for Pacific
naval forces overall.
Are you satisfied with the level of
readiness of your forward-deployed forces?
PRUEHER: Yes, readiness is good at the
tip of the spear. What the shortage of spares will affect is the ability to surge--the
ability to field and support multiple [aircraft] carrier battlegroups or MEUs [Marine
expeditionary units] at the same time.
Are the Pacific Command's out-of-area
operations--the rotational deployment of forces to the Arabian Gulf--a concern?
PRUEHER: Yes. We global source. For
example, Tony Zinni does not own many forces himself, so we all support him when the need
arises. We sent the Indy [aircraft carrier USS Independence] battlegroup
underway on very short notice, to respond to the Iraqi situation in 1998, and they did an
excellent job. Next we had to bring in Air Force units as backfill for some of the
carrier's capabilities to help manage the Korean situation. We can support the forces in
the Gulf, but when there is an extraordinary situation it is very costly. And it causes
turbulence in planning and training as well.
How do you assess your strategic
mobility forces--airlift and sealift--are they sufficient for your in-theater
requirements?
PRUEHER: Strategic airlift comes from
TRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation Command], which has done a great job providing lift for our
forces. But airlift overall is thin. Of course, more is better when it comes to lift, and
we are usually forced to make hard decisions about allocating airlift and sealift
resources.
In CENTCOM and Korea, for example, the
critical relationship of sealift assets to response time is not always well-understood.
Our nation is short on sealift. However, on the plus side, we have a significant amount of
supplies afloat on Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps prepositioning ships.
You have an AOR in excess of 100
million square miles. With forces dispersed over such a very large geographic area, does
this present exceptional command-and-control challenges?
PRUEHER: Because of the large area we are
very reliant on space-based systems. We cannot run fiber-optic cables everywhere! Our J-6
[director for command, control, communications, and computer systems, Brig. Gen. David
Bryan] is working with the system successfully to make our communications in the Pacific
more robust. They are adequate for day-to-day operations, but the redundancy, the
robustness that would be needed in a crisis, is not there. So we are getting more
satellite communications capability--it is a real priority.
Another challenging aspect of an AOR of
this size is strategy. It requires much anticipation and planning. In the Mediterranean,
you can be more reactive. We always have to be prepared to fight the right fight at the
right time and place--with the right forces. With the vast distances involved in moving
ships, aircraft, and forces for our operations in the Pacific, we really have to
concentrate on advance planning. It is very challenging.
You also have the important task to
ensure that PACOM's views are reflected in the interagency process with the U.S.
Department of State and other agencies. Are you satisfied that your concerns and
recommendations are included in these assessments?
PRUEHER: Yes. But it takes focus and
effort as we work with the decision-making process through OSD and the Joint Staff. PACOM
has traditionally done a great deal of work with embassies in the region. I was in
Singapore in October with 11 ambassadors of Southeast Asian nations discussing security
issues. One of the premises of our strategy is that we have to work with the confluence of
military, political, and economic issues in the region and in Washington. We work closely
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Council, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, State Department, and with other agencies as appropriate. It is a healthy
dialogue--we get our viewpoint aired very well.
In recent years CINCs have had more
direct interface with the president and with defense committees in Congress, is that
correct?
PRUEHER: Since the Goldwater-Nichols Act
the CINCs have interfaced frequently with Congress. We work frequently with Senator Daniel
Inouye (D-Hawaii), who is an outstanding legislator and a fine patriot. The CINCs also
meet periodically with the president and secretary of defense. Our most recent meeting was
in September 1998, and the subject, of course, was readiness.
Turning to other geopolitical matters,
have the revised guidelines for defense cooperation with Japan, signed in 1997, enhanced
U.S. relations with that nation?
PRUEHER: The defense guidelines with
Japan are a follow-on to the security agreement signed in 1996 and have reaffirmed our
strategic relationship with Japan. After the tragic rape incident that occurred in
September 1995 [U.S. Marines were convicted of raping a girl in Okinawa], both nations
reassessed and confirmed that the relationship is indeed important, which led to the
development of these defense guidelines. Our relationship is very healthy now, but it does
need careful nurturing. That relationship with Japan is our most important strategic
alliance in the Pacific.
How would you characterize our current
relations with Okinawa?
PRUEHER: They have improved quite a bit
because of the efforts of Marine Corps leadership there. The Marines have done a
significant amount of outreach to the community. There is not really any sense of
anti-Americanism on Okinawa. It is a basing issue. We have numerous bases there--Army,
Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force--and the Okinawans like having defense forces--a military
presence. But they do not want to live next to the bases or in the flight patterns. We are
trying to make our footprint as unobtrusive as possible.
With respect to the Marine Corps Air
Station at Futenma [Okinawa], our agreement is that we will move out five to seven years
after the SACO [Special Action Committee on Okinawa] report was signed and when a facility
that has comparable capabilities has been completed and is operational. The Japanese
government is responsible for selecting the replacement facility, but there has been
little progress on the issue primarily due to domestic concerns.
U.S. engagement with Singapore
continues; what is the timetable for completion of the pier at Changi Naval Base and U.S.
Navy access to it?
PRUEHER: It will be completed in the next
two or three years. Their deputy prime minister and defense minister, Dr. Tony Tan, is
coming to visit Secretary Cohen [Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen] and they are
expected to sign a memorandum of understanding about our access to the pier. We do not
have a formal treaty arrangement with Singapore, but they are very supportive of the U.S.
presence in Asia as a force for security and stability. They are very independent,
however, and neither side wants Singapore to be perceived as a "puppet" of the
United States.
What do you consider to be the most
worrisome threats to the stability of the Asian-Pacific region and to U.S. interests
there?
PRUEHER: There are four threats that come
readily to mind. The first is North Korea. The leadership there is what I would describe
as mercurial, and there has been some irrational decision-making. We are seeking a
detensioned, reconciled, nonnuclear Korean peninsula. Reunification may be farther off.
The second is the specter of transnational terrorism. Asia is not a hotbed of terrorist
activity, but we must be vigilant. The third threat is the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. We have a dialogue with China about that, but we worry about North
Korea. The fourth threat is the economic crisis. The lack of economic security in the
region can potentially translate into a military crisis if we are not careful.
Please assess the U.S. relationship
with North Korea in light of the interests of Japan and South Korea.
PRUEHER: The key relationship is not that
between the United States and North Korea, but between North Korea and South Korea. They
have to come to the table to work out some substantive issues. The tension on the
peninsula has been exacerbated because North Korea is suspected of building another
nuclear facility. They have not technically violated the Agreed Framework [the 1994
diplomatic agreement obligating the North to dismantle its nuclear program and comply with
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]. But that facility should be inspected to confirm
what is going on there. We need to maintain our solidarity with South Korea and to be
tough negotiators to bring about a detensioning of the peninsula. We cannot let our
national pride or ego get in the way. We must be careful not to make North Korea feel so
pressured that they "pull the trigger" and lash out.
North Korea has demonstrated a growing
ballistic-missile capability. How seriously do you view the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction in that country and a number of other Pacific-Asian countries? What
should the United States and its allies do about it?
PRUEHER: We take the Taepo Dong-1 launch
very seriously for several reasons. First, it represents a serious development in military
capabilities. The launch of a multistage missile shows North Korea has longer-range
capabilities than we were aware of and is capable of threatening the U.S. as well as
allies and friends in Asia. Second, the launch was a major setback to reducing tensions on
the Korean Peninsula. Third, we are concerned about the possibility of North Korea selling
its longer-range missiles to other countries.
There are several things the United
States and its allies can and should do about this. The first is to maintain our deterrent
posture, along with the Republic of Korea, on the Korean Peninsula. The United States will
also insist that North Korea continue to abide by the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework, which
obligates the North to dismantle its nuclear program and comply with the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United States should continue to engage in Four-Party Talks
along with the Republic of Korea, China, and North Korea. This provides us with a forum
for conveying to the North our concerns about their actions. Finally, through a variety of
channels, we should continue to press the North on economic reform.
At a time when North Korea continues
to devote considerable resources to its military forces beyond reasonable defensive
requirements, why is it in the interest of the United States to continue to participate in
the Four-Party Talks?
PRUEHER: It is hard to fathom why, in the
face of economic collapse and food shortages, North Korea continues to devote so many
resources to its military. Let me also point out that, in spite of North Korea's efforts,
the North's military capability is actually declining. Nonetheless, they still have a
significant capability to lash out and inflict serious damage on South Korea as well as
the 37,000 U.S. troops stationed on the Korean peninsula. It is in this context that we
should understand U.S. participation in the Four-Party Talks.
Our near-term objectives on the Korean
peninsula are to maintain peace and stability, to reduce tensions, and to maintain a lid
on North Korea's nuclear program. Achieving those objectives will eventually set the stage
for a lasting peace agreement and North-South reconciliation. We believe that the best way
of achieving those objectives is to engage in a dialogue with the North. The Four-Party
Talks give the United States and the Republic of Korea a vehicle for doing this. We also
do not want the North in a position where, in the midst of all their other difficulties,
they might not be clear on U.S. and South Korean intentions, and have no avenues of
communication available to them.
Finally, we should understand U.S.
participation in the Four-Party Talks in the context of South Korea's new
"sunshine" policy towards the North. South Korea is one of our most important
allies in the Asia-Pacific region, and South Korea's president, Kim Dae Jung, has recently
initiated several forms of contacts with the North. U.S. participation in the Four-Party
Talks is a useful complement to this policy.
You said earlier that the U.S.
military-to-military relationship with China has improved in recent years. There was some
criticism recently that China was not reciprocating with meaningful military visits to its
installations and forces; is this true?
PRUEHER: This is true to a degree, but
let me put this in the proper perspective. First, DOD's [Department of Defense's]
military-to-military relationship with the People's Liberation Army [PLA] is an integral
part of the United States' overall bilateral relationship with China. The goal is mutual
understanding, trust, and increased openness, or transparency.
To date, the military-to-military
relationship has yielded a number of concrete initiatives that have moved both nations
towards these goals. These include an exchange of official ship visits between our navies
and an agreement that allows U.S. Navy ships to continue making port calls to Hong Kong.
We have also established two sets of formal consultative talks to discuss the engagement
program and enhance military-maritime safety.
The United States would like to enhance
this relationship even further. We have been very forthcoming in showing the Chinese our
military capabilities. For their part, the PLA has shown us one of their nuclear-powered
submarines as well as their flight-test center at Cangzhou. However, the Chinese have
fallen short of the level of openness we would like to establish. In my view, insisting on
strict reciprocity is unnecessary. But, I would like to see them do more. So, yes, your
statement is true to a degree.
How have U.S. military contacts with
India and Pakistan been affected by their nuclear weapons tests earlier this year?
PRUEHER: This year, we had hoped to
increase our contacts with India's military. The nuclear tests have placed those efforts
on hold. In the long term, we hope this situation can be resolved and we can work again on
developing positive relations with India's military.
Can you update Sea Power
readers on efforts to achieve a full accounting for those U.S. service members still
unaccounted for from hostile action during World War II, the Korean conflict, and the war
in Vietnam?
PRUEHER: This effort is not just a PACOM
task--it is a U.S. government commitment to unaccounted-for service members. Joint Task
Force-Full Accounting [JTF-FA] continues search-and-recovery efforts in Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia for those missing in Southeast Asia. Cooperation between JTF-FA and the Vietnam
Office for Seeking Missing Persons has come a very long way and has greatly enhanced our
search-and-recovery efforts. The Vietnamese have also been successful in their unilateral
efforts to locate witnesses who have valuable, first-hand, wartime information relating to
cases of unaccounted-for Americans.
PACOM also recently completed a return of
remains from North Korea and a recovery operation in China, and is planning a
search-and-recovery operation in Indonesia for the remains of an aircrew from an aircraft
downed during World War II.
Do you foresee expanded U.S.
military-to-military contact or visits with Vietnam?
PRUEHER: Expanded contacts, yes, but at a
slow and deliberate pace, and on a narrow range of issues. Vietnam is cooperating in our
continued efforts to search for and recover the remains of MIAs [personnel missing in
action]. I have visited Hanoi once to meet with their senior military leaders. In October,
we hosted His Excellency Lt. Gen. Tran Hahn, vice minister of defense, in Hawaii. The idea
is to slowly expand the engagement program a little each year in consonance with overall
U.S. policy. By the way, Ambassador Peterson [U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Douglas
"Pete" B. Peterson] is doing a wonderful job of getting us on track in Vietnam.
Do you have any other thoughts you
would like to share with our readers?
PRUEHER: I would like to express my
gratitude to the Navy League for everything that marvelous organization does to support
our sea services. I remember the first time I had contact with the Navy League. We were
trying to establish the Strike Warfare Center in Fallon, Nev. At that time, in Churchill
County there were only two telephone lines--we could not get a secure line [protected
government line for classified conversations]--and we did not even have a safe cleared for
secret documents! And there was a terrible shortage of housing. The few Navy League
members in the area--about seven of them--really mobilized to find places for our people
to live as we set up. That is a small event, but it reflects the kind of concern and
involvement that has always characterized the Navy League. I am immensely grateful for all
of the League's support to our sea-service men and women.
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