By ROBERT W. KESTELOOT
Capt. Robert W. Kesteloot, USN (Ret.),
founder and president of K Associates Ltd., of Reston, Va., a maritime firm that
specializes in merchant marine and national security affairs, is a member of the Navy
League's Merchant Marine Affairs Committee. His last active-duty assignment with the Navy
was as director of strategic sealift on the staff of the chief of naval operations.
The National Defense Reserve Fleet
(NDRF), created by Congress in 1946 to provide emergency sealift, also provided a means
for operators to trade in their WWII ships with the assurance that they would not later
see them in the hands of competitors. The Ready Reserve Force (RRF), a subset of the NDRF,
had its beginnings in 1976, but consisted of only a few ships until the early 1980s, when
it became apparent to Navy logisticians that insufficient U.S.-flag commercial shipping
existed to support the newly created Rapid Deployment Force. The Maritime Administration
(MARAD) is responsible for the ownership and maintenance of ships in the NDRF and RRF.
When RRF ships are activated, they normally come under the operational control of the
Military Sealift Command (MSC).
The RRF was absolutely essential to the
success of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In August 1990, when Iraqi forces invaded
Kuwait, the RRF numbered 96 ships--79 of which were activated during the war. RRF ships
lifted nearly 25 percent of the unit equipment deployed to the Persian Gulf and 45 percent
of the ammunition, while maintaining a 93 percent record for reliability. Nonetheless,
this no-notice war spotlighted two major inadequacies in the RRF that required correction:
Greater numbers of roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships were needed, and force readiness
required improvement.
At that time there were only 17 RO/RO
ships in the fleet, and all were ordered to activate on 10 August 1990. Only four made it
in the time expected--11 of them were late (by an average of seven days) in being tendered
to the MSC. One ship incurred a major casualty that delayed her 55 days; another was 126
days late because she was undergoing a major overhaul of her main engine. Out of the 62
dry cargo ships activated, only 20 ships were activated in the time periods
specified--five, 10, or 20 days. The ships designated for a five-day breakout took an
average of 11 days. It took an average of 16 days to break out the 10-day ships.
Fortunately, because the buildup in the Persian Gulf was extended over such a long period
very few cargo movements were delayed by the late RRF activations.
The postwar analysis of the breakout
failures concluded that the major reason was a lack of the funds needed both for
maintenance and for test activations of the ships. Congress had repeatedly cut RRF funding
and, as a result, only 21 of the 79 RRF ships mobilized had been activated even once in
the years prior to Desert Shield/Storm.
Varying Degrees Of Crisis
Responsiveness
Clearly, improvements in readiness were
needed. Today, the 56 ships of the RRF have activation times of four or five days and are
constantly manned (with nine or 10 crew members). These maintenance crew members already
have signed agreements to sail with the ships on their first voyage, should any of them be
activated, thus guaranteeing the on-board familiarity needed for a rapid transition from
inactive to active status. The RRF ships also are homeported not in MARAD's reserve fleet
anchorages, as before, but closer to their probable DOD loading ports, and do not require
the assistance of a shipyard for activation. Ships in four-day breakout status conduct a
sea trial annually; the five-day ships usually alternate a sea trial one year with a dock
trial the next year.
The 28 RRF ships in 10-, 20-, or 30-day
readiness status are maintained at MARAD's three NDRF reserve fleet anchorages (in James
River, Va.; Beaumont, Texas; and Suisun Bay, Calif.). There are no crews on these ships,
and they do require shipyard assistance for activation, but they are maintained in a high
state of readiness--made possible by increased funding from Congress and a maintenance and
repair tracking system maintained by MARAD. Ships on 10-day readiness undergo a sea trial
every two years; 20-day ships receive a sea trial every five years--broken up by a
mid-period dock trial; 30-day ships go on a sea trial every five years.
The key to maintaining a ready RRF is
periodic maintenance sea trials and no-notice test activations. There have been 103
no-notice activations since Desert Shield/Storm. All but two were successful; one ship was
10 hours late in fiscal year 1994 and another was eight hours late in FY 1997. The last
fiscal year saw 36 test activations involving 40 percent of the total RRF--the most since
the Gulf War--and all were successful. Stable (and sufficient) funding by the Congress,
MARAD and the Navy say, is the key to maintaining this essential level of readiness.
For Want of a Fleet ...
The buildup of the RRF that started in
the early 1980s was intended to be an interim solution until the U.S.-flag
commercial fleet could rejuvenate itself. The United States has historically counted on
the U.S.-flag merchant marine to provide logistics support for its armed forces in time of
war. Unfortunately, that long-awaited rejuvenation has yet to occur.
In 1980, the United States possessed a
privately owned commercial fleet, 1,000 gross tons and above, that numbered 552 ships. The
number as of October 1998 was less than half that: 265 ships. The total deadweight
capacity of the 1980 fleet was 19 million tons. Even though many of the ships in today's
commercial fleet are significantly larger than those of 20 years ago, the collective
deadweight capacity of the 1998 fleet was only 12 million tons--and transported less than
three percent of the nation's foreign trade tonnage.
It would appear, therefore, that the
requirement for a government-owned, taxpayer-supported RRF is here to stay. The U.S.-flag
commercial fleet, which transported 12.7 percent of the cargo going to the Persian Gulf
during the war against Iraq, remains an important element of strategic sealift planning,
but the value of its cargo capacity is, in many ways, exceeded by the contribution of its
intermodal assets and expertise.
According to the Maritime Administration,
79 percent of all dry cargo shipped to the Persian Gulf region during Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm was carried by 169 U.S.-flag vessels. Here it should be noted that
government-owned or government-chartered shipping is the most expensive form of
sealift--but is, of course, essential when an adequate amount of commercial shipping,
firmly under the control of U.S. citizens, is not available.
RRF Expansion Plans
Readiness improvements to the RRF started
with the careful deactivation and repair of the 79 ships activated for Desert
Shield/Storm. The Departments of Defense and Transportation both were determined to return
these ships to the reserve fleet in better shape than they had been prior to the war.
Meanwhile, program planning began in order to meet the new strategic sealift requirements
identified in a series of Mobility Requirements Studies (MRSs) that followed the Gulf War.
The MRS series determined that, to meet
surge requirements, the U.S. military needs at least 10 million square feet of RO/RO
shipping. This amount of shipping would support a one-time lift of initial forces to a
single major theater war (MTW) at what was determined to be "moderate risk"--and
was premised, moreover, on having 4.3 million square feet of equipment prepositioned
afloat. It was these requirements that drove the decision to embark on the LMSR (large
medium-speed RO/RO) program, consisting of five ship conversions and 14 new-construction
ships. Eight of these ships--five conversions and three new--have been delivered to date;
the remaining 11 new ships are either under construction or on contract. The last LMSR is
scheduled be delivered in 2001.
By that time, the requirement for 4.3
million square feet of RO/RO space also will have been met with 16 Maritime Prepositioning
Ships (MPSs) for the Marine Corps and eight LMSRs for the Army. All but 550,000 square
feet--of the overall required 10 million square feet for surge shipping--will be met when
the eleventh LMSR is delivered and joins the 31 RRF RO/RO ships and eight Fast Sealift
Ships (also RO/ROs), plus 38 other RRF ships designated as common-user sealift surge
assets.
The shortfall of 550,000 square feet is a
RO/RO capacity problem that is not easily solved. There are no militarily useful RO/RO
ships in the privately owned U.S.-flag fleet, and the Congress has specifically prohibited
the Department of Defense from buying foreign-built RO/ROs. MARAD has, however, embarked
on a RO/RO expansion program that will increase the collective capacity of seven existing
RRF ships by a little over 250,000 square feet (by modifying the original design of the
ships). In five of these ships, a spar deck with an access ramp is being added above the
existing weather deck. The total deck space added to the five ships is nearly 135,000
square feet--which is more than equal to gaining a sixth ship. Four of the ships have
completed the RO/RO expansion process; the fifth will finish in September.
Too Weak, Low Overheads
Two other RO/RO ships, the Cape Wrath and
Cape Washington, former pure car/truck carriers (PCTCs) acquired for the RRF in
1994, have seven internal car decks that are not militarily useful (because of deck
strength and deck height limitations). MARAD has developed a design to remove these seven
decks and replace them with three stronger decks with deck heights that will accommodate
military vehicles. Funds have been made available to commence conversion of the first ship
in October. When completed, each ship will have gained 36 percent net deck space;
together, their combined net gain of more than 117,300 square feet of militarily useful
space is equal to the addition of another medium-size RO/RO ship to the RRF.
Together, the seven RO/RO expansions,
when adjusted for stowage factors, will reduce the current surge shipping shortfall,
550,000 square feet, to 300,000 square feet net. This is well within the margin of error
when calculating logistics mobility requirements from the base requirement of 10 million
square feet.
The average age of the 91 ships now in
the RRF is 31 years. Fourteen ships, mostly older ships with marginal military utility,
are scheduled to be downgraded to the NDRF by October 2001. Still, by that date, the
remaining RRF ships will be an average of nearly 32 years in age. Although these ships are
well maintained and aging gracefully, and adequate spare parts exist for nearly every
need, the day is in sight when significant funding will be needed for RRF replacement
ships. The aging of the RRF, Navy planners say, is a potentially significant problem--but
also an opportunity.
It is a problem because total replacement
of the lift capability represented by the RRF, given current budget priorities, is
unaffordable. But it is also an opportunity to explore alternatives to an inactive RRF
that could make a positive contribution to some of America's other transportation
infrastructure problems, which also need resolution, particularly in U.S. coastal areas,
where population density is the highest. One of the major impediments to travel in these
areas is the number of large trucks that dominate traffic on the north-south interstate
highways--e.g., I-95 in the east and I-5 in the west. Not only do these behemoths congest
and pollute, they also pose major safety hazards when using the same roads as relatively
small personal vehicles. If the long-haul trucks could be carried on the broad open-ocean
"highways" that parallel the coasts, traffic congestion would be significantly
reduced. Moreover, the ships that would carry the trucks also would be capable of hauling
large 53-foot trailers and therefore, by definition, would be militarily useful and could
be called upon during national emergencies.
The Mariner Precedent
The 1950 Mariner Program serves as the
precedent for building militarily useful ships to promote commerce. The Maritime
Administration, in need of ships to support the Korean conflict--and, not incidentally, to
stimulate the U.S. shipbuilding industry, ordered 35 Mariner-class ships for the
government account. These proved to be excellent ships for breakbulk liner service, even
though commercial operators were at first reluctant to buy or even charter them. They were
"too big" at 564 feet overall, "unnecessarily fast" at 20 knots, and
had "too many gadgets," such as hydraulically operated hatches. They originally
were operated for MARAD under General Agency Agreements, but after becoming familiar with
the ships and gaining an appreciation for their size, speed, and "gadgets," all
35 ships were purchased by American carriers. (Another 17 Mariner-class ships later were
built by the private sector, a well-deserved accolade to the MARAD design.)
A modern-day RO/RO version of the Mariner
program, designed for the domestic trade and intended primarily if not exclusively for the
long-haul movement of trucks north and south, also would serve as an "active
RRF" by making available to DOD militarily useful ships that would seldom be more
than two days from designated military loading ports. Trucking companies would find that
such a service could alleviate the shortage of long-haul drivers they are currently
experiencing. DOD would have the assurance of ships already crewed with experienced
mariners. Once initial DOD surge shipping requirements were met with adequate
domestic-trade ships, the program might be expanded to allow the operation of some ships
in the NAFTA trade with Mexico, reducing delays and congestion at southern border
crossings.
Help for U.S. Shipyards
A program to build as many as 50 large,
fast (25-plus knots), RO/RO ships, designed for rapid loading and discharge, also would
greatly assist in the revitalization of America's private-sector shipyards. In time, the
RRF itself might be phased out almost entirely, with the obvious exception of certain
special-purpose ships that have no equivalent in commercial service--e.g., crane ships,
offshore petroleum discharge ships, and perhaps a few others that have not yet been
specifically identified by DOD as a wartime requirement.
Last year, Congress mandated the creation
of a National Task Force to define the needs of a Marine Transportation System (MTS) that
would meet the needs of the 21st century. The MTS Task Force has completed its initial
meetings and is now considering the role of marine transportation within the context of
total U.S. surface transportation needs.
DOD logistics planners are not alone in
saying that such consideration should recognize that shipping cargo by sea has an inherent
advantage over every other form of transportation: Given an equal amount of fuel, one ton
of cargo can be moved longer distances by sea, more safely, and with less environmental
impact, than is possible with any other form of transportation. For this reason alone, the
MTS National Task Force would be well-advised to investigate the merits of a government
build-and-charter program for RO/RO ships that could be used in domestic coastal service
and also serve as active RRF replacements at relatively low cost, and with significant
personal benefits for U.S. taxpayers. |
