By
MERRICK CAREY
MERRICK CAREY, a
former intelligence officer in the Naval Reserve, is chief executive
officer of the Lexington Institute, a public policy foundation based in
Arlington, Va., and a frequent contributor to Sea Power Magazine
and The Almanac of Seapower.
The Asia-Pacific
region--which stretches from the West Coast of the United States to the
East Coast of Africa--encompasses 105 million square miles, nearly 50
percent of the Earth's surface. It contains 56 percent of the world's
population and generates 34 percent of the Gross World Product; within its
boundaries are the world's six largest militaries. For the United States
alone, the region is the market for roughly $50 billion in annual trade,
35 percent of the nation's total trade and nearly double the shares of
Europe and Latin America.
There have been
numerous ground wars in the area, but the watery expanses of the
Asia-Pacific region have been a peaceful American lake for over two
generations, thanks largely to U.S. naval power.
The prospects for
even longer-term peace and security in the region, though, depend in large
measure on whether the Asia-Pacific region, more strategically important
as each year passes, avoids the dangers to stability that increasingly
threaten to rupture what remains a fragile global center of gravity.
Among the
Asia-Pacific's 43 countries and 30 territories, perhaps no other grouping
of nations is more critical to long-term stability than East Asia--the
nations of China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and their neighbors to
the south. This axis, expected to be the world's largest importer of
petroleum by 2020, surpassing North America, mirrors both the
opportunities and the pitfalls that lie ahead for the region, and for the
world at large. As the past year has illustrated, political, cultural, and
philosophical differences continue to threaten what has nevertheless been
unparalleled progress in recent decades toward economic integration,
political reform, and security cooperation.
China seems to be
on a slow but steady path away from Communism to a free-market economic
state, but its long-term intentions as a global power remain a riddle.
Will China become the partner it claims it wants to be, or will it choose
a more confrontational and hegemonic approach to achieve the greatness it
so obviously desires? Will economically bankrupt and reclusive North
Korea, with its enormous military structure and demonstrated thirst for
long-range missiles and weapons of mass destruction, join the march toward
"globalization," or will it be the protagonist in a bloody but
ultimately futile conflict with South Korea (and, therefore, with the
United States)? Will other countries in East Asia overcome the social and
political strife that threaten to tear apart some of the region's nascent
democracies, or will such nations as Indonesia--the world's fourth most
populous state--spin out of control and stunt the region's growth?
Progress
and Stability
As the past year
has demonstrated, there is ample evidence to support the case for
continued progress. It is largely up to the nations in the region to
determine whether they move forward or are held hostage by confrontation
and conflict, but the dominant U.S. role in the area--both diplomatically
and in military affairs--is critical to ensuring that a stable environment
can be maintained.
"The U.S.
presence in East Asia has been, and will continue to be, critical to the
region's stability and prosperity," according to the United States
Commission on National Security/21st Century. The commission, cochaired by
former Senators Gary Hart (D-Colo.) and Warren Rudman (R-N.H.), said in
the first of its three reports on the future of American defense policy
that, "Clearly, a reduction of U.S. commitment and engagement in East
Asia, especially if it is simultaneously abrupt and deep, will increase
the likelihood of instability as states struggle to define a new regional
balance of power."
In addition to
deterring conflict, the presence of 100,000 U.S. troops in the region has
served the equally important purpose of providing an environment for other
countries to focus their energies on political and economic
progress--largely by cultivating bilateral and multilateral relationships
with the region's key players, including potential adversaries.
The benefits have
been numerous. To begin with, the Asian economic downturn of 1998 that
threatened to spread like wildfire through global markets--but did not,
thanks in part to the strength of the U.S. economy and to international
loans--appears to be cycling back around. According to the Pacific
Economic Cooperation Council, the Pacific Rim at large is on the road to
recovery, with all but three of its 19 major economies projected to return
to growth this year.
The People's
Republic of China (PRC), whose actions are watched as closely as any other
in the world, has shown signs that it remains committed to economic
reform. Ten years after Tiananmen Square, when student protesters were
fired upon by Chinese troops, the political landscape has improved
somewhat. Indeed, much of what the protesters were seeking--better jobs,
an end to inflation, greater academic freedom, punishment for corrupt
government officials, and freedom of the press--has been provided through
continuing democratic pressures and the (perhaps reluctant) acquiescence
of the PRC leaders in Beijing. With multiparty democracies sweeping East
Asia in recent decades, the PRC no doubt feels more than a little
surrounded.
Relations between
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK--i.e., North Korea) and
the rest of the world have inched closer to normalization in recent months
than they have been since the Korean War. In exchange for the DPRK's
pledge to suspend its long-range ballistic missile program, which has been
advancing at a much quicker pace than Western intelligence officials
predicted just a year ago, the United States agreed to lift some of the
sanctions (on trade, banking, and travel) that have contributed to the
crippling of the North Korean economy. South Korean, Japanese, and
American officials hope the lifting of sanctions will lead to long-lasting
agreements that will bring Pyongyang into the global fold.
The United States
and other countries also are improving relations with Vietnam, and with
Indonesia, which had a disastrous year when popular rebellion led to a
scorched-earth policy in East Timor. Indonesia's acceptance of an outside
peacekeeping force in East Timor, however, may bring stability and, later,
independence to that troubled state.
In short, there
have been several success stories. But there also are negative forces at
work in the region that, if they remain unchecked by the United States and
its allies, could paralyze East Asia's moves toward peace and prosperity
and create major problems for the world at large.
PRC
Modernizes For "Unrestricted War"
Although well on
its way toward economic and--to a lesser extent--political reform, China
also is beginning to embark on the most extensive military modernization
program in the PRC's 50-year history. Some worry that this modernization
effort could, over the next 15 years, result in the emergence of the first
"peer competitor" to the United States since the fall of the
Soviet Union in 1991.
It still lacks
adequate numbers of ships and jet aircraft to successfully invade
Taiwan--perhaps the region's foremost flash point--but Beijing does have
the world's largest standing army and is working to improve nearly all
elements of its armed forces: conventional naval and air forces,
land-based missiles, nuclear weapons, and new and unconventional means of
warfare--the key to combat success in what Chinese military analysts have
called "unrestricted war."
China's naval
forces are considered to be relatively weak, but have demonstrated in the
past the threat they could pose to Taiwan, and to the region, should they
realize their long-term plans for advanced submarines, surface vessels,
anti-ship missiles, and other weapon systems.
Since late 1998,
China has taken advantage of the region's preoccupation with economic
issues to move toward its long-term goal of taking control of the entire
South China Sea. Beijing has reinforced its military presence on Mischief
Reef, roughly 135 nautical miles from the Philippines, which it first
occupied in 1995. It also appears to have stepped up its naval presence
within the Philippines' 200-mile exclusive economic zone with frigates,
supply ships, and a research vessel.
China-watchers
worry that these developments signal future plans to seize the Spratly or
the Diaoyu Islands. "With the Philippines considered the weakest in
the region militarily, the presence of the U.S. Seventh Fleet is all the
more important to keep China's designs on the South China Sea and its
critical sea lanes in check," according to Asian security expert
Barbara Stewart. The "gapping" of U.S. carriers and the
continued shrinking of the U.S. submarine force will make it much more
difficult to maintain that presence, of course.
Full
Order Book on Warships
China's pursuit
of enhanced maritime power is part of a larger naval buildup in the
region. Trade officials predict that China, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea,
Australia, and other countries could add between 200 and 300 ships to
their naval inventories over the next 20 years, with the bulk of them
designed for blue water operations far from their own shores.
China also plans
to purchase up to 200 high-tech jet fighters over the next decade, and to
develop and deploy short-range missiles that would primarily threaten
Taiwan, at least in the short term. A U.S. Department of Defense report
concluded that China's buildup of ballistic and cruise missiles will give
Beijing an "overwhelming advantage" over Taiwan by 2005. The
missiles, deployed largely in eastern and southern China, would "pose
a significant threat to nonhardened military targets, [command and
control] nodes, and Taiwan's military infrastructure," according to
the February 1999 DOD report to Congress. China is believed to have
already sited more than 100 of the missiles directly across from Taiwan,
and could deploy up to 600 more in the next several years.
These land-based
missiles are the same as those test-fired by the People's Liberation Army
during military maneuvers in 1996 at the time of Taiwan's national
elections. China's threatening moves prompted the United States to
dispatch two aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait, sending a clear
message that U.S. forces in the region would not sit idly by if China
tries to intimidate Taipei with the threat of military invasion.
Threatening
Rhetoric
In recent months
there has been concern that there could be a repeat of the 1996 incident,
which took U.S.-PRC relations to an all-time low and the likelihood of
armed conflict to an all-time high. Communist Beijing's goal of
reunification with the democratically elected government in Taipei turned
hostile once again in July 1999 when President Lee Tang-Hui of the
Republic of China (ROC) declared Taiwan to be a separate "state"
deserving of diplomatic relations with other countries.
Viewing this
shift in policy as a sign of ROC plans to seek independence, Beijing upped
its military rhetoric, threatening Taiwan with military invasion should it
seek to change the long-standing "one China" policy adhered to
by Beijing and Taipei as well as Washington.
In response, the
United States again deployed two aircraft carriers (USS Kitty Hawk and USS
Constellation, and their battle groups)--this time to the South China Sea,
where they conducted military exercises. The deployment "was a nice
way to let our friends and potential adversaries know that the U.S. Navy
remains committed to maintaining peace and stability throughout the
region," a senior U.S. military official said at the time.
The brandishing
of Chinese missiles has helped fuel a rallying cry in Taiwan and among
Taipei's American supporters for U.S.-supplied missile defenses to help
protect the island from a Chinese invasion. The Clinton administration has
treaded softly on this issue, out of fear of further antagonizing Beijing,
and has agreed to bolster Taiwan's defenses in less overt ways. One
example: the United States agreed last year to sell Taipei an
early-warning radar system to monitor PRC missile and aircraft launches,
but deferred action on the ROC's requests for active missile defenses,
such as Aegis radar-equipped missile ships, to supplement Taiwan's
U.S.-provided arsenal of Patriot antimissile systems.
Differences
of Opinion
The
Republican-controlled Congress has pushed a harder line, and proposed the
Taiwan Security Enhancement Act of 1999, which seeks to authorize the sale
or transfer of active missile-defense systems and other equipment. The
Clinton administration opposes the legislation, contending that it would
antagonize Beijing and initiate a dangerous arms buildup. China already
has threatened to increase its sales of missile technology to North Korea,
Iran, and other hostile states if the United States builds missile
defenses in East Asia.
Beyond the issue
of hardware, however, the U.S. government has quietly expanded its
strategic ties with the island in recent years. Authorizing the type of
extensive dialogue not seen since the 1970s, the Clinton administration
has worked more closely with Taiwan on the policy level. "The
discussions have turned from procurement to policy," according to a
Taiwanese military official. "It's things like: 'What are your aims?
What do you think? What do you see happening in the next five years?' We
never had that sort of conversation before. ... We share with the United
States the action plan if we were attacked."
In addition to
its buildup of short-range missiles, China made strides last year in its
long-range ballistic-missile program, conducting its first successful
flight test of the Dong-Feng-31. The missile, which has certain mobility
characteristics that will be extremely difficult to counter, is capable of
hitting targets throughout East Asia, including U.S. forces in the region.
Taiwan is taking
steps of its own to counter the Chinese threat, including bolstering its
submarine force to prevent a Chinese blockade that could cripple Taipei's
economy and accomplish almost the same result as a direct military
assault. Taipei also announced plans last year to purchase between six and
10 diesel-powered submarines from Germany; the first is scheduled to
deploy in 2005.
Angst
and Espionage
China's military
modernization program cannot be fully assessed without recounting the
nuclear-theft and technology-transfer scandals of the past year. Agents
working for Beijing--many of them scientists visiting U.S. nuclear
labs--allegedly pilfered design information on several of America's most
secret nuclear weapons.
It also was
reported that--inadvertently or otherwise--Americans provided Beijing with
sensitive information that could assist other PRC modernization efforts,
including missile and space launch technology and supercomputing
capabilities originally sold for commercial purposes but redirected for
military use.
According to a
bipartisan congressional report issued by Rep. Christopher Cox (R-Calif.),
Beijing stole design data for the W-88 (a sophisticated multiple-warhead
nuclear weapon) and the W-70 (an enhanced-radiation warhead commonly
referred to as the neutron bomb). Beijing has vehemently denied the
charges and described the report as "sensational lies"; the
Clinton administration has maintained that Beijing has not developed any
new strategic weapons as a direct result of the thefts.
Nonetheless,
according to American intelligence assessments, China could soon deploy
its first nuclear warhead based (in large part) on stolen U.S. technology.
The Dong-Feng-31 has a range up to 5,000 miles and reportedly is being
outfitted with a small nuclear warhead based in part on American nuclear
design technology. Moreover, China announced publicly in July that it is
now capable of developing neutron bombs. "This shows that the Cox
Report was hard-hitting and has caused the Chinese some angst," said
Rep. Porter Goss (R-Fla.), chairman of the House Intelligence Committee.
Other evidence
that the Chinese efforts to gain information on U.S. military technology
have improved the PRC's weapon-making capabilities includes the revelation
early last year that a U.S. scientist working on a classified Pentagon
project in 1997 provided China with secret data about a submarine-tracking
radar. U.S. officials now fear that the Chinese Navy could use the data
against submerged U.S. submarines
"The
War of the Future"
But as China
works steadily to improve its conventional and strategic forces, it faces
the strong likelihood that it will remain woefully behind the United
States and its allies in overall military capability--and may never catch
up. China's assessment of the U.S.-led NATO air campaign over the former
Yugoslavia led some of the PRC's military experts to conclude that
traditional means of confronting the United States will not be enough in
the future. For that reason, some Chinese military officers have been
espousing the doctrine of "Unrestricted War." The doctrine,
outlined in a new book with the same title, postulates that terrorism,
drug trafficking, environmental degradation, computer attacks on military
and civilian targets, propaganda wars, and other asymmetric ways to weaken
an enemy's capabilities might be crucial in facing a more conventionally
powerful adversary such as the United States. "Unrestricted War is
war that surpasses all boundaries and restrictions," the book,
currently popular within PRC military ranks, states. "It takes
nonmilitary forms and military forms and creates a war on many fronts. It
is the war of the future."
The unease in
many U.S. quarters about China's intentions are matched by similar unease
in Beijing about U.S. intentions--particularly in the wake of the U.S.-led
bombing campaign in Yugoslavia that resulted in the accidental bombing of
the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. "The problem now for China and other
non-NATO countries is [that] if NATO's scheme to dismember Yugoslavia is
realized, then the United States and its allies may further apply this
model to the Asia-Pacific and other regions to attack countries that
constitute a 'threat' to its global control," Zang Wenmu wrote last
year in Strategy and Management, a respected Chinese publication. China is
especially sensitive in this regard when it comes to Taiwan or even its
independence-minded province of Tibet.
Here, once again,
U.S. involvement in the region has proved crucial to preventing strained
ties from ballooning into something considerably worse. Despite the
evidence that the Pentagon's engagement policy with China has enabled
Beijing to leap ahead in its modernization efforts, continued
military-to-military ties have served as a calming influence. According to
Navy Capt. Brad Kaplan, U.S. naval attaché in Beijing, "an important
and visible indicator of progress in the mutual effort to improve overall
Sino-American relations is the expansion of military-to-military contact
between the two countries."
Late last year a
delegation led by Adm. Joseph Prueher, then commander-in-chief of the U.S.
Pacific Command and later nominated by President Clinton to be U.S.
Ambassador to China, met with senior PLA leaders as China hosted an
increasing number of port visits by the U.S. Navy. "The armed forces
of the two nations carry a special responsibility to build upon these
exchanges to continually enhance military relations for the benefit of the
peoples of China, the United States, and the entire Asia-Pacific
region," Kaplan said. Prueher, in his October confirmation hearing,
said that one of his top priorities will be to maintain open
communications with the Chinese.
Enigma
in North Korea
Stalinist North
Korea, despite signs it may be willing--to relieve famine and economic
hardship--to end decades of hostility with its neighbors and the United
States, remains a constant focus of U.S. military commanders, who still
consider an armed confrontation with Pyongyang one of the more likely
possibilities of a major theater war (MTW). Military leaders continue to
cite North Korea and Iraq when discussing the U.S. two-MTW warfighting
strategy.
Notwithstanding
the modest progress toward rapprochement with the West in recent months,
Pyongyang continues to pose a substantial threat to peace and stability in
East Asia, and in the past year has engaged in several activities that
serve as stark reminders of the DPRK's penchant for confrontation and
possible conflict.
In June, North
Korean torpedo boats fired on South Korean naval vessels in the southern
waters of the Yellow Sea after the two forces had been taunting each other
for more than a week. In response, South Korean forces sank one of the
North Korean boats. The incident came after a series of attempts by North
Korean submarines in recent years to infiltrate the south to gather
intelligence. In one such incident, in 1998, a submarine went aground and
South Korean forces spent several weeks hunting down the North Korean
"defectors" who had escaped into the South Korean countryside.
In another
indication that the North's recent willingness to formally end the Korean
War (only an armistice, not a peace agreement, was signed in 1953) may be
a bluff to receive much-needed aid, Pyongyang has been accused of secretly
developing nuclear weapons at a remote site prohibited from outside
inspection. This would be in direct violation of its 1994 agreement with
the United States, South Korea, and Japan to halt its nuclear weapons
program in return for nuclear-power-generation facilities that could be
used only for civilian purposes.
Drugs,
Missiles, and Counterfeiting
A new and
emerging threat from North Korea appears to be Pyongyang-sponsored global
crime. Authorities in nine countries have caught North Korean diplomats
shipping illegal drugs, for example; North Korean officials also have been
charged with money counterfeiting, and Pyongyang's embassies around the
world have been used to smuggle a wide array of goods. A Congressional
Research Service study released in early 1999 documented at least 30
incidents tying North Korean officials to drug trafficking.
The entire
region--and the U.S. intelligence community--was caught off-guard in 1998
when North Korea test-fired a three-stage Taepodong-1 medium-range
ballistic missile that soared over the Japanese mainland and splashed down
in the Pacific Ocean. The past year saw Pyongyang continue its missile
program--and provide technical assistance to Libya, Iran, Pakistan, Syria,
and other potential threat nations--with increased energy. These actions
appear to be the main drivers behind: (a) the acceleration of the U.S.
missile defense program; and (b) the long-overdue shift in the Clinton
administration's support for near-term deployment of a national
missile-defense system.
Until its verbal
agreement in September to halt its missile development program, North
Korea had been readying its Taepodong-2 missile for a live test. The test
missile reportedly was ready to go, with rocket fuel delivered to the
launch site in North Hamkyong Province. The Japanese, in particular, were
extremely jittery.
Tensions subsided
a bit with the Berlin Agreement, as the sanctions/missile deal is called.
It was reached just days after a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate
warned that the intercontinental-range Taepodong-2 probably would be
tested in the near future--moving North Korea closer to deployment of a
missile "capable of carrying a several-hundred-kilogram payload to
Alaska and Hawaii."
The agreement,
which came on the heels of a special investigation of U.S. policy toward
Pyongyang conducted by former Defense Secretary William Perry,
demonstrated a dramatic shift in U.S. policy. Just a few years ago,
Pentagon officials maintained that it was only a matter of time before
North Korea would collapse under the weight of its own failed policies.
Now there is a growing belief that North Korea may not reunify with South
Korea for years--if ever. Perry said that any assumptions about the future
of North Korea would be "imprudent," and that it cannot be
assumed that the regime in Pyongyang will collapse.
The United States
Commission on National Security/21st Century also concluded, in its
September report, that it is "altogether possible that Korean
unification could be delayed another 20 years or more."
Negatives
to Normalization
It is not yet
clear, moreover, that the Berlin Agreement will hold long enough to lead
to more long-lasting normalization efforts. According to several reports
in late October, U.S. intelligence officials have compiled evidence that
North Korea has not halted its missile development, and may even be
stepping up its sales of missile-related technologies. According to the
Washington Times, a classified report by the Air Force National Air
Intelligence Center affirms that Pyongyang "is continuing Taepodong
missile development." The intelligence report also says that North
Korea: (a) has tried unsuccessfully to ship missile components to
Pakistan; (b) has held discussions with missile experts from Iran; (c) has
supplied Syria with aluminum powder for use in the construction of
missiles and weapons of mass destruction; and (d) may be training
Congolese forces in exchange for uranium ore.
Responding to
Pyongyang's well-documented (and suspected) nefarious activities, the
United States has taken several steps to mitigate the North Korean threat
to South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. homeland.
The North Korean
ballistic-missile program and its surprising progress has led, perhaps
more than any threat, to a general consensus in the United States in favor
of deploying a limited national missile-defense system at the earliest
date practicable to protect against a rogue or accidental missile launch.
In the tactical
arena, the Pentagon has redoubled its efforts on cutting-edge theater
missile-defense programs--the THAAD (theater high-altitude area-defense)
system and airborne lasers, for example--and to protect South Korea,
Japan, and other allies from the North Korean threat. The U.S. government
also is considering revising a 1979 agreement with South Korea not to sell
the ROK any surface-to-surface missiles with ranges greater than 180
kilometers. South Korea has repeatedly requested missiles with ranges
nearly double that to counter the conventional military threat posed by
the North's million-man army, dug in a few short miles from Seoul, the
South Korean capital.
The continued
U.S. military presence in the region has undoubtedly given North Korea
pause about the potentially disastrous consequences of its actions. The
concessions the United States was able to extract from Pyongyang last year
would not have been possible without the active U.S. support of South
Korea and the 37,000 U.S. troops stationed in the ROK. The status quo
probably will hold as long as North Korea remains belligerent--but how
long that will be is anyone's guess.
"I can
hardly overstate my concern about North Korea," CIA Director George
Tenet recently told the Senate Armed Services Committee. "In nearly
all respects, the situation there has become more volatile and
unpredictable."
Japan
and Southeast Asia
U.S. ties with
democratic Japan have contributed, perhaps more than any other
Asia-Pacific alliance, to over 50 years of relative stability in the
region. Japan is now a global economic superpower and has foresworn the
imperialistic and militaristic policies that defined Tokyo in the first
half of the 20th century. Japan's membership in the family of nations is
one of the great success stories of 20th-century American politics and
strategy.
The U.S.-Japanese
alliance, which both countries agreed to expand and build upon in 1999, is
key to regional stability. Most U.S. military forces in the Asia-Pacific
are headquartered in Japan, which is the home of the U.S. Seventh Fleet
and other expeditionary forces. Most of the cost of the U.S. presence
continues to be paid for by the Japanese people.
The United States
and Japan took several steps in 1999 to jointly keep a lid on the region's
flash points, particularly with regard to North Korea and its missile
program. The United States agreed to help Japan deploy an expanded
missile-defense system, and recently approved the sale of high-technology
surveillance satellites to give Japan earlier warning of North Korean
missile launches and other threatening moves.
Reciprocating,
the Japanese parliament approved legislation to expand Japan's military
alliance with the United States and its ability to play more of an active
role in Asia-Pacific security affairs. Japan will allow U.S. forces to use
Japanese airstrips and hospitals in a future conflict; Japanese ships will
help with missions such as search and rescue; Japan will provide logistics
support; and it will help with the evacuation of personnel from regional
trouble spots.
Meanwhile, Japan
is readying its own Midterm Defense Buildup Plan, covering the five-year
period that begins in April 2001. The Plan is expected to focus heavily
on: (a) expanding Japan's relationships with other countries and its
participation in U.N.-sponsored activities such as peacekeeping; (b)
improving its readiness to repel aggression; and (c) enhancing even closer
Japanese-American military and security ties.
Japan's neighbors
to the south--the Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand, and
particularly Indonesia--all play pivotal roles in determining whether East
Asia will move forward or stagnate and slide into instability. The United
States and its regional allies have worked to improve ties with these
countries and, in the case of Indonesia, have responded rapidly to signs
of potential crisis situations.
Having renewed
ties with Vietnam just a few years ago, the United States is now moving
forward to build a long-lasting relationship with that county's government
and military. The heightened PRC presence in the South China Sea has led
to rumors of a Vietnamese invitation to the U.S. Navy to return to the
excellent harbor at Cam Ranh Bay. The United States and the Philippines
have mended relations, which deteriorated in 1991 when Manila failed to
extend the U.S. military presence. The two militaries recently agreed to
hold talks about possible U.S. military assistance to the Philippines and
an increase in port visits.
The internal
problems that Indonesia suffered during the past year provide the clearest
example of the positive influence the United States can have in the
region. Thanks in large part to the close U.S. ties with Indonesia, a
United Nations peacekeeping force was able to gain permission and then
enter the nearly destroyed province of East Timor in record time. The
International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), set to reach 11,000 troops
made up largely of regional countries, secured the independence-seeking
province from the militia attacks that left thousands of refugees in their
wake and turned much of the province's infrastructure into rubble. Without
U.S. airlift, sealift, command and control, intelligence, and other
support, INTERFET would not have been on the ground nearly as quickly as
it was, if at all.
Short-Term
Risk, Long-Term Gain
U.S. assistance
to refugees and displaced persons also has helped significantly. As in
Bosnia, Kosovo, and other crises, refugee assistance serves more than a
humanitarian purpose: It also gives civilians safe haven from attacks,
helps to defuse hostilities, and prevents conflict from spreading. And, as
in the other crises mentioned, the cost to the United States is relatively
small. The $30 million provided by the United States to care for refugees
in East and West Timor is administered by the United Nations and the
International Committee of the Red Cross, and is complemented by the
contributions of other nations.
U.S. engagement
in the Asia-Pacific, East Asia in particular, obviously has its pitfalls.
The U.S. presence in the region continues to be opposed by tyrannies like
China, North Korea, and others. Their animosity, and the perception that
the United Sates seeks to control the region, is sure to continue in the
decade ahead.
U.S. plans to
field missile defenses, both national and theater, will probably raise the
stakes in the region in the short term, throwing China as well as Russia
off balance. But the Asia-Pacific's ever-increasing importance to global
security--both physical and economic--demands that the United States
remain engaged, preparing to counter threats to regional stability while
at the same time helping to provide a stable environment in which all
nations in the area can prosper. The risks of engagement are not small,
but those risks would be much greater without it. Americans can take
comfort from the fact that the massive U.S. investments previously made in
East Asia already have led to the emergence of mature capitalist
democracies, and rolled back tyrannies on many fronts.
"From a
strategic point of view," the United States Commission on National
Security/21st Century says in its report, "the essential U.S. choice
may boil down to this: either remain engaged at greater short-term peril
and political cost to ourselves, or disengage at the potential cost of
greater long-term peril to everyone."
Next article: A
Year of Change--Much of It Progress
Back to: 2000 Almanac of Seapower Table of Contents |
