Interview with Gen. Henry H.
Shelton,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Editor in Chief James
D. Hessman and Senior Editor Gordon I. Peterson interviewed Gen. Henry H. Shelton for this
issue of Sea Power.
Gen. Henry H. Shelton,
the 14th chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, serves as the principal military advisor
to the president, the secretary of defense, and the National Security Council. Prior to
becoming chairman, he served as the commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operations
Command. Commissioned a second lieutenant in the infantry in 1963, Gen. Shelton's
extensive background with conventional and special operations forces includes a variety of
command and staff positions with units in the United States and around the world. He
served two tours in Vietnam and, as assistant division commander for operations of the
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), he deployed to Saudi Arabia for Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm. Gen. Shelton commanded the 82nd Airborne Division following the
Gulf War. While serving as commander of the U.S. Army's XVIIIth Airborne Corps in 1994, he
led the joint task force that conducted Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. A master
parachutist and Army Ranger, Gen. Shelton was graduated from North Carolina State
University and holds a master of science degree from Auburn University.
SEA POWER: The
continuing decline in U.S. military readiness has forged a growing consensus that there is
an urgent need to increase defense spending. What are the administration's plans for added
funding in the FY 2000 defense budget and the FYDP [future-years defense plan]? What are
your top defense-funding priorities?
SHELTON: We have to make
sure we do three important things: continue to maintain the quality of the people we have
in the armed forces--the number one priority for all of our commanders in chief [U.S.
combatant commanders] and all of the service chiefs; we have to maintain our current
readiness; and we have to invest for the future.
In December, the
secretary [Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen] and I rolled out the proposed new
compensation package that should be available for our men and women in uniform. It will be
submitted with the president's FY 2000 budget. Broadly speaking, there are three pieces to
the compensation package. The first is the pay raise that was proposed by the
president--3.6 percent for 1999 and 4.4 percent for 2000--which is a great start to narrow
the gap that has developed over the last 18 years between civilian and military pay. That
[pay raise] will be applied across the board for all personnel to stop the pay gap from
increasing.
In addition, the plan now
is to revise what is commonly referred to as the Redux [reduced] retirement system. The
proposed change to Redux is that, instead of getting 40 percent of the basic pay upon
retirement at the end of 20 years of service, the individual would get 50 percent. That
would also be tied into a better COLA [cost of living adjustment] than we currently have
applied to retirement. So it is a real win-win to fix Redux. Our service members now look
at the retirement system as a disincentive, rather than an incentive, for a military
career. It is the fastest growing item of dissatisfaction according to all the survey
results that we have been receiving. We want the retirement system to be an incentive for
our people to stay--not something that makes them think twice about whether or not they
want to stay for 20 years.
The third part of the
compensation package is to reform the pay tables. The seventh and eighth Quadrennial
Defense Reviews [QDRs] both recommended some type of reformation in the pay system, but it
never has occurred. We saw an opportunity at this point to change the pay table so that it
rewards performance rather than longevity--again, the biggest increase in 18 years. Right
now, if we have one of our great E-6s [enlisted pay grade E-6, a Navy petty officer first
class or Marine staff sergeant] with 10 years of service and he or she supervises an E-5
with 14 years of service, they make roughly the same amount. The idea is to apply the pay
to those mid-grade noncommissioned officers and officers so that as they are promoted in
their careers they are rewarded for those promotions rather than just getting the same
longevity pay raises along the way. That brings us closer to the private-sector system. It
rewards those who normally are getting promoted on time or ahead of their contemporaries.
Turning to
procurement--we are trying to continue along the investment line that will bring our
procurement up to $60 billion per year by 2001. During the QDR, we [the Joint Chiefs of
Staff] all recognized that, in order to make sure tomorrow's Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen,
and Marines have the technology they need to be well ahead of their contemporaries or
potential adversaries, we needed to continue to invest for the future--to raise that
investment amount up to the $60 billion mark. Last year we hit about $48.7 billion, and we
need to ramp up even further this year en route to $60 billion by 2001. By 2000 we hope to
be at $54 billion per year. That is very important, I think, because many of our ships,
aircraft, tanks, and vehicles are starting to show wear and tear, and we need to reinvest
to recapitalize the force.
These would be the
largest investment increases since 1985. Correct?
SHELTON: They certainly
would be. And this package would be the biggest pay increase in more than 18 years for our
armed forces. We have to maintain the quality of the people we have in the armed forces;
we have to maintain our current readiness; and we also have to invest for the
future--modernize. Those are my top priorities--in that order.
How do you assess the
current joint-operational capabilities of the U.S. military, and are they good enough to
cope with two MRCs [major regional conflicts]?
SHELTON: First of all, I
think that the complementary capabilities that each of our services bring to the battle
are what make this nation so great and what make us such a superpower. We have the world's
greatest Navy. We have the world's greatest Marine Corps. We also have the world's
greatest Air Force and Army. And when you take the best of what each brings to the fray
and have it interoperable, you have something that is unbeatable, unstoppable--it is truly
the best that you could ever ask for. With the focus that has been placed on
interoperability since the Goldwater-Nichols Act came into effect in 1986, our joint
capabilities just continue to get better and better. Each service still has its own
culture, its own customs and courtesies, its own identity. But we now can put it all
together on the battlefield in such a way that it almost brings tears to your eyes to
watch when you are a joint-forces commander. It is magnificent--as we saw in Desert Fox
[U.S. and British air strikes against Iraq in December 1998].
We have a two-MTW [major
theater war] requirement. The National Defense Panel was a little critical of our
strategy--saying that we really should focus on the future and not so much on two MTWs. I
think all of us in uniform would like to have the latitude of doing that, but the truth is
that not only do we have a two-MTW strategy, but that strategy is driven by the real
world. We have to be able to fight in two different directions at one time as a
superpower. We do not have the luxury of saying we will fight only in Southwest Asia, or
we will fight only in Korea.
The reality of the world
right now is that as a superpower we need to have the capabilities for both possibilities.
Do we have them? Yes, we do. But as we drew down our forces by 700,000 since 1991, we lost
a considerable amount of capability. Our military end-strength reductions have been larger
than the current forces of Great Britain, Germany, Denmark, and The Netherlands combined.
As we tailored the forces following the QDR, we have downsized and watched the risks
associated with fighting in two MTWs go from moderate, to high, to a solid high in the
second MTW. Can we still win? Yes, we can win both, but it will take longer in the
second MTW, and that length of time is translated into terrain given up and lives lost.
That is what worries those of us in uniform--we can still fight two major wars at current
force levels, but the strategy does carry greater risk.
We have the right
strategy today--and we're capable of dealing with both MTWs, as well as carrying out our
strategy of shape, respond, and prepare. We are engaged around the world. More often than
not, when a crisis develops we are on or near the scene with our forces. Our military
forces are, in many cases, really military ambassadors that carry out our strategy around
the world on a day-to-day basis. Each of our theater CINCs [commanders in chief of U.S.
unified commands] has his own theater-engagement plan and uses the forces allocated to him
to set the stage for operations later on, if necessary.
We talk about
response--being able to respond in two directions or to small-scale contingencies. And the
final piece--which is to prepare--means modernization. We must look toward the future and
ensure that when we commit our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines we give them a
technological edge, and we do not have them fighting with one hand tied behind their
backs.
There is considerable
congressional pressure to accelerate development and deployment of a National Missile
Defense [NMD] system. What is your assessment of current Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
[TBMD] and NMD development programs?
SHELTON: The Chiefs and I
fully understand our requirement as service chiefs and members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. We all take an oath when we assume office that says we will defend the United
States and the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic--and that includes
those who would attack us with missiles. We have been portrayed on occasion as being
"anti-National Missile Defense." We are not! The simple fact is that we do not
yet have the technology to field a national missile defense. We have, in fact, put some
$40 billion into the program over the last 10 years. But today we do not technologically
have a bullet that can hit a bullet. If you talk to BMDO--the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization--General Lyles [Air Force Lt. Gen. Lester Lyles, BMDO's director] will tell
you that it is a systems-integration challenge that they have not been able to overcome
yet. We do support continuing--as rapidly as we can--development of this capability.
We also have seen in
recent months, in places like India, Pakistan, and Korea, that the WMD and ballistic
missile threat is growing at a faster pace--in some cases, these countries are able to buy
technology from other sources. My colleagues--the Joint Chiefs and I--believe that when we
have the technology for NMD we ought to have the capability to be able to transition right
into deployment if the threat warrants it. I think this is something the American people,
the Congress, and the Joint Chiefs will have to assess when we get to that point.
We also will have to
assess where the ballistic-missile threat is in the grand scheme of things. As you know,
in our business we have to take risks every day. We only have, for example, a one-MTW
strategic-lift capability. We have designed it that way. There is risk with that. That
means you cannot flow the forces both ways simultaneously--you must get them to one MTW
and then turn and go the other way.
And there are other
serious threats out there in addition to that posed by ballistic missiles. We know, for
example, that there are many adversaries with chemical and biological weapons that can
attack the United States today. They could do it with a brief case--by infiltrating our
territory across our shores or through our airports.
So, the Chiefs question
putting additional billions of taxpayers' dollars into fielding a system now that does not
work or has not proven itself--and we do not think that one round hitting one missile is
proof positive that we should start fielding. But, once we have that technology, we think
we should proceed.
It has been suggested
that the Navy's Aegis ships could serve as a good stepping stone to TBMD and NMD. Does the
Department of Defense plan to restructure the Army and Navy BMD programs to form a
joint-program office with a single upper-tier kill vehicle for both services?
SHELTON: Nice try
[laughing], but I am not going to get into the programmatic details at this point! There
are many systems in the developmental stage right now. Aegis is a great ship. It serves a
very useful purpose, and I think it is a great weapons platform. When we get into theater
ballistic missile defense, there are requirements that the services have right now--all of
which I think are very valid requirements--that are being worked quite hard and are being
funded. I think we need to continue to pursue each of those. I talked a while ago about
complementary capabilities. This blends together very nicely on the battlefield in theater
ballistic missile defense--you have inland forces, you have ports and airfields that must
be protected, you have not only point-defense requirements but area defense, you have
lower tier, upper tier--all of this comes together to create a requirement for an
impenetrable defense mechanism.
At one point as an
airborne commander I was asked, "Why do you need a Marine Corps if you can do a
forceful entry?"And I went to great lengths to come up and brief the Commission on
Roles and Missions on why I thought both forms of forceful entry were so important for
this nation. We are not a nation that has to limit ourselves to one. We can afford
whatever defense we believe is required.
I think that we now have
the best of each service's BMD program, and I fully support them. Where it makes sense to
combine programs and save dollars, however, I also am big on that--I do not support
building two systems, both of which do the same job, just because each service wants its
own. If we can save taxpayers' dollars, then that is one of those areas where merging
would make perfectly good sense.
Admiral Prueher [Adm.
Joseph W. Prueher, commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Command] has described the North
Korean leadership as mercurial--with evidence of irrational decision-making. This must
pose a tremendous security challenge.
SHELTON: There is no
question about it. We are very concerned. The agreed framework with the North Koreans,
established in 1994, induced them to shut down their nuclear reactor and production of
plutonium. Some of the underground facilities they are constructing are of great concern,
and that is why we have Dr. Perry [former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry] engaging
them right now--to ensure that they are not violating the agreed framework. If they are,
we will have to consider where we go from there.
We maintain about 37,000
U.S. troops in Korea, so it is an area that is very much of concern to us in terms of the
threat posed by the North Koreans, particularly when they have 1.4 million troops poised
on a wartime footing north of the demilitarized zone. And, given the fact that they had a
missile launch this past August, they still devote their very scarce resources to develop
an even greater military capability--although many of their people are starving to death.
You made a brief visit
to the troops in Bosnia during the last week in December; how is the mission progressing
there?
SHELTON: When I returned
from my visit to Bosnia on 22 December I was really fired up. Despite the snow, the cold,
and the austere conditions, what I found there is exactly what I found wherever I go to
visit our forces--troops who understand the mission and understand how important that
mission is for the United States and for the people of the Balkans. They are preserving
the peace, and they know it. Without them and their NATO counterparts, there would be no
peace there right now.
They are performing
extraordinarily well. The military is now entering the fourth year in Bosnia. The military
tasks have, for the most part, been accomplished for the last two and a half or three
years, but civil implementation is not proceeding as fast. That is the area we are really
starting to push now--to try to get it moving. Until you have a justice system, until you
have law enforcement trained to international standards, until you have civilian
institutions in position, you really cannot have a self-sustaining peace--which is what it
is all about, so that we could pull out all of our troops and still leave behind a legacy
of peace.
I can't say enough good
about our troops and what I saw. As I was flying in and looking down on Bosnia, I thought,
"What a great armed force we have--here we are in Bosnia today; two days ago a
trained and ready force was taking it to Saddam Hussein, and while they were doing that,
down in Central America another nearly 6,000 U.S. armed forces were there trying to bring
relief to that storm-ravaged land while another 37,000 stood guard against North Korea's
aggression on the Korean peninsula.
Wherever you go, our men
and women in uniform are fired up, and every time I come back, I say, "That will last
me for another six months." I continue to fight the battles, but then--after about
two weeks--I am ready to go back to visit them again.
The initial BDA
[bomb-damage assessment] for Operation Desert Fox suggests U.S. and British targets in
Iraq were struck successfully with a high degree of accuracy and damage. What can you tell
us about the operation's broader implications--and the road map for U.S. strategy toward
Iraq?
SHELTON: We have
maintained a U.S. presence in the region for more than 50 years, beginning with naval
forces and expanded to ground and land-based air units in recent decades. It is a vital
strategic region for the United States. Consequently, I know that the men and women who
stand guard in that area--those on patrol on ships and in the air and those on the ground
engaged in exercises or operations--fully understand why they are there and how important
it is.
In this case, Saddam
Hussein has been given every opportunity since the Gulf War to show the UNSCOM [United
Nations Special Commission] inspection teams that he does not have weapons of mass
destruction--either through producing the documents, recording destruction, or by
cooperating fully with the UNSCOM inspection regime and monitors. But he has consistently
failed to do that. It reached a point last November, when he threw UNSCOM out and would
not cooperate at all, that he avoided a strike by minutes when he raised a "white
flag" again and said, "I will comply. I will do everything you ask of me."
He spelled that out very
clearly and President Clinton set the bar--the five conditions he has articulated on a
number of occasions.
But when he [Saddam
Hussein[failed to meet the standards set by the United Nations, he left the United States
and the U.N. Security Council no choice. But we had made it quite clear from the very
beginning that we [the United States] did not need a Security Council resolution to take
action if Saddam Hussein did not measure up to what he said he would do.
From a military
perspective, we achieved the objectives that were set and approved by the president for
Desert Fox. The forces participating could not have executed their mission any better--the
weapons systems and our people performed to the high expectations we had for them. I was
extremely satisfied with the outcome of the operation from a military perspective. Having
said that, we all recognize that the best answer--both for the United Nations and for
Saddam --is reestablishment of an inspection regime that would be able to verify that he
no longer possesses weapons of mass destruction or continues to pursue his weapons of mass
destruction program.
Unless that takes place,
the only alternative he leaves us now is to continue to enforce "no-fly,
no-drive" zones [regions in Northern and Southern Iraq where Iraqi military flights
and ground operations are prohibited] and to conduct maritime interdiction
operations--which we will do--and to maintain U.N. economic sanctions forever so that he
cannot continue to rebuild his conventional forces or weapons of mass destruction. If, in
fact, he continues to pursue them and we detect that he has, then Desert Fox may not be
the last strike that he will see. We will not stand by and allow him to develop weapons of
mass destruction.
Saddam is a tyrant. He
has already demonstrated his true colors by attacking his own people and the Iranians with
chemicals. We have forces in the region that are subject to that threat today, and we
cannot stand idly by and watch him press on with his desires to rebuild his program. We
would welcome a change in government in Baghdad, and we also would welcome very much the
Iraqi people rejoining the international community--which they deserve to do--and not
having to live under a dictator.
Closer to home, some
people say that the U.S. military's culture of values, ethics, and integrity is too
rigorous in today's society, and they advocate relaxation of the standards. How do you
respond to those suggestions?
SHELTON: We are the
element of government--of our nation--that has a very unique requirement: We must be
prepared to fight and win the nation's wars. This is a profession that requires
discipline; it requires integrity--including personal integrity by those who lead--and
trust.
We ask young Americans
coming into the service to give up a lot--many of their personal freedoms--in the interest
of joining a team and being part of an organization that is prepared to move very rapidly
into harm's way and to carry out whatever is`asked of them. When you blindly parachute out
of an airplane at night when the green light comes on it is based on your trust in the
leader who went out in front of you and the pilot who put the light on during an airborne
operation. Everybody goes! It is an act reflecting special trust and confidence,
and you must have people of high values--people who earn the trust and confidence of their
subordinates. This is necessary because, in essence, their subordinates may be asked to
carry out an order that might result in their deaths. I think that, unless you have the
respect of those who are getting those orders, you are going to have discipline problems.
I think, given our
environment--one recognized by the Supreme Court in giving us our own Uniform Code of
Military Justice because of our unique requirements for good law, order, and discipline in
the armed forces--our culture must remain the way it is. We should not apologize to anyone
for that; it has served this nation so well for more than 200 years.
On the other hand, we are
a part of American society; we come from varied backgrounds. Many people are concerned
with a so-called growing wedge between the armed forces and Americans in society in
general. I do not share that concern--although I am not oblivious to the fact that we have
fewer members of society today who have served in the armed services and a Congress with
diminishing numbers who have served.
Most of our men and women
in uniform live off post in the civilian community. As a general commanding the 82nd
Airborne Division, I was very interwoven into the local communities and just about
everything that went on. So, I really do not have the concern that we are developing a
force that is isolated unto itself--one that does not understand America and is going on
its own separate way.
Is there anything we
have not addressed that you would like to share with our readers?
SHELTON: Thank you. There
is one more thing we did not touch on, and that's how important the support of the
American people is for our men and women in uniform. I recognize a great deal of that
support is generated by service--support organizations, like the Navy League. You play a
valuable role in keeping the public and Congress informed about critical national security
issues. Keep up the good work! |
