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By
EDWARD C. WHITMAN
Dr. Edward C.
Whitman, the naval science advisor of the Center for Security Strategies
and Operations (CSSO) at Techmatics in Arlington, Va., is former deputy
assistant secretary of the Navy (C4I, electronic warfare, and space). He
was assisted in the preparation of this article by Dr. Scott C. Truver,
executive director of CSSO.
As the U.S. Navy
turns increasingly toward the littorals in the aftermath of the Cold War,
its submarine force faces a significant sea change in its missions and
responsibilities. Virtually none of the "new" taskings levied on
submarines are really new per se. Land attack,
intelligence-gathering, surveillance, and the insertion of special forces
all have been part of the submarine's repertoire for decades, but the
relative importance of such near-land activities within the overall
spectrum of U.S. submarine operations is now increasing rapidly--sometimes
at the expense of such blue water tasks as open-ocean antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) and serving in direct support of carrier battle groups.
In view of
today's renewed emphasis on using sea power primarily to influence events
on land, future submarine roles seem likely to fall into three principal
areas of naval warfare:
- Intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR);
- Sea control;
and
- Land attack.
In the first of
these, the innate stealthiness of the submarine facilitates reaching a
vantage point close to the objective that usually would be impossible for
more overt platforms, particularly in denied or contested areas. Because
of the minimal ASW capabilities possessed today by the Navy's most likely
potential adversaries, U.S. submarines probably will enjoy a much greater
luxury in operating close to the surface--even at periscope depth--and
this capability will translate into a significant advantage both in
deploying sensors above the surface and communicating the ISR
"take" back to the command authority. Indeed, submarines of the
Virginia (formerly New Attack Submarine) class--will deploy with a greatly
enhanced sensor and communications suite specifically focused on littoral
operations. Submarine-launched un-manned underwater vehicles (UUVs) and
unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) promise even more opportunities for future
ISR missions.
To gain sea
control in contested areas, its stealthy properties will make the
submarine the platform of choice to be "first in" to areas that
need to be sanitized of opposition forces before aircraft carriers,
conventional surface craft, or amphibious forces can move in. Even small
numbers of diesel-electric or AIP (air-independent propulsion)
submarines--or the mere suspicion of a mining campaign--can pose a
significant "asymmetric threat" to conventional surface forces.
The submarine's covertness fits it ideally to deal with these underwater
threats, either by ascertaining their whereabouts or by neutralizing them
directly. In a sense, these operations represent the remnant of the
direct-support role so prominent in the Cold War.
Because of the
proven ability of the submarine force to take its place alongside naval
aviation and surface ship missile "shooters" in supporting land
attack, strike operations will become increasingly important. The natural
covertness of the submarine allows greater flexibility in choosing missile
launch points close to the enemy's coast and often well within his
defensive air umbrella. This results in shorter flight times, greater
surprise, and increased targeting accuracy. The Tomahawk is fully
integrated now for both vertical and tube launching; new missiles now on
the horizon, such as a navalized (NTACMS) version of the Army Tactical
Missile System, will offer both tactical flexibility and increased
lethality for the future. In the context of both sea control and
land-attack missions, Rear Adm. Charles B. Young, director of submarine
technology at the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), describes the
submarine as "an extension of the battle group into denied
areas."
Why
Network Centric Warfare?
Network Centric
Warfare is the Navy's name for the new operational concept in which
mutually shared information and a common tactical picture will permit
coherent employment of the entire naval force as a single synergistic
entity. Vice Adm. Arthur K. Cebrowski, the Navy's foremost exponent of
this approach, and his colleague John Garstka noted in the January 1998
issue of the Naval Institute Proceedings, that Network Centric
Warfare:
"derives
its power from the strong networking of a well-informed but
geographically dispersed force. The enabling elements are a
high-performance information grid, access to all appropriate information
sources, weapons reach and maneuver with precision and speed of
response, value-adding command-and-control (C2) processes--to include
high-speed assignment of resources to need--and integrated sensor grids
closely coupled in time to shooters and C2 processes."
For the submarine
force, however, Network Centric Warfare is a two-edged sword. To be sure,
the potential exists for submarines to derive significant benefits from
the network-centric infrastructure as well as from other new levels of
mutual support--from allied forces, for example. At a time when
submariners are at some pains to break away from their Cold War tradition
of independent deep-ocean operations--the heritage of "the silent
service," as it were--a strong networking approach may be just the
mechanism required to force that transition. On the other hand, accepting
a network-centric role for the submarine force also imposes new
requirements, and demands certain sacrifices as well.
By its very
nature, littoral warfare demands what might be called a multimedia
approach, particularly since joint and combined operations probably will
be the rule rather than the exception. Land, sea, and aerospace forces all
will be present, and the undersea dimension will be critical. Submarines
will be called on to sanitize fleet operating areas, insert special
forces, perform minefield reconnaissance, gather intelligence, launch
land-attack strikes, and provide indications and warnings to forces
further out to sea. Thus, for the submarine to play a more integral role
than ever before, an increasingly robust networking of the total
force--and of the pervasive communications infrastructure that goes with
it--will be a key enabler. Rear Adm. W. J. Holland, USN (Ret.) describes,
in an essay in the May 1999 Proceedings, the new environment in
which submarines will be expected to function:
"Technocrats
predict that within two decades the Navy can expect to have remote sensors
directly linked to shooters; high-data-rate communications systems
connecting fixed and mobile nodes in a worldwide network; data warehousing
techniques that will permit the retrieval of information without deluging
the seeker with unneeded steps or data; fusion engines that will resolve
ambiguities in sensed data; computer-assisted decision aids thawill serve
as the basis for the commander's judgments; and more."
To adapt to this
pending revolution in naval warfare and its new ways of operating, several
relevant new technologies will be needed.
Technology
Challenges
Probably the most
significant challenge facing the submarine force in assuming a central
role in the Navy's network-centric environment of the future will be to
ensure sufficient connectivity to share in the information superiority
that will be the key to combat success in future conflicts.
Network-centric theorists envision three interconnected data
"grids"--planning, sensor, and engagement--to which all
participants need access in varying degrees. These grids or networks
correspond roughly, and re-spectively, to today's Global
Command-and-Control System (GCCS); tactical data links--such as the Joint
Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS); and the Cooperative
Engagement Capability (CEC). Successively, each of these grids handles
more finely grained and timely information from long-range planning data
through real-time target tracks and weapon assignments.
While it seems
unlikely in the near term that submarines assigned to joint littoral
operations will be actively participating in the air war, many scenarios
envision them undertaking land-attack missions against mobile as well as
fixed targets. Moreover, they often will need real-time connectivity to
the rest of the force for the timely reporting and transmission of
surveillance and reconnaissance information. These needs will be filled
largely by participation in the planning and sensor grids, which require
only modest information rates. Adm. Archie R. Clemins (commander in chief,
U.S. Pacific Fleet) noted in an interview in the Spring/Summer issue of Undersea
Warfare that the submarine's foreseeable need for tactical
connectivity could be satisfied by two-way information transfer at 128
kilobits per second (kbs), supplemented by the capability to copy the
Global Broadcast Service (GBS) periodically.
The submarine
force is turning to a host of new technologies to achieve that greater
connectivity. The 1997 Joint Warfare Interoperability Demonstration
(JWID-97) already has shown that bidirectional data rates of 33 kbs can be
achieved with existing BRA-34 and EHF (Extremely High Frequency) antennas
operating in a so-called "asymmetric UHF" mode, which uses the
UHF band to pass data and Low-Data-Rate (LDR) EHF to establish IP (initial
point) data-transfer protocols. Every SSN that has deployed with a battle
group since JWID-97 has been equipped for this purpose. On the near
horizon are the new OE-538 Multi-Function Mast and the mast-mounted
High-Data-Rate (HDR) dish antenna. The OE-538 will cover all the bands of
today's AN/BRA-34, including identification friend or foe (IFF) and the
Global Positioning System, and also will provide the HF, VHF, and L-band
for Link 16 connectivity.
The 538 mast also
will allow communications to be established through the Iridium system at
50 kbs, and will provide the VHF capacity needed to support special forces
operations. The steerable 16-inch HDR dish antenna will handle EHF
Low-Data-Rate/Medium-Data-Rate (LDR/MDR), SHF, and GBS from periscope
depth. These systems will begin to be fielded next year, and by 2004
should be standard equipment throughout the entire submarine force.
To establish
higher-rate communications at speed and depth, the Advanced Buoyant Cable
Antenna (ABCA) is scheduled to undergo an Advanced Technology
Demonstration (ATD) under sponsorship of the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC). ABCA
will provide two-way UHF satellite communications at rates in the 10-20
kbs range, and at even higher rates for line-of-sight transmissions to
surface ships and aircraft.
Beyond
the Near Horizon
The more distant
future offers even more exciting possibilities: underwater acoustic data
links at tactically useful rates, the potential for revitalizing
air-to-underwater laser communications with a new generation of
technology, and novel uses of fiber optics for connectivity with weapons,
UUVs, and other offboard sensors. As Clemins said in his Undersea
Warfare interview, "bandwidth limitations ... [should not] be an
issue for the submarine any longer."
Numerous other
technologies will serve as key enablers for bringing the submarine force
into the era of Network Centric Warfare. As the ship best suited to
operate covertly in enemy waters, and best able to work close-in to
hostile coasts, the submarine is a sensor platform second to none. In
addition to her traditional sonar capabilities, increasingly moving toward
the higher frequencies and shorter wavelengths needed for high-resolution
sensing in the littoral, a wide variety of new mast-mounted sensors are
becoming available for infrared, visual, and radar observations, for
electronic support measures (ESM), and for active rangefinding.
Moreover,
submarines already have controlled UAVs from periscope depth and have
downloaded UAV sensor outputs in at-sea demonstrations. Concepts now on
the drawing board foresee the use of expendable submarine-launched
UAVs capable of providing what NAVSEA's Young describes as "a
10,000-foot periscope." In any event, the new submarine HDR antenna
will be able to provide for the additional radio frequencies needed to
communicate with UAVs, and the other possibilities are boundless.
As the first
new-construction submarines to benefit from many of these developments,
the Virginia-class boats, with their state-of-the-art electro-optic "photonics"
masts and mast-mounted sensor suites, will be particularly well-optimized
for serving in the littorals as a key node in the network-centric sensor
grid. The Virginia-class SSNs also will break new ground by deploying with
a new generation of onboard C4I capabilities. With new wideband local-area
networks available for the dissemination of internal communications and
tactical data, and a new wide-open layout with multipurpose large-screen
displays for the control room--now called the "Command-and-Control
Center"--the Virginias will be fully linked to external targeting and
intelligence grids. They also will be ideally prepared to display the
common tactical and operating pictures and to augment them with their own
local information. Many of the innovations planned for the Virginias will
be backfitted into earlier classes of attack submarines.
The growing use
of underwater offboard sensors, in the form of both UUVs and more modest
"leave behind" surveillance packages, expands the reach of the
submarine in still another dimension. The Near- and Long-Term Mine
Reconnaissance Systems (NMRS and LMRS) are only the first of an
anticipated series of UUVs that will allow standoff reconnaissance of
potential minefields, staging and approach areas, and bottom conditions.
Both fiber-optic
and underwater acoustic telemetry are prime candidates to transfer data
from remote sensors, and several prototype systems are already in use.
The Navy also is
on the threshold of a new generation of submarine payloads, with
vertical-launching systems the first step in breaking the so-called
"tyranny" of the 21-inch torpedo tube. A recent submarine
technology Memorandum of Agreement between DARPA and the Navy emphasizes
the development of new submarine payload concepts, including: (a) modular,
reconfigurable, free-flooding weapon "bomb-bays"; (b) the
external storage of rapid-response weapons; and (c) several novel
auxiliary vehicles. Implementation of these and other concepts would lend
extraordinary flexibility to the submarine force's repertoire of
capabilities for littoral operations, particularly in the areas of strike
warfare and the support of special forces.
Future
Challenges and Directions
The shift to
Network Centric Warfare promises exciting times for the submarine force as
it enters a period in which increased connectivity "will
significantly open up what submarines can do," according to Capt.
Michael Sharp, the program manager for submarine communications at the
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command.
But there are
still some unresolved issues and a few nagging concerns. Creating a
meaningful role for submarines in Network Centric Warfare--particularly in
the littorals--demands, for example, that they operate closer to the
surface for longer periods of time than they have in the past. The
physical need to deploy ISR sensors above water in shallow coastal areas
and the greater and more continuous connectivity required to participate
in sensor, planning, and engagement networks will inevitably cost the
submarine some degree of its primary advantage--stealth. This trade-off
between the tradition of the silent service and the necessities of
"relevance" in the New World Order is troubling to many.
Holland, in an
earlier Proceedings article, discusses the unique problems
submarines will encounter in maintaining continuous radio connectivity,
handling large amounts of data, and folding their own weapons into a
common engagement pool. To be sure, the U.S. submarine force is no longer
facing a Soviet-style blue water enemy, and in many plausible combat
scenarios--particularly against relatively unsophisticated opponents--some
degree of stealth can be sacrificed safely in operating and communicating
at periscope depth. Although stringent covertness may be required for some
missions, with connectivity achieved only sporadically--and then only when
absolutely necessary--many of the new combat scenarios now envisioned will
indeed require periods of continuous communication.
Holland believes
that existing submarine C3 (command, control, and communications)
capabilities are "perfectly adequate" for operating
independently in traditional missions. It is only when the submarine
becomes part of a battle group and is required to join in collaborative
planning and/or to transmit information up the command chain in real time
that current systems and capabilities fall short. While selective access
by local units to large centrally held data bases is a key enabler of
knowledge superiority in network-centric operations, the submarine force
more likely will make maximum use of user "pull" technologies to
minimize both the communications load and the actual percentage of time
submarines are required to maintain continuous connectivity with
command-and-control networks.
Adapting the Cold
War technique of consolidating tactical data at "Shore Targeting
Terminals" for automatic transmission to forward-deployed
submarines--using burst techniques when communications are established--is
a useful approach that also might be adopted. As Holland expresses it,
"Passing the vital, repackaging the important, and shelving the
mundane all can be done by teams at the appropriate command-and-control
center."
Situational
Awareness Vs. Need for Stealth
Bringing
submarines within the framework of Network Centric Warfare also will
require flexibility in fusing and interpreting the common tactical
picture. In the classic network-centric approach, common knowledge of the
precise position of all allied forces, and of all known or suspected
hostile contacts, is essential to situational awareness and may subsume
much of the traditional IFF function. Beyond the near-continuous
connectivity with submarines this requirement entails, it also implies
that each submarine's position--ideally as accurate a position as
possible--would be disseminated widely throughout the force. Even if the
security of submarine locations could be guaranteed, this is so much at
variance with past practices--and potentially so inimical to the inherent
stealth of the submarines--that the need for compliance is sure to give
rise to intense debate.
In some sense,
then, Network Centric Warfare may act as a great "leveler"
within naval forces of the future, blurring the distinction between the
way submarines and other platforms are employed in warfighting tasks.
Lacking, since the end of the Cold War, the near-term credible threat of a
deep-ocean submarine adversary, the U.S. submarine force has been
hard-pressed to resist the downsizing pressures that have literally
halved--from 100 boats to 50--the planned force level for nuclear attack
submarines. In that context, and with the submarine force "looking
for new missions" within the rapidly changing warfighting
environment, taking on roles that surface ships, and even aircraft, have
largely performed in the past may be necessary for survival.
As noted earlier,
however, this also may mean sacrificing some degree of the submarine's
primary distinction--its inherent stealth--to maintain a place at the
table. These are important and troubling issues, and the Navy's turn
toward Network Centric Warfare--forward-looking and more synergistically
effective though it may be--only sharpens those issues.
The technologies
are now in hand--particularly in communications--to enable submarines to
play as large, or as small, a role in this new warfighting strategy as
they are willing to assume. New doctrine and corresponding concepts of
operations need to be defined, and then refined, in exercises and
fleet battle experiments.
In the best-case
scenario, a workable compromise eventually will emerge that exploits the
submarine force's ability to be "covert when required, overt when
desired"--while also facilitating its fuller participation in
littoral and expeditionary warfare. In this period of transition,
network-centric operations will be the ideal vehicle for bringing the
submarine force "in from the cold" of the Soviet era and into
the more complex, more challenging, and in many ways more dangerous
littoral-warfare conflicts of the 21st century.
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