By
TOM PHILPOTT
TOM PHILPOTT, a
freelance journalist, has spent more than 20 years covering the U.S.
military as a reporter and editor, including more than six years as editor
of Navy Times. His articles have appeared in the Proceedings of the U.S.
Naval Institute, The Washingtonian Magazine, and Readers Digest. In May
1994 he began syndicating a weekly news column, Military Update, which now
appears in 50 daily newspapers that strive to keep military readers
informed on national-security matters.
The final year of
the 20th century saw five U.S. Navy aircraft carrier battle groups and two
amphibious readiness groups involved in combat operations--a level of
naval engagement not seen since the 1990 Persian Gulf War. At the same
time, the size of the fleet continued its inexorable decline to the
smallest U.S. fleet since 1931--when the Depression-era Navy numbered 308
active ships.
If the average
American failed to realize this, blame it not on apathy but on warfare's
changing nature--and a changing world. Modern warfare at the end of the
20th century involved smart bombs and cruise missiles--most of them
dropped or launched by the world's only remaining superpower, the United
States, leading an alliance, NATO, that also has no peer.
Its dominance
makes the United States a popular country to call in times of
international crisis. And if the United States wants to deliver a swift
response with bomb, missile, or an intimidating presence, forward-deployed
naval forces most often get the nod, as they did again last year.
Amid a fast-paced
and demanding operational environment, three issues seemed to occupy the
attention of naval leaders and shape their near-term agendas as 1999 drew
to a close--worries about force structure and force quality, and an
emphasis on new technologies offering revolutionary warfare capabilities:
- Force
Structure: Given the extraordinary pace of operations in the post-Cold War
era, ceilings on the numbers of submarines, air wings, and surface
combatants set by the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) have come in
for a blast of criticism from the Navy's top admirals.
- Force Quality:
Attracting and retaining the right quality and number of personnel were
top priorities for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1999, and they were helped
by Congress and, to a lesser extent, the Clinton administration. Naval
leaders are pressing for sustained increases in pay and benefits and
insisting that new ways be found to improve Sailors' working conditions
and reduce their time away from families.
- Information
Technology: The Navy made long strides in 1999 toward unlocking the power
of the information age to enhance the way it fights, communicates, and
sustains Sailor morale.
Answering
the Bell
In late 1998, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff pulled the readiness alarm, warning Congress in
blunt testimony that years of budgetary neglect and an intensive operating
tempo had brought the services to the edge of crisis. Overall preparedness
was in decline, and personnel quality was falling, most sharply in the
technology-heavy Navy and Air Force. In response, tens of billions of
dollars were added to the fiscal year 2000 defense budget to improve pay
and future retirement plans, and to beef up spending on critical readiness
items to remedy spare-parts shortages and repair backlogs.
Adm. Jay L.
Johnson, chief of naval operations (CNO), called it a "pivotal
year" but warned that one robust budget will not end the Navy's
readiness challenge. Indeed, Johnson said, the Navy received only about
half of the added $6 billion per year sought by the CNO. Over the course
of the Future-Years Defense Plan, the annual increases sought by CNO total
$36 billion in additional funding.
"Overall, we
haven't really turned a big corner yet," Johnson said.
"Investments in operating and maintenance (O&M) accounts and
manpower accounts are starting to give us more fidelity at the deck plate
but it takes so long." A year after the first infusion of O&M
dollars, Johnson said, he still finds it "very frustrating" to
visit ships and aircraft squadrons "and hear the same stories about
not having this or not having that ... but it's a work in progress."
The pace of
operations did not slow in 1999, not with NATO's air campaign over Kosovo
and Serbia, continuing air patrols over Iraq, and rising tensions in the
Western Pacific. Rear Adm. Michael G. Mullen, director of surface warfare
for the Navy staff (OPNAV), noted that, over an 84-month period ending in
September 1999, naval forces participated in 80 contingencies--from combat
to peacekeeping, from noncombatant evacuations to disaster relief.
"It has become so routine that I worry about it being taken for
granted," Mullen said. If that happens, Sailors will not get the
attention or equipment they deserve.
Maj. Gen. Dennis
T. Krupp, director of the expeditionary warfare division, used a different
yardstick. U.S. amphibious forces, he said, responded to 44 crises in the
final two decades of the Cold War, ending in 1989. In the decade
since--with a much smaller fleet--it has responded to more than 100
crises.
"I don't see
anything to change that landscape" of contingency after contingency,
said Vice Adm. Conrad C. Lautenbacher Jr., deputy CNO for resources,
warfare requirements, and assessments. He enumerated some of the
lesser-known operations of the past year: maritime intercepts in the
Persian Gulf and Red Sea; peacekeeping in East Timor; disaster relief
following earthquakes in Turkey.
It is not just
the pace of operations that has naval leaders desiring more resources and
more platforms. It is also the risk associated with shuttling fleet units
from one part of the world to another to cope with the latest crisis or
contingency--drawing down U.S. naval presence in key geographic areas of
vital interest to the United States. Peacekeeping assignments also are
often preceded or accompanied by hostilities--or run the risk of
transitioning to low-intensity warfare very quickly. Every air wing that
works up for deployment now "is getting ready for combat," said
Rear Adm. John B. Nathman, director of air warfare for OPNAV.
"There is
just a lot going on in an unstable world," said Lautenbacher. "A
lot of nationalistic, ethnic, and religious strife is not contained by any
mechanism other than world order under the United Nations [U.N.] and led
by the United States. Our involvement in all regions seems to be critical
to economic and political stability."
Force-Structure
Strain
As 1999 came to a
close, Navy leaders openly questioned whether fleet levels set by the last
QDR were realistic. Aircrews and aircraft may perform flawlessly over
Kosovo and Iraq, but they still feel the stress of having only 10 air
wings rotating for deployments on 12 aircraft carriers. The Navy is
"on a slow trend to bust operational tempo for air wings because we
don't have the right mix," said Nathman. "The 11th air wing has
got to be part of our story."
Demand for
"missile shooters," both surface-combatant warships and
submarines, also stayed high during 1999, even as their numbers slid too
far toward the QDR goal of 305 surface ships and 50 attack
submarines--down from October 1999 levels of 327 and 57, respectively. The
Navy's submarine- and surface-launched Tomahawk cruise missile
demonstrated remarkable around-the-clock, all-weather accuracy during
Operation Allied Force--including numerous strikes against mobile Serb
targets.
"Since we
took those decisions in the last QDR, you see how busy we are," said
CNO Johnson. "Our sense is [that] we cannot get any smaller and,
indeed, we may need to get larger. I make no apologies for that. That's
what the world requirement for the Navy's utilization has shown us the
last three years." The days of assuming that the Navy needs to get
smaller are over, Johnson said. "As we put together our next QDR
effort, we have to be real honest with ourselves about the glide path
we're on in number of ships, force structure, and how we deploy ... and
then ask ourselves very honestly, 'Do we have the numbers right?'"
Adm. Frank L.
Bowman, director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, believes that
the Navy is "understructured across the board, but particularly in
attack submarines." A new Joint Staff report on submarine
requirements, due out a month ago, was said to recommend raising the
ceiling on attack submarines (SSNs) from 50 to a figure between 62 and 68.
Meanwhile, the
inventory of attack submarines fell by another eight in 1999. That means,
at any given time, only 12 to 13 attack submarines are on patrol around
the globe versus a requirement for 15 to 16, said Rear Adm. Malcolm I.
Fages, director of submarine warfare for OPNAV. "There is a plethora
of things we are unable to do across all mission areas, including even the
highest priorities, National Command Authority tasks, and special
operations. We just don't have enough assets."
U.S. submarine
presence in the Mediterranean, for example, has fallen from an average of
four boats on patrol to a new average of 2.5. The drop comes at a cost.
The submarine force routinely turns down intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) missions it no longer can fulfill. Exercises with
allied forces are rare. "We anticipate essentially eliminating our
ability to participate in counterdrug and Arctic operations very
soon," said Fages.
But submarines
continue to deliver a powerful punch. They fired 25 percent of all cruises
missiles launched against Iraqi and Serb targets last year. Within the
context of strike warfare, the submarine's contribution "has
increased significantly," Fages said.
Two primary
initiatives are under study to increase efficiently the number of attack
submarines. The first would scuttle plans to retire eight Los
Angeles-class attack submarines and instead refuel them. For an added cost
of $300 million each per year, the Navy could extend the life of eight
submarines 12 to 15 more years. "That's a bargain,'' Fages said. The
second initiative would convert four Trident ballistic-missile submarines,
due to leave the fleet, into guided-missile SSGNs. The new-model
submarines would carry seven cruise missiles in each of 22 of the current
24 Trident missile tubes. "The SSGN, configured for strike, would
have about as many Tomahawk missiles as are resident in the entire carrier
battle group today,'' said Fages. The SSGN, while not an attack submarine,
still could carry out other missions, including the delivery of special
warfare units.
Surface
Navy
The number of
surface combatants stayed level in 1999 at 116. "I certainly do not
want to drop below that number," said Rear Adm. Michael G. Mullen,
OPNAV's director of surface warfare. In the short term he is confident
that the Navy will not. Mullen is more worried about long-term
shipbuilding. To maintain the fleet at 305 ships in 2005, the Navy needs a
build rate of eight to 10 ships per year. So far, budgets do not
accommodate that plan. Not until the middle of the decade will the
shipbuilding program rise to a level sufficient to sustain 300 ships, said
Lautenbacher. Congress views the matter with concern and has directed the
Department of Defense to submit a detailed shipbuilding report in
February.
Naval
Air
Despite thousands
of combat missions over Kosovo and Iraq, naval aviation had its safest
year in history in 1999, with only nine major accidents and seven
fatalities through 1.16 million flying hours. That rate of .77 accidents
per 100,000 flying hours is the lowest ever recorded. By contrast, in
1998, the Navy had 27 major mishaps for an accident rate of 2.32 per
100,000 flying hours.
Nathman partially
attributed this impressive achievement to "landmark"
improvements in the way pilots are trained. Pools of trainees waiting at
various points in the pipeline for their next phase to begin have been
eliminated. "We know it's important to sustain the flying part,"
he said. Total training time has been cut 20 percent, he said, so that jet
pilots now complete training in two and a half years "street to
fleet," and are better prepared for the fleet squadron.
"We are
still getting the air wings down too low in terms of readiness" after
squadrons return from deployment, Nathman said. "The slope to climb
back up to deployed readiness is a challenge." More budget dollars
have been pumped into maintenance and spare parts, but more time could
elapse before squadrons see the improvements.
Personnel
Challenges
Though
acknowledging the seriousness of "platform and mission issues,"
particularly with respect to attack submarines, Secretary of the Navy
Richard Danzig said the most significant problem the Navy still faces is
attracting and keeping quality people. "We know we're not retaining
at as high a rate as we want," he said. "We know recruiting is a
substantial challenge."
In 1999, the Navy
completed its post-Cold War drawdown, eliminating a final 9,000 Sailor
billets to level off at 372,000, so it should begin the first period of
stability in the personnel arena in 25 years, said Vice Adm. Daniel T.
Oliver, chief of naval personnel until his recent retirement. But leveling
off after a drawdown means tough challenges in other ways. For the first
time in a decade, the Navy must recruit a new Sailor for every Sailor who
leaves--and 58,000 are expected to leave this year.
The Navy met its
recruiting goal of only 53,000 in FY 1999 after missing the mark by 7,000
a year earlier. To succeed in 1999, the Navy increased its recruiting
force by 50 percent and launched a "Proven Performers" program
to double--to 10 percent--the number of non-high-school diploma graduates
who can enlist if they score well on the entrance exam and demonstrate
solid work records. To meet its goal, the Navy also placed a moratorium on
separating overweight Sailors or those who failed biennial
physical-fitness tests.
For the third
year in a row, the Navy missed its retention targets. The reenlistment
rate sought for first-term Sailors was 32 percent. It came in at about 28.
Second- and third-term reenlistment rates for career Sailors also were
disappointing. Retention rates of mid-grade officers fell 10 to 12
percentage points off target but were turning around at the end of
1999--thanks to new retention bonuses across the warfare communities.
Danzig said he
wants the Navy to move beyond "simply solving" personnel
challenges "to effecting a transformation in Sailors' lives."
The service needs "to stop thinking of Sailors as a relatively free
good"--the mindset from the era of conscription--and treat them as
"professionals whom we need to treasure and develop." Danzig was
leading an effort to arrange college credits for early Navy training, to
improve living spaces, and to reform the personnel system to treat
enlisted personnel more like officers in the way careers are laid out and
developed.
Perhaps the most
important factor affecting Sailor morale "is the perception of the
American people on the work of the military," said Vice Adm. Robert
J. Natter, deputy CNO for plans, policy, and operations. "That's
where [President Ronald] Reagan contributed even more than he did in pay.
He made the military, through the American people and Congress, feel good
about this profession. That was a huge factor and needs to improve, in my
judgment."
Shortage
At Sea
The Navy ended FY
1999 still short 12,000 Sailors in seagoing billets. But that gap was down
from a shortfall in November 1998 of more than 19,000 vacant billets at
sea. "You can't wipe that out in a year," said Lautenbacher.
"It's just too hard."
The USS Abraham
Lincoln carrier battle group deployed in 1998 roughly 800 Sailors short.
"The most recent carrier deployment [in the fall of 1999] was only
150 short," said Lautenbacher. Ships between deployments are still
living with shortfalls. "But now we are able to make sure deployed
forces are manned just about right."
Just over 50
percent of U.S. ships were underway at any given time in 1999. More than
30 percent were on six-month deployments, up from "just over 20
percent" deployed a decade ago. Another busy year, said Mullen.
"We must give [Sailors] some down time," he said. "They
joined the Navy to see the world. So we've got to get them on liberty in
good ports. ... If we do that, there is a tendency to hook them for
life."
"We are
right up against the stops in the personnel tempo, and that is the biggest
concern," said Natter. "They're racing out, answering the bell,
answering another bell and then coming home. We are very concerned that
we're stretching that wire to the point where people don't want to do it
anymore."
The pace of
operations, though high, remains "controlled," said CNO Johnson.
No ship is exceeding six months at sea, "portal-to-portal." The
long hours Sailors work when they return to home port causes the greatest
stress, he added. A year ago, at Johnson's direction, commands were
ordered to reduce the workload during interdeployment training cycles by
25 percent. "We're almost there," Johnson said. "We've
gotten a lot of what you might call the low-hanging fruit. Now it's a
little more sporting. But there's no magic in 25. I would like to go for
more."
Information
Age
Last year the
Navy intensified its communications revolution, installing a voice, data,
and video package called IT21--Information Technology for the 21st
Century--on four more aircraft carrier battle groups and four amphibious
ready groups. When combined with more aggressive use of the Internet,
battle force commanders down through deck-plate Sailors are able to shrink
the world through the new technology.
"The battle
group commander now has the ability to process a lot more information from
the beach and pass it around the battle group [with] the simultaneous
ability to collaborate in real time, by voice or operational e-mail, with
commanders on other ships," said Rear Adm. Richard W. Mayo, director
of space, information warfare, and command and control for OPNAV.
"The idea of collaboration has really transformed operations at
sea." Operational commanders have been creating secure Internet web
pages to share mission plans and responsibilities, allowing every
participant to punch up what has occurred in real time to review mission
orders, details, and milestones.
"The
commander controlling the web site can just update it whenever new contact
information or changes in mission are wanted," said Mayo. "We've
almost gotten out of the mode of having to do individual radio phone calls
or individual messages." The system mirrors capabilities provided by
the Internet--just a little more sophisticated and a great deal more
secure. "We brought that to sea with IT21," Mayo said. Thirty
years ago information reached the ship through high frequency radio
transmissions, perhaps even Morse code, at a maximum rate of about 100
words a minute. "Today, with IT21, we're up to transmission speeds of
56 kilobytes, 128 kilobytes, and, on our large ships, 1 megabyte of
information per second," said Mayo. A ship's information pipeline,
once limited to the stream of Teletype, now flows with data, voice, and
video.
Submarines, too,
can take advantage of IT21, said Mayo, adding antennas to increase
data-rate collections from standard satellite technology. "Without a
doubt," said Mayo, "IT21 has been the hallmark achievement of
what we've been able to do for the fleet this year."
During the
Persian Gulf War in 1991, air-tasking orders with targeting data had to be
delivered to aircraft carriers by helicopter from the Desert Storm air
command in Saudi Arabia. Satellite communication "pipes" were
too narrow. IT21 allows real-time transmission of a lot of data, including
strike orders. "We are completely out of the business of flying the
air-tasking order around by helicopters, and into the big leagues in
information throughput." On-scene commanders with the U.S. Sixth
Fleet praised the improved operational impact demonstrated during the air
war over Kosovo.
By the fall of
1999, a third of the fleet was upgraded with IT21 capability. The system
should be installed in the entire fleet, Mayo said, by October 2002.
"Fleet commanders are enthralled with the capability," Mayo
said.
One of the
greatest difficulties with IT21 is the impact on operations with allies.
"It is a real problem because more and more maritime naval activities
overseas have a coalition component," said Mayo. To promote allied
involvement, the Navy has developed a "low-end interoperability
solution" for IT21, a compromise that does not require U.S. allies to
buy faster, more expensive, more sophisticated systems. "The only gap
that exists [with] our allies is a resource gap," said Mayo. They
need to make the commitment to buy the equipment. Allies, Natter said, are
not spending enough on defense in general, and on command and control
specifically.
The first IT21
installations on U.S. ships generated interoperability problems that were
manifested during critical at-sea work-ups and predeployment training
periods, Mayo said. By year's end, systems were being installed on
deploying ships earlier and faster so Sailors had time to train on them
before deployment. The Navy's systems commands and fleet staffs followed
through aggressively to implement a plan developed in 1998 to improve
configuration management and to identify and correct system problems
before ships went to sea.
The submarine
force also is investing in IT21, with new investments aimed at expanding
bandwidth and high-data-rate capability. IT21 will improve connectivity
and enhance command, control, and communication, officials said. A
submarine soon will test a buoyant cable antenna that will allow Internet
protocol exchange between submarines operating at speed and depth--without
requiring the submarine to put an antenna out of the water.
CEC
and AEGIS
The Navy is one
year into a two-year fix of software compatibility problems between two
critical systems: the Aegis radar and the Cooperative Engagement
Capability, or CEC. The problem forced USS Hue City and USS Vicksburg, two
Aegis Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruisers outfitted with CEC, to
miss a deployment in 1998. By late fall 1999, the Navy completed an
underway test of CEC and Aegis aboard the same two ships. The systems had
been integrated, and they worked.
"We have
made spectacular strides in solving that kind of [software] problem,"
said Mullen. The two cruisers still weren't battle-group-ready by the
fall, he said, but they were in "much better condition than a year
ago." CEC uses sensors from a variety of platforms to present one
unambiguous track for an incoming missile or enemy aircraft. It does so by
sharing sensor data in real time, calculating the best firing solution,
and determining which platform should fire. It has enormous implications
for Theater Ballistic-Missile Defense. "There is no other technology
that competes with it," said Mullen. "It's center stage to the
future of an integrated battlespace."
Regarding
Ballistic-Missile Defense (BMD), the Navy expects to start test-firing a
missile-defense weapon within two to three years. Mullen calls BMD the
"most significant" mission the surface Navy--indeed the whole
Navy--will have in the future.
The Navy, he
said, should have a robust missile-defense capability by 2007. "World
events in 1999 conspired to teach us a lesson: that human nature hasn't
changed much," said Vice Adm. Oliver. "That's the bad news. It
also underscores why the United States needs a strong Navy--a reflection
on the strategic requirements of the world's greatest maritime
power."
"The good
news is," said Oliver, "there's great demand for our
product."
|
THE
CARRIER GAP
The Navy faces
a keen obstacle in arguing that 12 aircraft carrier battle groups are
not enough: Despite what it believes is an undersized fleet, it keeps
accomplishing its global mission with its existing force structure.
"Time-sharing"
carriers between critical regions of the world can preclude immediate
U.S. action--vividly demonstrated by the USS Saratoga's 1986 intercept
of an airliner carrying the highjackers of the Achille Lauro cruise
ship--slow the U.S. response to a crisis, and raise the risk of armed
conflict--conflict that might have been prevented had U.S. naval forces
been on station. The warnings so far have had little impact on Navy
budgets, however, because the 12-carrier fleet "gets the job
done" with no apparent consequence to the United States or its
allies. Still, the warnings are getting louder and, in 1999, became more
specific.
Vice Adm.
Daniel J. Murphy Jr., commander of the Mediterranean-based U.S. Sixth
Fleet, made one of the strongest cases for additional aircraft carriers
in recent memory in testimony last October before the Senate and House
Armed Services Committees. Murphy suggested that if a carrier air wing
had been available for Operation Allied Force last March, when NATO
began its air war against Serb aggression in Kosovo, Serb leaders might
have capitulated sooner, presumably saving lives, property, and much
hardship for the people of Yugoslavia--Serbs and Kosovars alike.
Instead, because of fresh provocation by Iraq, a carrier air wing did
not arrive off Kosovo until two weeks after the fight began--too late to
influence the Serbs' early diplomatic or military response to the
crisis.
"Had the
CINCEUR [Commander in Chief Europe] requirement for continuous carrier
presence been met, a Navy air wing would have been in the fight from day
one," Murphy testified. "Though we can only speculate as to
the difference naval air would have made in the first two weeks, I
believe it would have been substantial."
Murphy noted
that Carrier Air Wing Eight aboard Theodore Roosevelt arrived after
hostilities commenced, and though it represented only 8 percent of
allied aircraft it still "accounted for 30 percent of all verified
kills against fielded forces in Kosovo." The carrier's air wing
commenced combat operations the day it arrived on station--ten days
after it departed its homeport of Norfolk, Va. The untimely gap in
continuous carrier coverage was unavoidable, Murphy said, given a force
structure limit of only 12 carrier battle groups set during the 1997
Quadrennial Defense Review. The limit was imposed despite assessments by
U.S. unified combatant commanders documenting a requirement for 15.
Indeed, Murphy
noted, carrier presence in the Mediterranean "has dropped to a
historic low." In 1998, the U.S. European Command had a carrier
under its control only 148 days, or 40 percent of the year. That climbed
in 1999 to a projected 60 percent but only because of the Kosovo air
war. "There are simply not enough carrier battle groups, amphibious
ready groups, and submarines to meet global tasking," Murphy
testified.
On 16 March,
eight days before air strikes began against Serbian forces, the carrier
Enterprise was ordered to leave the Mediterranean for the Persian Gulf
to keep pressure on Iraq. "CINCEUR wanted to keep the Enterprise
but we simply did not have the numbers," Murphy said. He also told
Congress that the redeployment sent a mixed diplomatic signal to Serbia
at a critical stage in allied diplomacy. After spending the final weeks
of its deployment in the Gulf, Enterprise returned home in time to stay
below the six-month deployment cycle so critical to Sailor morale.
The carrier USS
Kitty Hawk had to be surged from Japan to fill the void left in the Gulf
by the Roosevelt's diversion to the Kosovo conflict. This, in turn, left
the U.S. Pacific Command without a carrier presence near North
Korea--where tensions with the unpredictable regime were rising.
"Thus far, by time-sharing and splitting apart [battle group and
amphibious ready group] assets, we have retained minimally sufficient
numbers to do the job," said Murphy. "In most cases, however,
numbers arrive just in time, leave a gap elsewhere, and place a strain
on the Navy globally."
Adm. Frank
"Skip" Bowman, director of naval nuclear propulsion, said
running a Navy with 12 aircraft carriers boils down to managing risk.
The danger is invisible to most Americans--but worrisome nonetheless.
When there was no carrier on patrol in the Pacific last spring, he said,
"we didn't go to war, North Korea didn't come across the 38th
Parallel, and China didn't invade Taiwan. So what did we lose?
"It's not
necessarily all about bullets and governments falling," Bowman
continued. "It's about perception. What signal are we sending to
our allies, and does it make them less fervent in their support of our
values? Are they starting to look around for other partners because,
after all, we're not going to be there if the bell does ring? ... I
would argue there is some intangible harm done every time we drop our
guard like that." Other observers note that today's shrinking U.S.
fleet is not sized properly to fulfill new requirements associated with
the U.S. engagement strategy adopted by the Clinton administration in
recent years.
Adm. Thomas B.
Fargo, commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, said aircraft
carriers, thankfully, are "incredibly flexible and responsive. We
do have the ability to move [them] from theater to theater to be in the
right place at the right time. It's not always perfect--somebody's
important needs go unsatisfied for a period of time--but our strength is
our ability to respond." Fargo, who was deputy CNO for operations
when the Pacific region was left without a carrier last March, said the
gap was filled to some degree by relocating additional land-based
aircraft into that theater.
"As fleet
commander," said Adm. Vernon Clark, commander in chief of the U.S.
Atlantic Fleet, "I can't spend any time thinking about having 15
carriers. Collectively we've got 12." And, from his past
perspective as the former director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, there are compromises and alternatives to a carrier in time of
crisis--including moving additional Air Force or Marine Corps squadrons
into a theater or "surging" a carrier from its homeport early.
Though not optimal, such solutions can lower risk to an acceptable
level, he suggested. Given the increased time and effort now necessary
to return carrier battle groups to higher readiness levels during the
interdeployment training cycle, however, the feasibility or desirability
of surging carriers from their homeports early are questionable unless
no alternative exists.
The Office of
Naval Intelligence (ONI) does not have good information on how potential
adversaries might respond during periods when carrier battle groups are
gapped in critical regions, said Earl E. Sheck, the assistant director
of ONI, because it still hasn't happened often or for very long.
"There are really so few cases where ... there isn't a carrier
within the theater for any length of time. We've looked at some specific
instances to see if somebody had taken advantage. But the windows are so
short and so infrequent [that] I'm not sure I could make a
judgment."
No, gapping a
carrier's presence has not become routine, although it did occur with
increasing frequency during 1999. Indeed, if conditions in the Balkans
and the Persian Gulf calm down, the Navy could return to a more normal
cycle for carrier deployments. Accommodating maintenance schedules and a
reasonable rotation for crews, 12 carriers should allow what planners
call a 2.5 global presence. That equates to 1.0, or a carrier on station
full time in the Pacific; a .75 presence in the Central Command's area
of operational responsibility in Southwest Asia (i.e., a carrier
deployed at least nine months out of the year to the Persian Gulf or
Indian Ocean); and an identical .75 presence in the Mediterranean. Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein and Serbia's President Slobodan Milosevic
combined to destroy that deployment pattern in 1999.
Amphibious
Ready Groups (ARGs), which have fewer aircraft but an impressive
warfighting capability, can go far toward filling a void in the aircraft
carrier battle group's presence, said Maj. Gen. Dennis T. Krupp,
director of the Navy's office of expeditionary warfare. A review of
recent contingency actions, he said, shows that, "very rarely is it
full-blown combat." More and more, ARGs are being used separately
to quell crises or provide humanitarian assistance.
"The
carrier will respond to certain crises, and the ARG will be alone and
unafraid in other crises. You're not going to have the cover of the
carrier in most things we're going to do in the next century,"
Krupp said. "In Iraq and Iran wars, you certainly will. But East
Timor, probably not."
So are 12
carriers and 12 ARGs enough? "No," said Krupp. The next QDR,
he said, is "an opportune time for the Navy to say, 'If we're the
force of choice--because of what we do and where we are--then maybe we
need more.' Where does that 'more' come from? It comes at someone else's
expense. And those are tough decisions."
"We're
making do with 12 carriers--barely," said Rear Adm. Michael G.
Mullen, the Navy's director of surface warfare--adding, with obvious
pride, that the fleet's execution of missions in recent years "has
been flawless."
"It's
something we manage and, if I do say so myself, I believe we manage it
quite well," said Adm. Jay L. Johnson, chief of naval operations.
"We've had a lot of experience with it now--the Navy, the Joint
Staff, the unified CINCs [commanders in chief]--everybody working
together."
Informed
observers continue to worry about the impact the Navy's prolonged high
operational tempo will have on its Sailors' morale. But, ironically,
their impressive performance of combat operations and execution of
multiple global missions during 1999 could remain the Achilles' heel of
any renewed Navy push for a 13th aircraft carrier. TP
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