SPECIAL REPORT: The Case for the Carrier
Aircraft Carriers and Sea-Based Air Power
Smaller Is Not Better
And Numbers Do Count!
By RICHARD C. ALLEN
Vice Adm. Richard C. Allen retired from active duty in 1996 as
commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and is the immediate past
president of the Association of Naval Aviation.
At the height of the recent crisis between the People's Republic of
China and the United States, sparked by the midair collision of a U.S.
Navy EP-3E Orion Aries signals-intelligence aircraft and a Chinese F-8
fighter in international airspace, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)
reportedly suggested three courses of action for the two-month-old
administration of President George W. Bush.
All of those options depended on having flexible and effective air
power at hand--in the form of the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk and its
multimission air wing, the unstated "big stick" in the quiet and
delicate but high-stakes diplomacy between Beijing and Washington.
The carrier was underway in the Gulf of Thailand en route to a port
visit in Guam when the incident flared, resulting in the death of the
Chinese pilot and forcing the damaged Orion to land on Hainan Island.
There the U.S. crew of 24 men and women was detained until diplomats
achieved their release.
PACOM's reported suggestions included sending the Kitty Hawk aircraft
carrier battle group (CVBG) on a slow northward track through the South
China Sea to signal strong U.S. interest in resolving the crisis quickly.
Another option called for the carrier and its escorts to
"linger" near the Philippines or, the third option, to continue
on an easterly course toward the U.S. territory of Guam for its scheduled
port visit. When the aircrew was finally liberated, Kitty Hawk remained in
position, ready to respond if needed.
One lesson to be drawn from the incident is that having 70-plus
tactical and support aircraft at seaready where and when they were
needed, fully sustained by underway replenishment vessels, and accompanied
by multimission surface warships and attack submarines in an area in which
U.S. access to land bases and facilities was at best negligiblegave
the United States political and military options that could be provided
only by naval forces.
Ultimately, the Bush administration opted for a quieter diplomatic
approach to resolve the crisis, but sea-based tactical air power embarked
on the sovereign U.S. "territory" of a large-deck aircraft
carrier was once again shown to be something the United States cannot
afford to do without.
At a time when all aspects of U.S. national-defense programs are under
increasing scrutiny and the review of "big-ticket" acquisition
items by the Bush administration is the order of the day, would-be
reformers should take heed of a salient point relating to aircraft
carriers and their embarked advanced aircraft: Smaller is not better, and
numbers do count.
Why Carriers?
In early 2001, work was well under way, as part of the second
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), to define a new framework for critical
decisions about America's defenses when President Bush announced a
parallel review that would leave no stones unturned in transforming the
U.S. military to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Other calls had
already been raised for a radical restructuring of the nation's forces,
particularly naval forces.
A central target in some studies has been the large-deck
nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs), with pundits and analysts alike
offering opinions about: (a) the "real" number of carriers
needed in the 21st century; (b) the alleged vulnerability (particularly to
asymmetric threats) of these 96,000-ton warships; and (c) the relative
attractiveness of smaller, stealthier, and more easily dispersed
"air-capable" warships (some no larger than 700 tons) or even
submarine "arsenal ships."
Despite real-world experiences that clearly and repeatedly underscored
the value and survivability of sea-based tactical aircraft operating from
large-deck carriers, their operational requirements and military worth
have had to be explained at regular intervals since the end of World War
II. The earliest confrontation, in 1948, was cast as a competition between
the first "supercarrier," the United States, and the Air Force's
B-36 bomber.
That carrier was laid down on 18 April 1949, but was canceled four days
later. Scrapping of the B-36 bomber began in 1956, and by 1959 all B-36s
were out of service. The changing nature of the threat and advancing
technology made them obsolete--just as the carrier force began its
renaissance. It is worth noting, however, that since 1954 large-deck
carriers--and, since 1968, nuclear-powered large-deck carriers--have
always been the preferred design for the nation's sea-based aviation
forces.
Most fundamentally, naval forces, particularly those centered on
large-deck carriers, act as the "eyes, ears, and fists" that
assure immediate U.S. access to potential trouble spots with sufficient
combat power to protect important U.S. interests and/or to facilitate the
deployment of follow-on joint forces. Operating from international waters
and airspace--and unencumbered by the need for diplomatic
clearance--aircraft carriers and their multimission air wings, surface
warships, and submarines constitute agile, mobile, flexible, and effective
"forces of choice" that will continue to be of great strategic
value to the United States.
A carrier battle group's greatest tactical advantages are endurance
(now measured in months, not minutes), access-assurance, on-scene
deterrence, sea-control and power-projection, and overland-defensive
capabilities--all achieved without infringing upon the sovereignty of any
other nation.
Enjoying freedom of movement throughout the high seas and operating
from international waters in the littorals of the world, carriers and
their associated combat and support forces can assure sustained access
that does not depend on a foreign nation's willingness to host U.S.
forces, provide supporting infrastructure, or approve overflight requests.
When called upon, sea-based air power can respond at a moment's notice
to put ordnance on critical targets, accurately and precisely, 24 hours a
day, in all weather, against any foe, and throughout extended periods of
operation.
A Multimission Force
And Ordnance on Target
The increasing value of sea-based aviation also is underscored by
improvements in the lethality of a carrier air wing's weapons since the
early 1990s. Indeed, "tons on target" is no longer an adequate
measure of strike effectiveness. In terms of the number of "aimpoints"
that can be hit each day with precision munitions, today's air wing enjoys
a nearly 500 percent increase in effectiveness compared to the
capabilities demonstrated during Operation Desert Storm in 1991--and with
a significantly enhanced kill capability per sortie. The Navy expects an
additional 200 percent increase in "aimpoint efficiency" by 2008
as newer weapons join the fleet.
Throughout a 30-day campaign, a carrier air wing in 2001 can deliver
approximately 5,000 precision-guided weapons; depending upon the exact
scenario, it can launch more than 200 sorties per day, and strike nearly
700 discrete aimpoints. By 2010, the air wing will be capable of some 215
sorties that can strike 1,080 aimpoints every 24 hours.
Certainly, land-attack cruise missiles are integral elements of any
sea-based strike, and Tomahawks already have been used in large numbers
and in a manner that nicely complements the employment of sea-based manned
tactical aircraft. Similarly, the contributions of land-based air power,
once introduced into an area of operations, are valuable assets during
joint campaigns. But their immediate-response capabilities and flexibility
are considerably less than those represented by an aircraft carrier and
its multimission air wingon-station, ready to act.
For example, the payload of in-service Nimitz-class carriers goes well
beyond the aircraft in their air wings. Each ship carries some 3,000 tons
of ordnance and up to 3.5 million gallons of jet fuel. And, because
ordnance and jet fuel--along with spare parts for the aircraft, and food
and other consumables for the crew--can be replenished at sea,
carrier-based aircraft can deliver a large volume of precision ordnance
around the clock for an indefinitely sustained campaign, while also
conducting numerous other vital missions.
Thus, by being there before the start of a crisis or conflict, a
carrier battle group ensures that U.S. military force is immediately
employable by the U.S. national command authority. A forward-deployed CVBG
ensures that the "door remains open" to enable the deployment of
follow-on forces from the continental United States.
Recent crises like NATO's air war in Kosovo have shown that the United
States will need all the air power it can muster during the critical early
days of a conflict. But today's force of 12 carriers and 10 carrier air
wings (CVWs) means that a carrier may not be on-scene when a crisis breaks
out, and that it may not be possible to divert additional carriers already
forward-deployed for critical missions in other regions.
This lesson was forcefully (and unfortunately) illustrated in the
Mediterranean Sea during the initial stages of Operation Allied Force in
1999. Because of the current "gapping" policy reluctantly
imposed on U.S. unified commanders as the result of insufficient numbers
of carriers, the USS Enterprise was redeployed to the Persian Gulf at
precisely the wrong moment eight days prior to the outbreak of hostilities
in Kosovo--notwithstanding the USCINCEUR (U.S. commander in chief,
European Command) requirement for continuous carrier presence in NATO's
southern region.
In fact, carrier presence in the Mediterranean dropped to a historic
low in 1998--just 40 percent of the year. As Vice Adm. Daniel J. Murphy
Jr., then commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, later told Congress,
"There are simply not enough carrier battle groups, amphibious ready
groups, and submarines to meet global requirements."
Numbers Matter
During the height of the Cold War in the mid-1980s, the U.S. Navy's
Maritime Strategy called for 15 "deployable" CVBGs and 600
"battle-group-capable" ships to carry out sequential global
operations. A minimum of 15 CVBGs was considered the
"prudent-risk" force, although some defense planners knew that
the "minimum-risk" force objective was 22 CVBGsfar more than
the nation allegedly "could afford." The happy coincidence was
that 15 carriers and 14 air wings would satisfy regional warfighting
commanders' requirements for peacetime forward-presence and crisis
response in important regions of the world.
Today, the 15 CVBG/14 CVW/600-ship Navy is little more than a forlorn
memory. The nation's 12 carriers and 10 air wings are still critical
"nodes" in the much smaller 300-ship fleet, though--but they are
under increasing operational and fiscal strain. Indeed, at a time when
U.S. interests and friends both seem to be in jeopardy almost everywhere,
the nation's naval forces have been busier than ever. During the Cold War,
the Navy responded at the president's direction to a different
international crisis every nine weeks or so, on average. By the late
1990s, the response rate had increased to one every three weeks.
Because of the shipbuilding "holiday" of the last 10 years,
it has become apparent, according to recent projections, that a
10-carrier/250-ship fleet--or smaller--is increasingly likely unless
dramatic changes in approach and funding are made. There are growing
concerns that the current reviews may lead to ill-founded decisions about
America's carriers from which there may be no easyor
inexpensiveway to recover.
Given the requirements of the regional warfighting commanders, no fewer
than 15 large-deck carriers and 14 carrier air wings are needed to provide
100-percent CVBG "coverage" of three major areas of
responsibility (AORs): the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and the
Northwest/Western Pacific. Since 1993, however, the U.S. global naval
force presence policy has been based on the inevitability of significant
"gaps" in carrier coverage in these regions.
As a result of the combination of downsizing and the increased
operating tempo, the Navy's carrier force is being stretched increasingly
thin to meet even these constrained global commitments. It is becoming
increasingly difficult to maintain a balance between ensuring today's
combat readiness and at the same time modernizing and recapitalizing the
force needed for the decades ahead. The emphasis on combat readiness for
U.S rotational forces is critical; when battle groups deploy today, the
odds are great that at some time during their forward-deployed operations
they will engage in actual combat. All of the last 11 CVBGs to deploy have
experienced this reality.
This unavoidably high operational tempo, coupled with the reality of
actual combat, has caused the diversion of more and more resources toward
sustaining current readiness--but at the expense of recapitalization.
Operational commitments have been met, but only by the cannibalization of
scarce parts and by cross-decking critically needed people, ordnance, and
equipment. In both the 2001 QDR and the review being conducted by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, therefore, the Navy must underscore
the reality that force levels need to take into account the high usage
rates expected in any future security environment. The "do more with
less" posture of the 1990s can no longer be sustained.
Size and Mobility:
The Keys to Survival
During the Navy League's Sea-Air-Space Exposition in April, Chief of
Naval Operations Adm. Vern Clark said the following about the alleged
vulnerability of carriers to asymmetric threats: "Maybe in the future
we will have to worry about it more than we have to worry about it today.
But for now and the near term, there is no more powerful, no more capable
platform anywhere in the world than an American large-deck aircraft
carrier."
Just as quantity has a quality all its own, so does size. Numerous
studies and analyses carried out since the mid-1950s have shown that,
compared to smaller ships, large-deck carriers are much more survivable
against a wide variety of threats. They will continue to be so for the
foreseeable future. Any susceptibility to attack is mitigated by the
carrier's mobility, organic self-defense systems, embarked air wing, and
area defenses (afforded by surface warships and submarines).
A would-be attacker must penetrate sophisticated theater-wide and
area-layered defenses--and land numerous hits--to put a carrier out of
action. Carriers can withstand considerable damage, thanks to their large
size, the distribution of redundant systems throughout the ship, their
high-strength steel and sophisticated armor, their ballistic plating, and
their underwater protective systems.
The carrier's ability to withstand severe punishment was--unfortunately
and unintentionally--vividly demonstrated in 1969 when nine 500-pound
bombs (the equivalent of six Soviet cruise missiles at the time) exploded
on the flight deck of the USS Enterprise during a fire resulting from the
detonation of a rocket's warhead. Despite the damage done, the Enterprise
could have resumed flight operations within hours. Today's new carriers
are even tougher and more survivable.
Before it can be hit, moreover, the carrier must first be detected.
Targeting a carrier is much more difficult than finding its general
operating area--which, during a 24-hour period, could encompass several
thousand miles of ocean. The intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance challenges facing a would-be attacker, therefore, are both
complex and resource-intensive.
Few potential adversaries possess such capabilities today, and their
sensors and weapons are themselves vulnerable to operational deception and
attack. "These platforms [aircraft carriers] are tough with all kinds
of defensive but also powerful offensive systems," the CNO told the
Navy League. "They are mobile, and they are fast ... which translates
into a 700-square-mile area of uncertainty in 30 minutes. In an
hour-and-a-half it grows to 6,300 miles and, friends, that presents one
heck of a targeting problem."
Size also contributes significantly to seakeeping qualities and to the
ability to conduct flight operations safely in severe weather around the
clock. While today's larger high-performance tactical aircraft have
imposed design requirements for larger flight decks--from the 81,500 tons
(full load) of the first post-WWII carrier, USS Forrestal, to today's
96,000-ton Nimitz-class CVNs--so too has the demand to conduct flight
operations 24 hours per day and in sea states and weather conditions that
would completely shut down a much smaller ship.
Taking into consideration both the size and the capabilities of the new
aircraft coming into service, the large-deck carrier and its air wing will
have the ability to operate "24/7" and in virtually all weather
conditions. The question that must be asked, therefore, is whether
"part-time" sea-based air power staged on small
"air-capable" ships is acceptable in future crises and
conflicts. If past is prologue, the answer is a resounding "No!"
The tangible and intangible contributions of nuclear propulsion to
operational effectiveness also must be factored into this complex
equation. The endurance of today's nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is
measured in millions of miles. The CVNs are capable of 25 years of
operations before having to be refueled. Nuclear-powered carriers have the
ability to steam at high speed from one operating area to another, without
the need to replenish. They arrive on station ready for immediate action.
A Needed Investment
In U.S. National Security
Despite the hopes of most Americans to transition to an era of reduced
conflict and crises during the post-Cold War era, there has been no
reduction in the operational and personnel tempos required to meet U.S.
global commitments, and the increased pace of operations has strained the
Navy's people and their equipment. In short, the delicate balance between
matching strategic requirements with needed resources has been thrown
off-center. But "doing much more with much less" has become the
mantra and the reality of the U.S. armed forces in recent years.
If the United States expects to preserve its position of world
leadership, to assure access to world regions of importance, and to have
the credible military force needed to deter conflict--and/or to respond to
crises and win wars--it must invest more in all elements of U.S. national
security, particularly in its versatile, capable, and forward-deployed
naval expeditionary forces. The Bush administration is now poised to make
a dramatic course-change to make things right.
The dramatist and writer Ben Jonson once remarked, "Good fortune
smiles on the audacious." It is past time for the Navy to be
audacious in articulating its "real" requirements, as the chief
of naval operations has emphasized. Analysis and real-world experience
clearly show that any reductions below the current force structure of 12
aircraft carriers and 10 air wings would pose great risk to U.S. national
security and to the well-being of this nation's allies around the world.
Moreover, the increasingly chaotic and troubled international-security
environment of recent years, combined with the higher-threat scenarios
projected for the future, suggests that 15 large-deck carriers and 14 air
wings would really be "the right stuff" for the United States of
America. *
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