On-Scene Report: Kernel Blitz (Experiment) 01
"An Incredible Level of
Situational Awareness"
By DAVID VERGUN
Production Editor
David Vergun covered Kernel Blitz (Experiment) 01 aboard the Nimitz-class
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis and the modified
Austin-class command ship USS Coronado, as well as from the Space and
Naval Warfare Systems Command San Diego (SSC) and the Marine Corps base at
Camp Pendleton, Calif.
During the Battle of Britain, German success was limited, due in large
part to the British use of radar, a new system that allowed the British to
detect Luftwaffe bomber formations well before they were able to reach
England.
Now, more than six decades later, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps
have completed an experiment involving a futuristic
concept--network-centric warfare (NCW)--that officials hope will have as
big an impact on situational awareness of the battlespace of the future as
radar had for the British during World War II. Third Fleet Commander Vice
Adm. Toney M. "Mike" Bucchi said his goal is "to have at
least 95 percent of the [NCW] solution set by Millennium Challenge
[Experiment] in June 2002."
NCW is a comprehensive command-and-control system linking warfighters
on the ground, on the sea, and in the air to the same real-time
information. The system provides the "big picture"
simultaneously to all participating units and gives commanders the tools
they need to make timely and well-informed decisions on how best to strike
the enemy and to position their forces safely and efficiently throughout
the battlespace.
The experiment--Kernel Blitz (Experiment) 01, or KB(X)-01--ran from 18
to 28 June in, and in the waters offshore of, Southern California. It
involved approximately 5,000 personnel: Sailors and Marines from Third
Fleet, SSC, the Naval Research Laboratory, NWDC (Navy Warfare Development
Command), I MEF (I Marine Expeditionary Force), and the Marine Corps
Warfighting Lab; civilian contractors from the private sector; and a small
number of Airmen and Soldiers. These joint forces rigorously tested the
strengths and limitations of NCW against an enemy force projected 10 years
into the future.
At the heart of KB(X)-01 was a network architecture designed and
installed by NWDC as part of Fleet Battle Experiment-India (FBE-I). NCW-equipped
computers were carried by aircraft-- U-2 spy planes, E-2C Hawkeyes,
F/A-18C Hornets, and a variety of UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles); by
ships and submarines--the John C. Stennis; the Coronado; the
Ticonderoga-class cruisers USS Bunker Hill and Lake Champlain; the
Wasp-class amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard; and the Los
Angeles-class nuclear-powered attack submarine USS Jefferson City; and by
infantrymen down to the squad level.
Bucchi was pleased with the experiment outcome. "We are finding
that an integrated network empowers decision-makers at all levels. A
common operational picture shared by both the senior decision-maker and
the front-line commander actually strengthens the command process,"
he told Sea Power.
"Now," he continued, "the senior decision-maker can
anticipate additional support that might be needed by the front-line
warfighter. A networked force helps to eliminate confusion and
misunderstanding, increases the lethality of our forces, and is far less
vulnerable to fratricide."
Links, Grids, and Nodes
Here are the nuts and bolts of NCW-speak: Everyone who transmits and
receives information--e.g., Sailors and Marines with access to computers
aboard ships, submarines, aircraft, in the field, and in command
centers--is considered to be a node. Every device, platform, or system
that relays or stores digital electronic information--e.g., underwater
sensors that detect and track friendly and enemy ships and submarines by
their acoustic signatures--is also a node, albeit a more passive node.
Also in the node category are UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) that take
digital images of the battlefield; signal-relay devices aboard aircraft
and ground vehicles that pass along and boost signal strength; and
databases containing such information as weather, medical, and terrain
features.
NWDC used current commercial technology to provide a surrogate for
future systems during the experiment. Nodes were linked together via
encrypted Ku-band satellite feeds in a complex network that continually
moved about as forces deployed throughout the battlespace; it was
something akin to a giant spider web undulating in a stiff breeze. The key
feature of NCW is that all nodes are connected through a common-platform
software and hardware system.
Information flows through links or "pipelines" in the form
of: (a) electronic chats, resembling civilian chatroom discussions on the
Internet; (b) battlespace terrain graphics overlaid by color icons
representing enemy and friendly force dispositions; (c) video and still
pictures; (d) drawing programs for sketching diagrams; and (e) database
directories with powerful search engines.
During the experiment, there was so much information to display that
some participants had three computer screens jury-rigged together and were
monitoring up to eight chat rooms on one screen, watching images on
another, and monitoring battlespace movements on the third.
Chatroom Warriors
An important advantage of using chat-rooms is that a "chat
history" is automatically compiled. "If you can't keep up with
the chats or you are relieving someone, you can go back and see what had
been said," Lt. Cdr. Erik A. Burian of NWDC told Sea Power.
"Every reference to a numbered target [e.g., AB1234] from all the
chat rooms also is automatically written in chronological order to an
electronic target folder posted on the SIPRNET [Secret Internet Protocol
Router Network]. This gives everyone--from the warfighters in the
battlespace to Pacific Fleet Headquarters in Oahu and the
Pentagon--immediate situational awareness." He noted that chat
histories also are useful for training purposes and/or to evaluate an
exercise or operation. Conversations can be pulled up immediately by
executing a name, target number, or timestamp search.
Current communications through the battlespace are too slow, according
to Cdr. Mark Chicoine, FBE-1 director from NWDC--the organization that
developed the network that supported all of KB(X). He identified four
discrete grids in the present battlespace decision-making process:
(1) The sensor grid, which queues battlespace awareness--i.e., the
disposition of blue (friendly) and red (enemy) forces;
(2) The collaboration grid, which helps decision-makers determine which
targets to select;
(3) The engagement grid, which is used to help determine what weapons
to use; and
(4) The assessment grid, where damage to targets is evaluated to
determine whether to proceed to the next targets or to reengage targets
that have not yet been neutralized.
Collapsing the four grids into one is NCW's solution to the
decision-maker's time problem. This is a radical departure from the
traditional linear military decision-making process, according to Chicoine.
In NCW every person participates in a collaborative effort. In effect, the
forces become self-synchronizing--taking the initiative and acting on
real-time information without delay, while keeping in step with the
commander's intent.
Facilitating the Process
Burian, the assistant FBE director, agreed that the current
decision-making process is too slow: "Time-critical strikes have been
our toughest challenge. Our enemies have developed weapons--including
weapons of mass destruction--that have operational cycles on the order of
10 to 15 minutes. Therefore, our focus has been on the very short,
temporal battle."
Previous fleet battle experiments--KB(X)-01 was the ninth--tested
different levels of control. "During one experiment, we had a very
centralized control structure but things bogged down very quickly because
all information had to go through one cell and things were happening in
the battlespace very quickly," Chicoine said. "In another
experiment, though," he added, "we let it go completely and the
joint task force commander looked at that and said, 'You are now in my
decision-making process.'
"We learned from those two experiences that technology allows us
either to be very centralized and too slow, or [to be more] free-wheeling
and going too fast. In the current experiment, we tried to set up
somewhere in the middle--the top letting go coupled with commander's
intent running in the background."
Self-synchronization has not been without its problems, Burian
acknowledged. "The admiral or petty officer can chat freely over the
[NCW] chat room instead of going through the chain of command," he
said. "You want to facilitate the process so you need to be in touch
with the person providing that information regardless of rank. This has
created some problems with the socialization process. Some people feel
more comfortable communicating face to face or over the telephone. ... [In
NCW] you are identified by your watch station and this gives you
positional authority." Burian termed the socialization process
"a revolution." He said that, after their initial frustration,
people "got used to it and found it to be quite effective."
Experimenters found that NCW is flexible in allowing joint control of
fires through joining battlespace management. Chicoine provided several
examples: "Where you are doing deep interdiction of targets, maybe a
joint-forces air component commander would want to call up more assets;
when you are prioritizing targets on the ground, the Marines would want to
be the main participants; whereas on the Navy side you might be more
worried about antisubmarine warfare and in that case the joint-forces
maritime component commander would take more of a leadership role."
He compared the flexibility of the process to "an amoeba as it moves
and changes shape--where the effort is is where the leadership goes."
Infantrymen Issued Computers
For the Marine Corps, NCW--coupled with a new generation of
advanced-range guided munitions fired from ships, submarines, and
aircraft--holds the exciting possibility of greatly extending the reach of
joint fires inland from 20 or 30 miles to several hundred miles, according
to Burian. Such weapons and programs include the Extended-Range Guided
Munition (ERGM), the Land-Attack Standard Missile (LASM), the Tactical
Tomahawk, and the Advanced Land-Attack Missile (ALAM).
In the future, Burian said, there might not be as great a need for
organic tank and artillery support because ordnance could be delivered
precisely on target from ships and/or aircraft far over the horizon. This
would significantly reduce the logistics burden on an amphibious force and
help improve its speed of maneuver.
During KB(X)-01, Marines and Soldiers fought a simulated enemy in Camp
Pendleton and El Centro, Calif. Marines flew in CH-46 Sea Knight
helicopters instead of the simulated MV-22 Ospreys--which when fully
operational will have a much longer range and higher speed.
Each Marine squad carried an end-user terminal (EUT) that linked it to
the NCW net. The EUT, a wireless computer, displayed topographical maps
down to the 1/25,000 scale and Marines could accurately pinpoint enemy
targets using a stylus. Rounds were placed on targets almost immediately;
previously, several radio transmissions to the fire control center were
needed to adjust fires--the more keying that was needed, the greater the
chance of the enemy finding the sender's position. Fratricide is
significantly reduced because with NCW blue forces can be viewed in real
time on the screen.
"It was a novel experience for Marines in the field to carry
laptops but it was pretty successful," said Col. Larry Brown,
operations officer for the I MEF element aboard the Coronado. "On my
computer screen I viewed icons representing squads moving up a draw,
coming around a ridge, and then moving into position against enemy
objectives. I also saw helos landing in El Centro and infantry units
popping on the screen as they disembarked [from the helos].
"With just a 90-second delay in receiving location updates from
the field, I call that real-time situation awareness," Brown
continued. Without NCW, he said, there is a 30- to 60-minute latency that
involves "a lot of phone conversation and plotting."
Marines were enthusiastic about the real-time communications capability
that NCW affords, but also were skeptical about relying on it too much, so
they also packed their traditional gear--maps, compasses, grease pencils,
and field radios. One Marine said, "We want to be sure we can still
do our mission if the lights go off."
Netting Stealthy Submarines
Bringing submarines into NCW was one of the most important achievements
of the experiment, according to Chicoine, who said that the challenge was
netting the submarines without giving away their positions to the enemy.
Paul Schmitt, an NWDC undersea warfare specialist, said the submarines
were netted on Sea Web, a system of digital acoustic modems and autonomous
sensors that uses underwater magnetometers to detect submarines and passes
signals up through a buoy which can then relay the signals ashore or
afloat through aircraft and satellites.
The use of Sea Web involves about a one-minute delay, but provides a
high 95 percent reliability when the submarine is in the right zone. The 5
percent difficulties occur primarily at periscope depth, when it is easier
to use an antenna for communications, anyway. "The nice thing is that
submarines can stay at speed and depth and be in the game with the rest of
the battle group while on the net," Schmitt said.
When they were not in their "hunter killer" mode during the
experiment, the submarines were used to launch simulated UAVs for
battle-damage assessment or harbor surveillance, or to support Navy SEALs
operating ashore.
Medical Uses for NCW
During KB(X), doctors aboard the ships chatted over the NCW system and
shared medical images and epidemiological data with one another and with
surgeons at Pacific Fleet Headquarters in Oahu. NCW-enabled computers
sorted and synthesized data to get such information as: real-time updates
in the battlespace by unit, time, and location of unexplained fevers and
indicators of a biological or chemical attack; the availability of blood,
hospital beds, and medical personnel and equipment; and the tracking of
simulated casualties in refugee camps.
Capt. Jeffrey Young, a Third Fleet surgeon, said the doctors and
corpsmen participating in the experiment were "positively
ecstatic" about the new NCW system's medical capabilities. "We
have gone from using plastic boards and grease pencils to getting instant
access to medical information," he said.
NCW in the Big Picture
"One of the unique things about experiments is they never
fail," said NWDC Commander Rear Adm. Robert G. Sprigg. "You test
an idea and you either prove it works or you prove it doesn't. In this
case we proved that it is possible to establish and maintain a wide-area
relay network that links ships, aircraft, and ground units with a variety
of useful data. To me, that is a great step forward.
"Now comes the important process," he continued, "of
analyzing what we learned during KB(X) and using that analysis to advance
the concept of network-centric warfare. It seems to me that the next
logical step will be to mature and expand the network and experiment with
a larger joint force."
User Acceptance Is Key
NCW alone will not be a useful tool for winning battles if the
technology is not fully embraced by those who will use it. Bucchi said he
thinks KB(X) has put achievement of that goal one step closer to reality.
"What I have observed at all levels is that people understand we must
seize the initiative when it comes to emerging information
technology," he said. "The cost of ignoring new technologies ...
is far too high. Everyone I have spoken with--from Marines using end-user
terminals in the field to the battle-watch captains onboard Coronado--has
been astounded by the incredible level of situational awareness this
technology provides--to know exactly where our forces were located during
all phases of the experimentation.
"Changing our service culture is probably the biggest single
challenge," he continued. "The capability to network units at
all levels challenges the way we think, the way we communicate, and,
ultimately, the way we fight. New technology is of little value to us if
we don't have the doctrine, techniques, and tactics to take advantage of
that technology.
"Innovation isn't just new things," Bucchi said. "It's
also about new ways of doing things. That's why dedicated experimentation
venues like KB(X) are important. They allow us to develop and refine
procedures to accompany new technological capabilities." *
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