THE MOC

Vice President Kamala Harris met with South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol on September 29^th in Seoul. After meeting President Yoon, Harris toured the Demilitarized Zone to show the U.S. commitment to the alliance and condemn a “brutal dictatorship, rampant human rights violations, and an unlawful weapons program” in the north. The meeting occurred on the last day of joint maritime exercises conducted by the U.S. and the Republic of Korea (ROK) navies.

Advancing Democratic Values, only on the Korean Peninsula

During the presidential campaign in early 2022, Yoon pledged to make his country a “global pivotal state” by “no longer being confined to the Korean Peninsula” and “advancing freedom, peace, and prosperity through liberal democratic values.” Unlike his predecessor who maintained ‘strategic ambiguity’ between the U.S. and China during most of his tenure, Yoon revitalized the alliance by fully expanding the scope and scale of military exercises and restoring the eroded readiness of the alliance. Furthermore, Yoon expressed commitments to join the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and conditions-based transfer of wartime Operational Control. However, Yoon’s actions have not reached beyond the peninsula. In addition to declining Ukrainian President Zelenskyi’s request for an anti-air weapon system, Yoon avoided meeting with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi when she visited Seoul after her intrepid visit to Taiwan in early August.

Yoon’s reluctance to openly align with the U.S. on the most contended issues is not surprising. In fact, he is not so different from his predecessors, as they chose to maintain a balance between the U.S and China, although to varying degrees. While the U.S. remains its vital security guarantor, China is still its biggest trading partner, accounting for 25 percent of exports in 2021.

Unlike Australia, South Korea does not possess trading leverage over China. Despite the overt economic retaliation waged on Australia since 2020, China could not completely ban Australian imports, as 60 percent of its iron ore comes from Australia. As a result, the Chinese tariffs barely dented Australia’s aggregate export revenue. In contrast, Seoul’s painful memory of China’s 2016 economic retaliation over the decision to deploy the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile defense system to South Korea is still too vivid. As Seoul is still recovering from economic and diplomatic damage inflicted by Beijing, the Blue House’s concern over China is not ungrounded.

Nonetheless, as tensions rise in the Taiwan Strait and top U.S. government officials assess that China is developing the ability to seize Taiwan by 2027 under Xi Jinping’s order, Yoon’s repeated pledge to advance liberal democratic values increases anticipations from Washington. A week before the meeting between Yoon and Harris, the State Department Spokesperson stated that “one of the many reasons for our support for the people on Taiwan is the fact that we share values with the people of Taiwan” and added, “that is also true of our South Korean allies.” Further, DoD Spokesperson clarified that the mission of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) is not only “to defend ROK’s sovereignty” but also “to support U.S. national interest in the region,” not limited to the Korean Peninsula. On an extremely rare occasion, a high-ranking White House official of the Biden administration revealed that Harris and Yoon will discuss the security of the Taiwan Strait. Indeed, the White House released a readout after the meeting, stating that Harris and Yoon “discussed China and Taiwan” and Harris “emphasized the importance of upholding the international rules-based order” and “an essential element of a free and open Indo-Pacific.”

A stark contrast is untenable as the Yoon administration and many South Korean experts balk at supporting the U.S. on matters surrounding the Taiwan Strait. During a press briefing after the meeting, the Blue House declined to answer the questions on Taiwan Strait and revealed what was discussed only after the White House’s press release. During his interview with CNN, before the meeting with Harris, Yoon avoided answering a question on the role of the USFK in supporting Taiwan from a conflict with China, reasoning that there is a very high possibility of provocation from North Korea in case of military conflict on Taiwan. A leading security expert at a government-funded Korea Development Institute asserted that South Korea must minimize its military involvement in aiding the U.S. if there is a military conflict over Taiwan Strait.

Although it is not well publicized, South Korea shares a similar security concern with many of its counterparts in Taipei and Southeast Asia as China is engaged in gray zone tactics, employing military intimidation, state-affiliated businesses, and paramilitary activities. Since the exclusive economic zone is not clearly defined between the two countries, there is a fear among the ROKN that China will take advantage of the situation and attempt to drastically reduce the operational area of the ROKN. Accordingly, Seoul must support Washington in advancing the rules-based order at sea, regardless of the region and the distance from the Korean Peninsula. After all, South Korea is one of the numerous nations that rely on the trade routes that pass through the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. As Beijing continues to reject South Korea’s right to conduct defensive maritime exercises on the opposite side of the Peninsula, Seoul must follow Yoon’s vision: “should no longer be confined to the Korean Peninsula but rise to the challenge of being” a “global pivotal state.”

Talk is Cheap – Actions Speak

The Yoon administration has attempted to be a “global pivotal state” through more engagement with U.S.-led security entities but focused only on ‘soft-hitting’ issues. Although the Yoon administration’s expressed interest to join the QUAD is admirable, the plan was to participate in sub-working groups that deal with pandemic vaccines, climate change, and emerging technology, instead of becoming a fully-fledged member state of ‘QUAD-Plus.’ The Blue House’s decision to establish a diplomatic mission to NATO in Brussels is limited to cybersecurity. Most importantly, the Blue House has not yet responded to Washington’s request to join the ‘Chip 4 Alliance,’ which seeks to unite the American chip supply chains with those of Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea in accordance with the CHIPS and Science Act. To date, Tokyo and Taipei agreed to join the Alliance while Seoul is still dithering.

Marking the 70^th anniversary of the Korean War, it is important to remember that the U.S.-ROK alliance defended not only the people but also shared values of liberal democracy on the Korean Peninsula. The alliance has endured the crucible of wars and a myriad of military provocations, including the employment of ballistic missiles. However, while other democratic allies of the U.S. in the region, Japan and Australia, are in the vanguard of defending liberal democratic values including the Freedom of Navigation, Seoul continues to “remain conspicuously silent in the face of violations of liberal democratic norms and human rights.” Hence, As Seoul aspires to elevate its game and become a champion of liberal democratic values, the alliance now faces an opportunity. To become a “global pivotal state” as Yoon describes, Seoul must act – not just on its territory, but on the global arena.

Andrew Park is Senior Analyst at the Center for Maritime Strategy and Non-resident James A. Kelly Fellow at the Pacific Forum. He previously served as a translator/interpreter at the U.S.-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command / U.S. Forces Korea (CFC/USFK) and holds M.A. in Asian Studies from the Georgetown University Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service.

The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.