THE MOC

American Maritime Strategy Prior to the Second World War and the Myths of US Isolationism?

“The people of Europe who are defending themselves do not ask us to do their fighting. They ask us for the implements of war, the planes, the tanks, the guns, the freighters which will enable them to fight for their liberty and for our security. Emphatically, we must get these weapons to them, get them to them in sufficient volume and quickly enough so that we and our children will be saved the agony and suffering of war which others have had to endure.”

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt delivered these words in his famous Fireside Chat, colloquially referred to as his ‘Arsenal of Democracy’ speech, in December of 1940, a year prior to America’s entry into the Second World War. Much of this sentiment is echoed today by a majority of American citizens who wish to see a democratic Ukraine successfully defend itself against the authoritarian Russian Federation. In fact, the Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022 is soon to be in effect in October of this year. The last iteration of the Lend-Lease program was implemented prior to the American entry into the Second World War and was enacted in March of 1941 to aid the United Kingdom in their fight against Nazi Germany.

Although, many unfamiliar with the United States’ foreign policy prior to the Second World War may fear an inevitable open conflict with Russia, as the United States was ultimately drawn into the Second World War despite measures to prevent such an outcome. However, these fears can be attributed to many historical misconceptions about American neutrality and isolationism prior to the Second World War. Fortunately, an examination of American maritime policy can dispel these myths.

Popular historiography contends that the American public became so burdened by domestic economic collapse that international affairs were disregarded. However, this ignores the fact that the United States Navy and Merchant Marine remained steadfast in actions protecting American interests overseas during the Great Depression. In fact, the United States held trade with China in high regard decades prior to Imperial Japan’s false-flag operation to invade Manchuria in 1931. Beginning in the 1890s, the United States viewed the European powers vying for preferential trade agreements with China with suspicion. As a result, American Secretary of State John Hay proposed an Open-Door Policy which sought to “to remove possible causes of international irritation and reestablish confidence so essential to commerce.”

[Furthermore, international powers pledge to] in no way interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called “sphere of interest” or leased territory they may have in China.” This policy was later codified into international law via the Nine-Power Treaty in 1922, of which Imperial Japan was a signatory. Prior to the Japanese invasion of China, the American Navy dispatched gunboats along the Yangtze River to patrol and protect American business interests and ports protected by the Nine-Power Treaty. When Japan invaded China, in violation of the Nine-Power Treaty, the United States refused to recognize the Japanese puppet state in Manchuria and remained determined to sail within China with due regard for preestablished law. As atrocities were committed against the Chinese, ships of the Yangtze Patrol embarked civilians and American diplomats from the area. As American vessels of the Yangtze Patrol evacuated people from Nanking, the Imperial Japanese military attacked and sunk the USS Panay and other American merchant ships resulting in the deaths of five people and the wounding of 48 more. The continued atrocities committed by the Imperial Japanese eventually led to the United States placing an embargo on war materials and later oil and gasoline in 1940.

In the Atlantic Ocean, the United States Navy and Merchant Marine played a more direct role in supplying the United Kingdom against Nazi tyranny. In fact, scholars from the United States Naval Academy contend that “U.S. Navy entered World War II on 5 September 1939 when the CNO, Admiral Harold R. Stark, initiated Neutrality Patrol operations in the Caribbean and in waters 200 miles off the coasts of North and South America. During 1940, the Navy conducted battleship sweeps deep into the Atlantic to deter Axis surface raiders and U-boats from entering the Neutrality Zone.” The activation of the ironically named “Neutrality Zone” saw the increased deployment of naval assets in the Atlantic to protect American interests.

Furthermore, American merchant policies were amended as the Nazi military continued its offensives in Europe. For instance, after the Nazi annexation of Czechoslovakia in March of 1939, the United States allowed the export of arms and munitions under a “Cash-and-Carry” program. The initial program, which facilitated the export of general materials to countries that happened to be at war, allowed for said states to purchase raw goods and other manufactured products as long as they purchase these goods in cash and transport their purchases on ships respective to the buyer’s country. Later, in 1940, the United States struck a deal with the United Kingdom which traded American naval destroyers for leases of British naval bases in Newfoundland and the Caribbean. Ultimately, the support for the United Kingdom culminated in the Lend-Lease Program in March of 1941 that saw the United States “lend” critical war supplies to the United Kingdom for deferred payments.

The United States, prior to the Second World War, utilized its industrial and maritime strength to promote democratic ideals abroad at a time when they were at risk. The current Lend-Lease Act will provide Ukrainians with vital supplies and keep America out of open conflict with Russia. As shown, the United States does not historically cower in the face of aggression but counters it strategically through diplomatic actions. To believe the fallacies of isolationism and neutrality is to believe in the prolonging of war. Thus, it remains critical to heed President Roosevelt’s warning that “No man can tame a tiger into a kitten by stroking it. There can be no appeasement with ruthlessness. There can be no reasoning with an incendiary bomb.”

Connor L. Mitchell is a military historian and a recent graduate of American University, receiving an M.A. in History and a B.A. in Political Science. His research focuses include the strategic and tactical history of the Cold War and American foreign and military policy of the 20^th century. His work has been published in the Small Wars Journal and he has contributed to an archival project for the U.S. Army War College.

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The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.