THE MOC

The term “infernal machine” has been used to label many warfare innovations but in naval warfare it was often used to describes mines or torpedoes in the 19th century. As these weapons became more capable, they were seen as a serious threat to capital ships in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The torpedo boat menace was written about extensively in popular novels of the day, and the weapon was seen as a “game changer” for weaker powers unable to build large, armored warships. Fear of torpedo boat attack, especially at night and in poor weather conditions haunted the fleet commanders of the day.

The Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron proceeding from the Baltic to the Pacific on its eventual doomed effort to revive Russian fortunes in the East was so fearful of night torpedo attack that it fired on British trawlers working the Dogger Bank fishing grounds, killing several British seamen. The fear of the torpedo boat was eventually mitigated through the installation of rapid-fire secondary guns that later had a record of mixed results in defeating attacking torpedo craft. Fleet strategy was forever altered because they operate in a less permissive environment, but ultimately small torpedo craft did not achieve the results promised by their developers.

Today’s unmanned surface drone craft occupies a similar space to that of the manned torpedo craft from 125 years ago, and while dangerous, it too can be deterred and potentially defeated through the addition of other capabilities to existing ships. Submarine drones, like their manned counterparts remain a more dangerous threat.

The Torpedo Boat Menace

From the late 1880s through the end of the First World War, the torpedo-armed surface craft appeared just as much a threat to the surface battle line as its submarine variant later became. Armed first with explosives designed to detonate on contact, and later with self-propelled torpedoes, the torpedo boat quickly became a popular addition to navies of second and third rank powers.

The first purpose-built torpedo boat was the HMS Vesuvius of 1874. The first vessel sunk by self-propelled torpedo was the armored frigate Blanco Encalada, sunk by a British-built torpedo gunboat on April 23rd, 1891. This quickly begat the “torpedo boat destroyer” whose original purpose was to defend ironclads and later pre-dreadnaught battleships from such attacks. When he took command of the British Mediterranean Fleet in 1898, Admiral Sir John Fisher purposely restructured that formation’s operations and tactics, specifically in longer range gunfire and quick-fire guns to sink enemy torpedo boats before they could get close enough to launch their weapons.

Other battlefleets followed suit as the torpedo boat further proved itself in the Russo-Japanese War, and specifically in the Battle of Tsushima strait, sinking the older Russian battleships Navarin and Sissoi Veliky and damaging the armored cruisers Admiral Nakhimov and Vladimir Monomakh to the point that they were later scuttled to avoid capture. Only three Japanese torpedo boats were lost in return. Navies like the German, French, American and Japanese that had previously bought torpedo boats or their larger “destroyer” cousins bought more. Torpedo nets designed to thwart torpedo attacks at anchor appeared on ships and are still used to defend ports like Sevastopol. Admiral Fisher was so convinced in the power of the torpedo that he created a naval strategy and force design where torpedo boat destroyer and submarine flotillas with the torpedo as their primary weapon, and not battleships would be the primary defenders of the British homeland. In staff work just before the war, future British Grand Fleet Commander Admiral Sir John Jellicoe estimated that if Royal Navy battleships remained on a constant course for more than six minutes within range of torpedoes that they would suffer heavy damage. The torpedo seemed poised to eliminate larger surface warships from the order of battle.

But Large Surface Ships Persist

Nonetheless, torpedo boats, destroyers, and submarines did not bring an end to larger warships despite the torpedo’s clear ability to sink capital ships. Torpedo targeting was difficult in rough weather, and torpedo boats and destroyers had poor seakeeping that did not allow them to remain in conditions weathered better by larger warships. Smaller craft claimed few victims in both the First and Second World Wars, as larger combatants added more small weapons, searchlights, and their own screens of destroyers to launch torpedo counter attacks. Only two older battleships – one British and one German – were sunk by torpedo-firing surface craft at sea in World War I.

For unprepared surface ships, torpedo boats remained a threat. British Royal Navy torpedo boats attacking the unprepared Soviet Baltic Fleet at Kronstadt in 1919 sank two cruisers and a battleship. Submarines, however, posed a greater threat and submarine launched torpedoes. For example, they accounted for more large aircraft carrier losses than any other weapon system, accounting for two of four large U.S. carriers and three of five large Royal Navy carriers sunk in World War II. By contrast, the American PT Boat, such as the famous PT-109 commanded by future President John F. Kennedy, sank no large surface combatants during the conflict.

Small warships like torpedo and now missile boats often appear the best choice for tactical combat but do not fit into wider strategic and operational level of war choices. Large surface warships with extended endurance are essential to any power operating away from home shores and playing an “away game” as U.S. forces almost always do. Small warships that can be easily transported and deployed in support or defense of larger ships can, however, be a force multiplier and they bring the conversation back to the question of unmanned platforms. The kind of surface and air drones used by the Ukrainians to attack Russian Black Sea Fleet forces last month can also defend larger manned ships needed for global presence and campaigning.

Just as battleships before World War I acquired screens of torpedo boat destroyers – the ancestors of today’s large surface combatants like the Arleigh Burke class destroyer – today’s surface warships ought to field screens of surface and aviation drones that can act together in a swarm for both attack and defense. Some elements of warfare change due to new capabilities, such as sea-based aviation and submarines, but some remain surprisingly familiar. It is time to equip today’s warships with their own screen of air and surface drones for combat operations. Early destroyers protected capital ships and changed the tactical calculus of commanders in the age of the dreadnoughts. Today’s unmanned surface, subsurface, and aviation drones, deployed for larger warships can act in a similar way in offensive and defensive roles for expeditionary forces. As a young officer in 1873, after observing torpedo experiments, Admiral Fisher wrote, “the result of my observations was that in my opinion the Torpedo has a great future before it and that mechanical training will in the near future be essential for officers.” The same can now be said for unmanned systems.

Dr. Steven Wills is the Navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy. His research and analysis centers on U.S. Navy strategy and policy, surface warfare programs and platforms, and military history.

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The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.